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STATEMENT OF CASE
The original complaint in this action was filed August 18, 1937. Ten persons were named as plaintiffs; two
corporations and four individuals personally and doing
business under an assumed name were named as defendants. Each plaintiff claimed a cause of action against
each defendant.
The demurrer filed by this appellant was overruled,
(Tr. 176) and defendant answered. This answer was
filed November 15, 1938. Thereafter and on the 2~d day
of March, 1939, an amended complaint was filed (Abs. 2),
with twelve plaintiffs joined, each alleging a separate
and distinct cause of action against each of said defendants. This appellant demurred to the amended complaint
(Abs. 15) and after the overruling of said demurrer by
the Court (Abs. 23) filed its answer to the amended
complaint on March 27, 1939 (Abs. 23).
After the case had been tried on its merits, a memorandum decision was filed (see Abs. 259) dismissing the
action as to three plaintiffs and all of the defendants,
except only the appellant. Injunctive relief was denied
the remaining plaintiffs but the Court retained jurisdiction over the remaining plaintiffs, nine in number, and
permitted them to further amend their complaint. Thereafter and on June 22, 1939, a supplemental complaint was
filed (Abs. 27) in which there were the nine remaining
plaintiffs joined, together with two of the former plaintiffs against whom the action had been dismissed, against
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the appellant as the only defendant. (see Abs. 259). Demurrer (Abs. 39) was likewise filed to the supplemental
complaint and overruled (Abs. 46) and a motion to strike
the paragraphs of the supplemental complaint relating
to the two plaintiffs against whom the action had previously been dismissed (Abs. 45) was denied {Abs. 46)
and an answer to the supplemental complaint was filed
on July 3, 1939. ( Abs. 47).
After the trial on the supplemental complaint, the
action of Edward M. Beck, otherwise known as Reed
Beck, was dismissed for the second time (Abs. 402), and
judgment was rendered in favor of the remaining ten
plaintiffs, including the plaintiff Maylan Carter, against
whom the action had previously been dismissed.
The complaint as filed ( Abs. 2) alleges that the
plaintiffs are the owners in severalty of ''homes, yards
and farms'' situate in a locality ''distant from general
traffic and industrial manufacture where the inhabitants
are chiefly engaged in farming and agricultural pursuits,'' and at a distance of from five rods to half a
mile from the property of the defendant; that ''this locality has for more than fifty years last past been distinguished as a residential and farming section''; ''that
said locality is especially valuable for residential purposes.''
It is then alleged in the complaint that the defendant
manufactures fertilizing materials and other animal byproducts, from which operations odors float over the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
property of plaintiffs and into their homes, rendering
the same unfit for residential purposes, thereby diminishing the market value of the homes and land of the
plaintiffs. The prayer is for an injunction.
The appellant~s answer (Abs. 23) denied the material allegations of plaintiffs' complaint and alleged (Abs.
26) that because of the nature of the community, the defendant's rendering plant was a necessary aid to the
comfort of the community in disposing of carcasses and
offal that was exposed on the surface and permitted to
rot; that the lands of the plaintiffs and defendant are
industrial rather than residential properties; that they
are contiguous to the main line of the Oregon Short Line
Railroad Company, in a location where there are a pea
vinery, a sugar factory, and feed yards for live stock;
that the defendant had operated its rendering plant for
five years prior to a fire, and rebuilt it after the fire in
the same location; that the plaintiffs' actions are barred
by laches and the statute of limitations ;(Par. 11 answer of
def. trans. p. 53) (Par. 9 answer to amend complaint Abs.
27) ; that some of the plaintiffs moved upon the lands
in the vicinity of the plant and constructed homes
thereon since the defendant commenced operations. Appellant further alleged that there is a misjoinder of parties plaintiff and a misjoinder of causes of action, and
that there is a defect in parties plaintiff, because there
are many persons other than the plaintiffs directly interested in the ownership of the properties alleged to be
affected.
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The case came on for trial on the 3rd day of April,
1939 (Abs. 49). On the 7th of June, 1939 (Abs. 384),
the Court made its memorandum decision in which the
Court found, made and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law (Abs. 392), wherein the Court concludes
that the plaintiffs are not entitled to have the defendant
enjoined from operating the plant, but plaintiffs should
be entitled to recover damage for loss or injury suffered
and to be suffered by them as owners of the homes or
lands adjacent to defendant's plant. The Court retained
jurisdiction and permitted the parties to amend their
pleadings (Abs. 259, 393), and to put in additional evidence upon the question of damages to which plaintiffs
might be entitled.
On the 17th of October, 1939, the cause came on for
hearing on the supplemental pleadings, and additional
evidence on the question of damage was adduced (Abs.
260).
Whereupon the Court adopted its findings and conclusions of June 7, 1939 (Abs. 393), and then entered
findings with reference to damage in each of the ten
separate cases.
Appellant will now discuss each of the ten causes
of action separately.
THOMAS LUDLOW testified (Abs. 57):
His occupation is farming, cattle and sheep;
his home is located 200 rods west and 10 rods
north of defendant's plant; he has 40 acres with
a home, garage, three chicken coops, barn and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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wash house; the fair, reasonable market value
of his lands "yith improvements is $10,000 (Abs.
58).
(It is alleged in the complaint that his property is
worth $12,000 ( Abs. 4, 29).
He gets the odors from the plant maybe
two days a week (Abs. 58); it is an unpleasant
smell; none of his family has b~en sick from it
(Abs. 59); he has manure on his farm (Abs. 94);
the house is forty years old (Abs. 95), worth $2,500 ; the barns, chicken coops, etc. $1,500; the barn
is probably 150 feet from the house; part of the
barn yard is between the house and the barn ;
cows are kept in the barn yard; the manure is
cleaned out t\vice a year and hauled away once
a year; Exhibit 4 is a part of his yard (Abs. 96);
dead sheep are burned on his place and dead
horses and cows go to defendant's plant; he has
pelted as high as 50 sheep in one or two days;
defendant's Exhibit 3 looks like a place on the
ranch ; there are dry bones from three head of
sheep~ Exhibit 11 pictures the improvements
around his horne (Abs. 97) ; Exhibit 12 shows his
barn; there could be dead sheep in the corral;
the odor of manure is not offensive to him (Abs.
98); Earl Ludlow's yard, Exhibit 10, is 40 rods
from his house; he hauled 426 tons of beets last
year; he takes all the pulp from the sugar factory; the beet pulp has an unpleasant odor; it
bothers people a little; it doesn't bother him; the
defendant's plant used to be a brick yard; the
brick yard and the sugar factory were running at
the same time (Abs. 99); the center of population
of Benjamin is one-half mile south and a mile
west from his home ; he sold carcasses to the
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defendant; neighbors' animals are picked up as
soon as they are dead and hauled over to the defendant (Abs. 100); the last two years he has
sold the defendant three horses, a cow, and a calf
and has disposed of sheep which died in the last
two n1onths (Abs 101); the beet pulp is beneficial
to him; all the beef feeders feed it (Abs. 102) ; he
has 200 loads of manure on his place at one time;
he feeds 2,000 head of sheep, 40 head of beef; hii
business is feeding live stock ( Abs. 253).
On this evidence of the plaintiff the Court awarded
this plaintiff $1,360 (Abs. 396), more than 50% of the
original value of the home which is more than 40 years
old.
EARL LUDLOW testified:
He feeds stock; his home is 200 rods northwest from defendant's plant; he has 20 acres
(Abs. 130); the odors from the plant occur eve.ry
time they get a breeze from the east (Abs. 131);
Exhibit 10 is a picture of his barn yard; the stuff
in the foreground is manure; he has sold appellant a few pelts; he has bought three sacks
of tankage and fed it to his pigs, 300 feet from
his house; where they feed this tankage it smells
(Abs. 132) ; he gave $6,000 for this farm of 20
acres fourteen years ago to his father; he thinks
it is now worth $9,500; his four children, his wife
and liimself are healthy; they have never called a
doctor on account of the smell; he paid his father
at the rate of $300 an acre for this land (Abs. 133).
In the complaint it is alleged that his property is
worth $7,000 (Abs. 7, 30). On this testimony the Court
allowed Earl Ludlow $920.00 (Abs. 397}.
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EDWIN B. (or Ed,vard) SELENE testified:
He is a forn1er e1nployee of defendant, and
worked in defendant's plant (Abs. 73); is now
'vorking for ~Ir. Greer, likewise a forn1er employee of the con1pany (Abs. 49), in a competitive business ( . .\bs.
.
54, 55); acquired the property
in 1931 ; the deed stated a consideration of $3,000;
he paid $7,000 but this included water from the
Stra-,vberry Reservoir (Abs. 72); 17.69 acres; his
land is 30 rods from defendant's plant; he is
bothered by the odor and by the rats (Abs. 70);
values his house at $2,000 and his farm at $200 an
acre; his chicken coops, granary and barn are
worth fifteen or sixteen hundred dollars (Abs. 74);
eight shares of water worth $100 a share; his
present occupation is selling and handling pelts
and hides; he maintains a pelt house in Salem;
Exhibit 8 and 9 are pictures of his premises as
now located (Abs. 75); he never called a doctor
into his home on account of the odors (Abs. 73).
The Court awarded this plaintiff $2,176 damage
(Abs. 397) which represents more than one hundred per
cent of the value of his home as fixed by himself (Abs.
74). Not the slightest damage was shown to his land or
to his farm improvements. His farm is contiguous to
the railroad right of way. When he moved away temporarily he had no difficulty in renting it. He testified
his land grew just as large and abundant crops now as it
did before the plant was there (Abs. 74).
The cause of action of Mr. Selene is essentially
different from the cause of action of either of the Ludlows. Mr. Selene worked for the defendant and helped
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build up its business as an employee in its present location in close proximity to his home. He is estopped not
only from claiming the right to enjoin the business, but
from claiming any damages at law on the business which,
as an employee, he helped to establish.
Mr. Selene, as the principal agitator of this law
suit, brought into the case his employer, Mr. Greer, and
relied upon his testimony.
MR. GREER testified:
That he built the original plant for the defendant; he bought the land from the people who
owned and operated it previously as a brick yard
(Abs. 49); he helped build the defendant's plant
in 1933; the plant continued until the fire (Abs.
50).
It was stipulated that the date of the fire was April
8, 1937 (Abs. 76).
The construction of the old plant was corrugated iron and cement; the new plant is brick and
concrete; the cookers are the same kind of cookers
as in the old plant and he thinks about the same
capacity; the defendant has added entrail washers; outside of that the machinery and equipment
is practically all the same ; these odors arise from
the cooking (Abs. 52) ; from 1934 to 1938 he
bought pelts anywhere in the State of Utah he
could and stored them in Salem; he worked six
or seven years for defendant in a rendering plant
before he came to Spanish Fork; after six years'
experience as an employee of this defendant he
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selected this old brick yard as a suitable site for
the defendant to begin doing business (Abs. 54) ;
within a year and a half after they started operations they actually started rendering carcasses in
the Spanish Fork rendering plant ( Abs. 55) ; Edwin Selene is working for him now on a commission basis ( Abs. 56) ; the pea vinery is closer
to the center of Benjamin than this defendant's
plant; when he selected this site 'he personally
took into consideration where the population of
Benjan1in was; it was in April, 1933 that he went
there to locate this site ( Abs. 57).
It is a singular thing that this first "\Vitness upon
which the plaintiffs rely should have selected the site as
a suitable site for the business of the defendant, and that
all of the plaintiffs should have stood by from April,
1933 until the commencement of this action and rendered
no complaint against the plant until two of the former
employees of the plant should find themselves in competition with the appellant, one of them becoming the leading plaintiff and the other the leading witness. It is certainly to be inferred and to be argued that they would
have no difficulty in inducing the rest of the plaintiffs
to join them in this action when they held out the possibility of collecting damages against the defendant for
something which had not otherwise bothered them all
these years, arising out of the operation of a business
which naturally adapted itself to the stock-feeding carried on in the neighborhood, and in part as an incident to
the sugar factory and the pea vinery which produced the
feed for the animals to be fed in the yards of the plaintiffs. Certainly the lower court erred in giving to the
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plaintiff Edwin Selene more than one hundred percent
of the value of the home, as fixed by the plaintiff himself,
in damages, when the evidence of the plaintiff himself
shows that the plaintiff was able to lease the home immediately upon his vacating the same (Abs. 73), with the
plant present and in operation. Some value must be
attributed to the home on account of this evidence alone,
to say nothing of the evidence of the experts of the defendant as well as the plaintiffs.
The only possible conclusion that can be drawn from
the amount of damage allowed by the Court to this
plaintiff is that the Court allowed damages to the land,
the chicken coops, the barn, pig pen and other outbuildings incident to the maintenance of the place as a farm
in an industrial center, namely, a center for the feeding
of live stock.
To allow damages to the land or any improvements
other than the home is contrary to the evidence of the
plaintiff himself. It is clear, therefore, that the damages
allowed by the Court to this plaintiff were excessive and
unreasonable, even were we to assume the right of this
plaintiff to recover damages at all.
MARGARET D. HANSEN:
Heber Eugene Hansen, the son of the plaintiff, testified (Abs. 123) that there are nineteen
and a fraction acres in this plaintiff's name and
the remaining sixteen acres in the estate of Heber
J. Hansen, deceased, not a party plaintiff. He
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lives on this 35 acres and is now farming it; he
is not a party to this action. The home is approx~
imately eighty rods southwest fro1n defendant's
plant; the hon1e is t"~enty eight years old; there
is a barn, chicken coop, garage, coal shed, grain
bins, thousand bushel granary, corrals and sheds;
he has a full "\Yater right. He couldn't say how
many shares of water belongs to his father's estate. The value of the lands and improvements
is $10,000 (.A. bs. 123). The odors come into his
home; .neither he nor his wife or children have
been made sick by it; they are all well; it is intermittent and it is disagreeable (Abs. 124); he
is bothered by rats and flies (Abs. 125); he purchases tankage from the defendant plant and
feeds it to his hogs; he has sold an animal to the
plant to be killed for fox feed. The home is worth
$5,000; the farm improvements $2,100; the water
$3,000 (Abs. 126). He has been in the plant to
use the scales of the defendant; from his home he
smells the odor of the plant, and not the sump
near the plant (Abs. 127). Exhibit 5 is a picture
of the home; there is manure in the foreground
(Abs. 128); his cattle have access to his whole
yard at present; his pig pen is approximately
five rods south of the water; the house is 200
feet from the corral and 300 feet from the pig
pen; the pigs have access to the water in the
corral shown in Exhibit 5; Exhibit 6 is a picture
of the same corral; Exhibit 2 is the interior of
the defendant's plant. Odors from the barn yard
and pig pen never bother him; he has seen rat
nests around his place ( Abs. 129).
The Court allowed this plaintiff $1,124.40 damage
(Abs. 398). It is impossible to ascertain either from the
findings or the decree what portion of this damage was
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due to damage to the home, to the farm improvements,
to the water rights, or to the land. This home of the
plaintiff is about as far away from the plant as the home
of Ludlow. In the Ludlow case the Court allowed more
than 50% of the value of the home, and in this Hansen
case the Court has allowed a little more than 20% of the
value of the home, if we charge the entire amount of
damage to the home itself.
If there is any difference in these two causes of action, it would seem that the advantage should go to the
Hansen case rather than the Ludlow, because in the Ludlow case the plaintiff was really operating an industry
of feeding more than 2,000 head of sheep and 40 head of
cattle as a feed yard immediately adjoining his home.
While it is true that the Hansens are raising live stock
on their place, they have only twenty five acres, as
against 40 acres of T. E. Ludlow, and could not accommodate as many cattle, but nevertheless their property
is located within the same industrial area in which the
feeding of live stock is the principal industry, operated
in connection with the pea vinery, the sugar factory and
the railroad.
The supplemental complaint describes 25.80 acres.
The testimony of the son is that there are nineteen and
a fraction acres belonging to the mother and sixteen
acres to the father's estate. The Court makes no finding
of fact as to how many acres there are upon which damages are allowed. In Finding of Fact No. 10 (Abs. 398),
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the Court simply says that at the time of the trial of this
case the value of the 25.80 acres of land etc. would be
$7,94!. The Court no doubt took into consideration the
value the son placed upon the thirty five acres, as well
as the values placed upon the 'vhole farm by the various
witnesses testifying as to values. It cannot be detertnined from the findings upon what the damages of
$1124.40 are found to exist, or which of the thirty five
acres the 25.80 acres are. Certainly under the evidence
as it stands, the Court could not have awarded damage
to the plaintiff on more than nineteen and a fraction
acres. If the estate is to recover any damages on the
sixteen acres, it would have had to be made a party to
the suit. Living on the property the son suffered the
injury the mother is awarded the damage. The son could
still sue.
JOHN ANGUS testified:
He lives less than half a mile west of the defendant's plant; he has eight acres and rents
eight acres; he has rented the eight acres adjoining the plant of the defendant for three years; he
has a home, two chicken coops, granary, garage
and blacksmith shop, a barn, and flowing wells.
This is farming land; he grows hay, grain, sugar
beets. The value runs from $2,500 to $3,000
(Abs. 87).
He purchased the property either in 1929 or
1930, paid $535 for the land, 7.82 acres. Since
1933 at the time of the commencement of defendant's business he has built two chicken coops and
a well on the property; they are now worth $400 ;
he did most of the building; the original lumber
bill was $300; the blacksmith shop was moved
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onto the place four or five years ago ; its present
value is $30 or $50.
He started building a home in 1930; the home
when it was completed had cost him $1,250; it
cost him $350 to drive a well; electric lights cost
$120; there is nothing else to speak of (Abs. 89).
He has five children, ages 24 to 9 ; they are all
healthy; his wife and he are healthy. The rats in
this vicinity breed in the grain fields around Benjamin; they are the kind of rats you see everywhere; the odor fro1n the plant is stronger when
they are cooking (Abs. 90); the smell which comes
from the plant is a cooked smell (Abs. 91).
They had flies before the plant came; the
flies are worse now; he has lived all of these years
that this plant has been in operation and made
these improvements; his family has continued to
live there and grow up and be healthy (Abs. 93).
This plaintiff was awarded $824.00 damage (Abs.
398). Although the plaintiff in his complaint alleges
the total value of his property at $3,000 ( Abs. 5, 31), and
himself testifies that the value of his property runs
around $2,500 or $3,000, the Court in its eleventh finding
of fact finds the value to be $3,568.50 (Abs. 398), $568.50
more than the highest amount claimed by the plaintiff
and a like amount higher than the amount alleged in the
complaint. The damage of $824 represents substantially
more than fifty percent of the cost of the home, namely,
$1,250, or $1,370 with electric lights.
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JOHN ANDERSON testified:
He lives about thirty rods north of defendant's plant; he started to build in 1934 after the
defendant's plant was built; his wife and five
children have lived with hin1 at this place ever
since he built it; he owns five and one-half acres
of land (Abs. 108) with a water right; improvements are a home, chicken coop, shed, barn, pig
pen, granary; the present value of the place is
$3,000.
He worked at the plant until April1937, at the
time the old plant burned down; he worked in the
construction of the new plant whenever they
needed an extra man.
They get odors whenever the cooker is in
operation; it has never really made him sick
(Abs. 109); they have flies and rats at their home;
he got accustomed to the smell when he worked
for the defendant; he didn't hesitate to accept
employment from the plant from time to time
whenever there was employment; he accepted the
defendant's money for his services; he lived in
his home while he was working at the plant; he
built it there after the plant was established; when
he worked at the plant he did some of the cooking
(Abs. 110); the new plant is no worse than the old
one he operated; he has used the new cookers; he
doesn't know the difference in the construction
of the present plant over the old one ; he thinks
they have some new machinery; the only smell he
smelled was made while he was cooking; the rat
situation has not improved or got worse since
1934; he helped build this new plant and saw the
kind of construction it was ; he thinks the building
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is rat proof; the bone pile is where the rats are;
the bone pile is no different now from what it
was when he first moved there (Abs. 111); the
flies get into his house the same as other people's.
There are no more flies there now than there were
before the old plant burned down (Abs. 112);
there are meats on the inside of the plant that
gather the flies; on the outside there are manure
and bones; the cooking of fresh meat will have
just as bad odor as the cooking of the dead meat;
he lived at this place from the time he built the
home until !{arch, 1939, without instituting any
suit for the removal of the plant; he didn't complain to the defendant company or any of its management while he was working at the plant or
living in his home about their maintaining this
plant there, and he didn't make any complaint to
the owner when they' hired him to help rebuild it
after the fire.
His five and a half acres are worth $200 an
acre with the water; it is good land and raises
good crops, just as good now as when he bought
it, and produces just as much produce. Chicken
coops, sheds, etc. are worth $210 (Abs 113); four
and a half acre feet of Strawberry water are worth
$100 a share; and four and a half shares of river
water worth $100 a share; they get drinking water
from the well that is located on defendant's property; they have the permission of the manager
to use the drinking water. None of this property
stands in his name; it is in his wife's name. (Abs.
114).
This is the testimony of this witness. His wife is not
a party to the suit. In spite of this testimony the Court
finds, Finding No. 12 (Abs. 398), that at the time of the
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trial of this case the value of the five acres of land described in the supplemental complaint as belonging to
John Anderson, including improvements thereon, would
be $2,200; that said lands and improvements of John
Anderson will be depreciated in market value to the
extent of $1,050 and said plaintiff will be damaged in
said sum if defendant's plant continues to operate. There
is a finding of fact that John Anderson is the owner, but
the evidence is conclusive to the effect that John Anderson was not the owner of the property and had no
right to collect any damage. His wife was the proper
party plaintiff, and if this judgment were allowed to
stand and defendant were compelled to pay it, there
would be nothing to prevent the wife of this plaintiff
from suing to recover on a cause of action which is hers
and which is in no wise satisfied by the findings, conclusions or decree herein entered. Furthermore, it is to be
noted that the plaintiff's own evidence shows that the
total value of his property is $3,000, $1,100 of which is
land, $900 of which is water, $210 of which is farm improvements (Abs. 113), leaving only a balance of $790
for the value of the home. The amount of damage allowed
Mr. Anderson, an employee of the defendant company,
and who assisted the defendant in building even the new
plant, is substantially more than the total value of the
home. This home of the plaintiff, built since the plant
was constructed, is dependent upon the industrial property which was purchased by the defendant from the
brick yard for industrial purposes; this plaintiff gets
his culinary supply of water from this industrial source
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and continues so to do while suing the defendant for the
maintenance of the industry which gives him his culinary
water.
It would appear that the Court had increased the
damage in this case because of the fact that the house
was built after the plant was established, whereas we
will endeavor to show that in purchasing this property
and building upon it after the establishment of the. plant,
and while he was employed by the plant, he defeats any
possible claim he might have for damages resulting from
the operation of the plant, even if he, rather than someone else, were the owner of the property. It is to be
noted here that this is not a suit for the temporary inconvenience of this plaintiff as a mere resident upon
these premises, but is a suit to reimburse the owner of
the premises for the difference in value of the premises
with the plant operating and with the plant eliminated.
This is a cause of action that can belong only to the
owner of the land, if at all.
This action was dismissed as to Maylan Carter,
Edward M. Beck and James Albert West, original plaintiffs in this action (Abs. 259). Thereafter, and without
leave of Court, Maylan Carter and Edward M. Beck were
included in the supplemental complaint. With the principal action dismissed as to these two plaintiffs, it is
impossible to see how the Court could ultimately award
tnem judgment on the basis of the supplemental complaint without having first reinstated them as plaintiffs
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in the original action. To what was their complaint supplemental~

All of the evidence in the original proceedings is
relied upon by the Court in avvarding these two plaintiffs
in the supplemental complaint the judgment allowed
them. Furthermore, each of these plaintiffs claims
to be the owner of real estate upon which there are no
improvements.
MAYLAN CARTER testified:
That he owns a tract of land across the railroad tracks from the plant (Abs. 320); he paid
$225 per acre straight through; he has received
the same rental from this property for the past
fifteen years ; he hasn't lost any money on the land
since the plant came there; he has received just
as much income from it since as before; he can
continue leasing his property for as much now
as before the plant came; that he figured when
he bought it it was worth $225 an acre as farm
land; it is not the best residential property in the
world next to the railroad; it is good farm land
but poor residential land; he didn't remember
whether the brick yard was there when he bought
the land or not (Abs. 323).
For this the Court allowed Mr. Carter $646.60 damage (Abs. 399). The allowance of such a damage, even
if the right to damage were established, would be contrary to the evidence of this plaintiff himself, in which
he says that he bought the land for farm land and as
such it has not been damaged.
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EDWARD LUDLOW testified:
He is a butter maker; lives in Benjamin and
owns ten acres adjacent to the plant immediately
on the south; the ground around there is worth
$300 to $500 an acre; he farmed it himself until
the last three years; the last three years he has
rented it; the land has a water right (Abs. 134);
the rats, squirrels and gophers are bad there
(Abs. 135); he doesn't know whether the odors
come from the plant or its surroundings; the
record title in these ten acres is not in him; it
hasn't been for about two years; it hasn't been
since this law suit started. Sometimes the bone
pile is at the plant and sometimes it is gone;
Exhibit 10 would be a pretty good place to find
rats (Abs. 137), and Exhibit 8 would be a pretty
good place for them to breed; the situation in
Exhibit 9 would be conducive to rat breeding, and
Exhibit 6 shows another such place; he would say
rats would breed in places like that on Exhibit 5;
Exhibit 14 would be a good place for rats to live;
he has leased his farm for the last three years
and received rent for it; he wouldn't trade it for
Thomas Ludlow's (Abs. 138); he paid $250 an
acre in 1918; he is Thomas Ludlow's cousin;
second cousin to Earl Ludlow; his land is fertilized; there is a smell to it; it is the same kind of
barnyard manure that they have at the defendant's plant that he puts on his land and farm
(Abs. 139); the smell of manure from his barn
yard bothers him; he doesn't like the smell; that
is the smell that is objectionable to him on his
land; he wouldn't want a condition to exist like
that in Exhibit 10 in his own back door yard; he
aims to keep his yard cleaned up ; he doesn't want
to say there is no smell comes from the situation
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in Exhibit 9; doesn't want to say there is not
enough smell to get to the house shown in that
picture; he knows there would be; the flies have
al,vays been bad in farn1 communities in this
county and their cities too, as far as that is concerned; he had just as 1nany flies at his home
before the plant came as he has now (Abs 140);
every year you would have an increase of the
number of manure piles and barn yards in Benjamin; with every extra barn yard he would expect
to find a few extra manure piles, a few extra flies
and rats; he has done business with this plant,
bought fertilizer and sold them dead animals; he
thinks it better to burn his animals up than to
bury them; he has had experience of rats getting
into dead animals; the recent tendency in this
county has been to take care of dead animals by
rendering them; this plant has served a useful
purpose (Abs. 141) in this county in getting rid of
dead animals ; the pea vinery is in Benjamin ;
there are some disagreeable odors emanate from
the pea vinery; he felt like closing his car window
as he went by it; he doesn't like that any more
than he likes the smell from the rendering plant;
there are some odors and some offensive odors
from the sugar factory; all of them go to make up
the community with its industrial life; all of the
industries that they have in Benjamin are really
an incident to farming and live stock business,
including this defendant's plant. This ten acres
gives him as good a return as anything else he
invested in; this property has never been for
sale in 21 years; it produces a fair return on $300
an acre (Abs. 142).
This piece of property has no home or improvements upon it and is in the same position as the Maylan
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Carter property. The Court allowed $427.87 damage
to this 8.15 acres of land because of the presence of the
plant. This damage is allowed to the father as plaintiff,
although the record title is admittedly in the son who is
not a party plaintiff. The land continues to be worth as
much as it was before, as farm land, and to produce as
many crops, and to bring in a fair return on $3000, when
the plaintiff only paid $2,037.50 for it. It is the best
investment he has.
There is no finding of fact and no evidence sustaining a finding of fact on which to allow an estimate of
damage on either the Maylan Carter or Edward Ludlow
case. The Court found this land to be worth $1,711.50
(Abs. 399).
RUFUS ANDERSON testified:
He lives 40 rods southwest of defendant's
plant (Abs. 117) with his wife and six children;
has 19.53 acres with full water right; the land is
under cultivation; improvements are chicken
coops, barn, pig pen, granary, garage and home;
he values the home and land at $7,000; experiences
the same odor in the new plant as with the old
(Abs. 118); he had rats there before the plant
came ; his chicken coops cost him $350 ; were built
in 1936, after the plant was built; his barn cost him
$75 or $175 and the granary $75; the garage, $50
(Abs. 119); he remodeled his home in 1935; it cost
him $1,200 in money; he judged he did $300 work
on it himself; he started remodeling in July and
finished in October, 1935; he rebuilt his home from
the foundation; he never tore out the old founda-
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tion; it 'vas built fron1 the old foundation up with
new foundation added on; the remodeling of the
house cost $1,400; he has 20 shares of water right
for his land 'vorth $50 a share ; the odor of the
plant woke him up fron1 his sleep last October;
since last October he hasn't been bothered at
nights 'vith the odor from the plant (Abs. 120) ; it
is the s1nell of the cookers that he smells; he may
get the odor for only a few minutes during the
whole day; he gets no odor from the sump (Abs.
121) ; he smells the pea vinery; it is the odor of decaying peas; he gets the odor of the beet pulp as it
is hauled along the highway; he feeds pulp to his
animals, so that he has it around him for certain
periods of the year quite a bit; he doesn't mind the
odor; he has ten pigs; he feeds garbage to his pigs,
throws it into an open trough 25 rods from his
house; he has never seen any rats on the land of
the defendant (Abs. 122).
In the 15th finding of fact (Abs. 400) the Court
makes a more detailed finding than in the previous findings pertaining to the other plaintiffs. In this finding
the Court finds that the value of the land, exclusive of
improvements, is $4,296.60, and the value of the improvements $3,100; that at the time the plant was built Rufus
Anderson's improvements were worth $1,200; that the
value of the land is depreciated twenty per cent by defendant's plant and the improvements forty per cent,
giving to Rufus Anderson $2,099.32 damage. This forty
per cent is based upon all of the improvements located on
the land at present, and the Court includes the value of
the improvements built since the defendant commenced
operations~
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Although Rufus Anderson alleges in his complaint
that the total value of his property is $7,000 (Abs. 5, 30),
and although he testifies in the case that the value of
Iris home and the land at the present time is $7,000 (Abs.
118), the Court finds his property to be worth $7,396.60.
This forty per cent depreciation on the $3,100 value
placed upon all of this plaintiff's improvements gives
the same depreciation to the barn, the granary, the
garage, the chicken coops, the pig pen and the shed as
to the house. There is no contention in the pleadings and
no evidence which would justify forty per cent depreciation upon chicken coops and pig pens in which there are
fed the products of the cooker in defendant's plant to
the chickens and the pigs, and which carries with it the
smell which is so objectionable to these plaintiffs. There
is only one possible element of damage, even on plaintiffs' theory of the case, and that is the disagreeableness
of the odor. So far as flies and rats are concerned, the
evidence is almost conclusive that that condition could
not be attributed any more to the defendant's plant than
to the conditions that exist around the plaintiffs' barnyards and premises. Many of the plaintiffs so testify,
as we have heretofore pointed out. This smell cannot
affect the value of anything other than the home. In
this 15th finding of fact (Abs. 400), there is no way of
determining what portion of $3,100 represents the home
and what represents farm outbuildings. This is the first
instance in the findings in which the Court has revealed
even in part, the basis upon which the damage awarded
has been computed. The same can be said about the
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twenty per cent depreciation of the land. So far as the
evidence shows, the land is just as valuable now with the
plant there as it would be with the plant removed. In
all of the other findings it is impossible to determine
what portion of the damage was allowed for damage
to the land.
PAUL E. SWARTZ testified:
His home is 130 or 140 rods north of the defendant's plant. He lives there with his wife and
four children ; has 30 acres of land, house, chicken
coops, garage, coal house and sheep corrals ; the
smell affects his sleeping and eating on occasions
(Abs. 103) ; he has sold the defendant a little wool
and maybe a calf hide or two; all the people who
live around the plant are engaged in farming, in
the poultry business and in dairying (Abs. 104);
it is his signature on Exhibit 13; he sold a cow to
the company on February 24, 1939; the cow was
not his; he lives close to the railroad track (Abs.
106) ; the smoke from the engines doesn't bother
him; he figures his 30 acres worth $6000 ; he has
30 shares of water worth $3,000; his land produces just as many crops as it ever produced; he
doesn't claim the odor from the plant or the
smoke from the plant injures the crops (Abs.
107); the chicken coop is as valuable now as it
was before; chicken coops are worth $2,000; his
shop is worth $60; he hasn't placed any value on
the corrals ; live stock consists of horses, cows,
pigs, a few sheep ; none of them died from the
odor (Abs. 108).
Mr. Swartz' property in the complaint is alleged to
be of the value of $10,000 (Abs. 6, 31) yet the Court, in
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Finding No. 16 (Abs. 401) finds its value to be $10,252.40
-$252.40 more than that claimed by the plaintiff. It is
impossible from the finding of the Court to tell whether
or not in the valuation of $5,252.40 placed on the land
without improvements the Court took into consideration
the $3,000 worth of water. This water is transferable to
other lands and could not under any circumstances be
damaged by the operation of the defendant's plant. Certainly there is no evidence to show any damage to the
value of the water. Although this plaintiff expressly
states that his land has not been injured in any way, the
Court allows twelve per cent of the value placed on the
land, which evidently includes the water, as damages,
and depreciates all of the improvements upon the land
twenty per cent as damages, when the plaintiff expressly
stated that his chicken coops are just as valuable now as
before. The Court has included twenty per cent of this
$2,000 in damages; in other words, the corrals of the
plaintiff, used in the business of feeding life stock, and
the chicken coops were damaged as badly as the home,
so far as the Court's finding is concerned. The Court
awarded the plaintiff Swartz $1,230 damage (Abs. 401).
It is interesting to compare the Court's fifteenth
and sixteenth findings of fact (Abs. 400, 401). From
these two findings it is clear that the Court allowed
damage for improvements placed upon the land between
the time the defendant originally began its operations
and the time it reconstructed this plant after the fire in
April, 1937, but has allowed no damages for improve-
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ments placed upon the lands of the plaintiff since the
fire in 1937. It is appellant's contention that no such
distinction can be drawn either in law or from the
facts; that if the rule of law applies to improvements
placed since the rebuilding of the plant immediately
after the fire, it "\Vouid likewise apply, and particularly
so in the case of Rufus Anderson, to improvements
which were placed on the land after the defendant began
operations in the beginning.
On the question of values, the evidence of the plaintiffs was supplemented by the following witnesses for
the plaintiff: P. P. Thomas (Abs. 260) ; C. E. Hawkins
(Abs. 287); L. M. Anderson (Abs. 306); and L. Johnson
(Abs. 324). ·
The testimony of these men was all given upon the
theory that this farm land was to be considered of primary value for homes and residences. No evidence was
given other than the evidence of plaintiffs themselves
with reference to the values of the lands in controversy
as industrial farm lands.
The witness for the defendant, C~ S. Woodward
(Abs. 183) and the witnesses T. H. Heal (Abs. 350),
Henry Jeppson (Abs. 366) and William Parry (Abs. 365)
who made a joint appraisal, found no damage to the
lands of plaintiffs· whose primary value was for indus . .
trial agricultural purposes.
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SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS RELIED
UPON FOR REVERSAL OF
JUDGMENT
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 1 to 44, INCLUSIVE (Abs. 414-424). Errors in overruling general and
special demurrer of defendant to amended and supplemental cornplaints of plaintiff.
1.

2. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 45 and 47 (Abs.
436, 437). Court's error in failing to grant defendant's
motion to strike the causes of action of Maylan Carter
and Edward Ludlow. These two causes of action involved lands with no improvements upon them.
3. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 48 (Abs. 437). The
Court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the
supplemental complaint of the plaintiffs.
4. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 46 AND 49 TO
76, INCLUSIVE. (Abs. 437-445). Errors assigned to rul-

ings upon evidence.
(a) Assignment of Error 46
erred in refusing the defendant
into the sicknesses of the family
termine what, if any, relationship
from defendant's plant.

(Abs. 437). The Court
the right to examine
of Paul Swartz to dethey bore to the odors

(b)_ Assignment of Error 49 (Abs. 437). Court's
refusal to receive in evidence defendant's Exhibits 18
and 18-A, exact copies of records contained in the office
of the County Assessor of Utah County, prepared and
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filed in that office by the Utah State Tax Commission
(Tr. 638), Exhibit 18 detailing the improvements upon
the property of Heber J. Hansen and Exhibit 18-A classifying the farm land. These exhibits were offered for
the purpose of showing one of the bases upon which Mr.
Woodward made his appraisal.
(c) Assignment of Error 50 (Abs. 437). Court's
refusal to receive in evidence defendant's Exhibits 102
to 112 ( Abs. 371-2), copies of records of the Utah State
Tax Commission containing the appraisal of properties,
description of improvements, classification of lands, all
based on fair market value as made by the State Tax
Commission for the years 1933 and 1934, showing that in
arriving at the value of improvements they took the
replacement or reproduction value as shown in the exhibits and deducted therefrom for their age. These are
part of the records made for the purpose of equalizing
the assessment of land in the various counties, and includes part of a state-wide survey, all based on fair
market value.
(d) Assignments of Error 51 and 52 ( Abs. 438).
The Court erred in refusing the evidence defendant offered to show the sanitary condition of the plant. (Abs.
220.)
(e) Assignment of Error 59 (Abs. 439). The Court
erred in denying defendant the right to cross examine
plaintiff's expert witness as to values T. M. Anderson,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32

as to what he took into consideration In making his
appraisal.

Assignments of Error 65 to 74, inclusive (Abs.
441-444). The Court erred in denying defendant the
right to offer evidence pertaining to the industrial nature
of the community in which defendant's plant is located.
(f)

Assignments of Error 75 and 76 (Abs. 444445). The Court erred in refusing defendant's offer to
prove 1929 to 1939 assessed valuation of plaintiffs' lands
and improvements.
(g)

5. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 77 TO 92, INCLUSIVE (Abs. 445 to 450). Errors in findings of fact:

(a)

Assignment of Error 77 (Abs. 445):

1. The Court erred in that it found the plaintiffs,
with the exception of Maylan Carter, to be the owners
of homes and farms.
2. The Court erred in finding that the operation
of defendant's plant and the use of its land as a place of
deposit of drainage from the plant causes noxious odors
to be discharged into the surrounding atmosphere.
3. The Court erred in iinding that the area occupied by defendant's plant cannot be classed as an industrial area.
4. The Court erred in finding that the odors emanating from defendant's plant injure plaintiffs by mak-
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ing their homes substantially less desirable as dwelling
places and by making their lands less attractive to tenants
and prospective purchasers of home sites.
(b) Assignment of Error 79 (Abs. 447). That the
Court erred in its fourth finding of fact (Abs. 395) that
the market value of lands of the plaintiffs has been depreciated by reason of the odors of the defendant's plant,
and that they have been made less desirable for home
sites.
(c) Assignment of Error 80 (Abs. 447). That the
Court erred in its fifth finding of fact ( Abs. 395) in finding that the lands of the plaintiffs are substantially less
desirable as dwelling places and substantially less at~
tractive to tenants and prospective purchasers of farms
or home sites on account of the odors.
(d) Assignment of Error 81 (Abs. 447). That the
Court erred in its sixth finding of fact in finding that
purchasers of such land as plaintiffs' are usually desirous of acquiring lands upon which homes can be maintained; that the odors from defendant's plant depreciate
the market value of farm lands adjacent to said plant.

Assignments of Error 82 to 91, inclusive (Abs.
448-450). The Court erred in finding ownership, value,
damage, in the case of each of the ten plaintiffs.
(e)

Assignment of Error 92 (Abs. 450). The Court
erred in its 17th Finding of Fact in finding that there
(f)
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was no difference in valuation of plaintiffs' properties
from the time defendant commenced operating its present
plant, and erred in failing to find the value at the time
defendant originally instituted its plant.
6. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 93 TO 95, INCLUSIVE (Abs. 451, 452). Errors in the Court's Conclusions of Law :

(a) Assignment of Error 93 (Abs. 451). That the
plant as operated and maintained constitutes a nuisance.
(Conclusion No. 1, Abs. 402.)
(b) Assignment of Error 94 (Abs. 451). That the
plaintiffs are entitled to recover damage in the amounts
set opposite their names. (Conclusion No. 3, Abs. 402.)
(c) Assignment of Error 95 (Abs. 452). That plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction unless damages are
paid in sixty days. (Conclusion of Law No.4, Abs. 403.)
7. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 96, 97, 98 (Abs.
452, 453). The Court erred in rendering the decree filed
herein.

8. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 99 (Abs. 454). The
Court failed to find on material issues:
(a) That the plant has benefited the health and
comfort of the community by the removal of exposed
carcasses and offal.
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(b) That since the operation of defendant's plant
Edward B. Selene has built improvements on his property; John Anderson has built his home; Rufus Anderson has entirely rebuilt his home from the foundation;
Paul E. Swartz has remodeled, rebuilt and added onto
his home.
(c) That plaintiffs have derived profit from the
building and operation of defendant's plant, purchased
products from defendant's plant for use on plaintiffs'
property in feeding cattle; that some of the plaintiffs
have helped reconstruct defendant's plant, and others
were employees of the defendant's plant.
(d) That the depression or sump complained of
was produced by the brick manufactory operating an
industry upon the property prior to defendant.
(e) That defendant operates the plant in a sanitary manner.
(f)

That the action was dismissed as to Maylan

Carter.
(g) That non-condensable gases produced by defendant's plant are consumed by the fire of the boiler
and do not go into the atmosphere.
(h) That screens have been installed in defendant's plant since the filing of the complaint.
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(i) That the value of plaintiffs' lands has not been
depreciated by defendant's plant.
(j) That the market value of plaintiff's improvements has not been depreciated by defendant's plant.

(k) That defendant's plant is located and operated
in an industrial area.
(l) That the defendant's plant is built in an area
heretofore used for beet loading and wool loading stations, located on the main line of the Union Pacific Railroad Company.
9. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 100 (Abs. 456).
The Court erred in denying defendant's motion for new
trial. (Abs. 409, 410.)

ARGUMENT
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 9 - DENIAL OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The first ground of appellant's motion for new trial
{Abs. 409) is that the damages are excessive and appear
to have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice.
For the Court's convenience we have prepared Exhibit A which we have printed and which appears in the
appendix to this brief. This exhibit gives in:

Column 1, the name of each plaintiff;
Column 2, the number of acres of farm land, as
taken from the findings of fact of the Court;
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Cohtmn 3, the distance of the plaintiffs' homes from
defendant's plant, as taken from the Court's findings;
Column 4, the value of the properties of the plaintiffs, as alleged in the complaint;
Column 5, the damages alleged in the complaint;
Column

6,

plaintiffs' testimony as to value ;

Column 7, the appraised value of the lands shown on
Exhibits 17 to 17-H, made by the State Tax Commission
in its state-wide re-appraisal, taken from the County
Assessor's office, appearing in the appendix to the
abstract;
Column 8, the value as fixed by the Findings of the
Court;
Column

9,

damages awarded by the Court;

Column 10, percent of Court's value allowed as
damages;
Column 11, the appraised value made by defendant's
witness, Charles S. Woodward; (Mr. Woodward appraised no damage, taking the position that the establishment of an industry in an industrial section tended to
increase the demand for homes for industrial workers,
and that the presence of this plant would enhance,
rather than detract from, the value of the real estate.)
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Column 12, appraisals of Heal, Parry and Jeppson,
the three appraisers selected by the defendant and whose
appraisals were given jointly. (They, like Mr. Woodward, appraised no damage.)
Column 13, appraised values of P. P. Thomas;
Column 14, appraised damages of P. P. Thomas;
Column 15, percent damages allowed by Thomas;
Column 16, appraised values of Hawkins;
Column 17, appraised damages of Hawkins;
Column 18, percent damages allowed by Hawkins;
Column 19, appraised values of Thomas Anderson;
Column 20, appraised damages of Thomas Anderson;
Column 21, percent damages of Anderson;
Column 22, appraised values of Lawrence Johnson;
Column 23, appraised damages of Lawrence Johnson. Mr. Johnson appraised only the real estate.
Column 24, percent damages allowed by Lawrence
Johnson.

THOMAS LUDLOW
It will appear from this exhibit that Thomas E.
Ludlow testified his properties were worth $10,000, al-
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though the complaint alleged $12,000. The Court finds
his property to be worth $10,400, $400 in excess of the
value placed upon the land by the plaintiff himself, and
on that value awarded Thomas E. Ludlow $1,360, which
is 13.2% of the value found by the Court. This is twotenths of a percent higher than the damages as appraised
by ~Ir. P. P. Thomas, the banker for many of the plaintiffs. In arriving at his appraisals, Mr. Thomas on
cross exanrination says:
He has experienced the odors from this plant
for eight or ten years; he is not familiar enough
with the odors to say whether over the ten-year
period there has been any change or not; he
frankly admits, ''I don't know as I know very
much about it. I have only experienced them from
a distance (Abs. 264), and still I have based these
estimated damages which I have made on the
odors.''
He knew there was a stink there that varies
from day to day, probably could vary from year
to year; he would say the smell is some kind of
animal; he can't tell what, "something, I certainly don't know just what I did smell.'' He does
not know how many hours during the day or
how many days during the week or ho'v many
months during the year the smell would be present; he didn't base his estimate on how many
hours a day, how many days a week, or how many
months a year it is there; he based it on his
judgment; in his judgment it was a very bad
smell (Abs. 265); he doesn't think he has stopped
at the plant; he was on Reed Beck's farm when
he remembers last smelling it; that was about a
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year ago; that is the last time he has smelled this
smell on any of these men's lands; he has smelled
the pea vinery from the highway; he would consider the pea vinery an industrial activity in that
community located near the railroad; there are
other industries in the community; there is the
sugar factory, that is on the railroad; the pea
vinery, the packing plant they call it, the flour
mills ; he doesn't think they are all on the railroad; they are not more than a quarter of a
mile away; he remembers the brick yard where
the defendant's plant is located; that was an
industry carried on in the community for many
years ; there used to lie an alfalfa mill there ; he
thinks that was on the railroad; from his experience in this county, most all the industries named
would be located on or near the railroad. (Abs.
266.)
The witness was then asked the question,
''It is your opinion, is it not, when a railroad
goes through a certain section of land, it pretty
much makes that land industrial~''
to which question the Court sustained on objection of the
plaintiff, to which defendant duly excepted, and the
principle of which is covered by Assignments of Error
65 to 74, inclusive (Abs. 441-444).
The community has been served by the Union
Pacific, and the Rio Grande Railroad is about
14 mile away. In arriving at his damage he did
not take into consideration the railroad being
there; he considered the railroad an asset rather
than a detriment; he didn't think that trains passing daily emitting smoke, making a noise, would
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be an elen1ent to take into consideration in increasing rather than decreasing the value of the
land imn1ediately adjoining the railroad right
of "~ay: he thought it would decrease the lands on
account of the railroad. His appraised values
were given \Yithout consideration of the presence
of the railroad; no\v that the railroad was called
to his attention it may or 1nay not require some
reduction in the value on account of the presence
of the railroad ( Abs. 267) ; that he didn't take
into consideration the pea vinery; he didn't think
about it; if he were building a home he would
prefer to be farther removed than nearer to the
pea vinery; he has not at any time in any of his
calculations given to the Court taken into consideration the presence of the railroad or the pea
vinery; his valuations were based on a continuous,
rather than an intermittent smell (Abs. 268); he
has one of these plants right against his fence
and ''I don't like it;'' he never thought anything
about this damage until day before yesterday; he
has given it his superficial attention in the last
few days as to the valuation of these properties;
he has known the plaintiffs all his life (Abs. 269) ;
that the land would continue to produce as many
and as bounteous crops in spite of the defendant's
plant, the pea vinery (Abs. 270), the sugar factory
or the railroad; a man's income would be the san1e
from the land whether the plant was there or
not; that they don't generally locate brick yards
in the most fertile sections of farm land; the brick
yard wouldn't affect the fertility of the surrounding farms; he has no more objection to the brick
yard than the railroad; that so far as the intrinsic
value of the land is concerned, there would be
no difference; it is an advantage for men who are
feeding livestock like many of these plaintiffs
(Abs. 271) to have the pulp close at hand and to
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have a railroad in the back yard and a pea vinery
and rendering plant near by; it is essential to
have some industry in connection with agriculture ; the brick yard was an essential industry;
if there were more industries in the community
it would be even more prosperous; the value of
the land has something to do with the prosperity
of the community; if the industrial activities were
doubled he thinks the values of the land in the
vicinity of this plant would increase (Abs. 272);
the steel plant at Springville is decidedly obnoxious; he wouldn't say the institution of that plant
had decreased the value of property at Springville; he thinks it has helped Springville; the
steel plant is about ten miles from defendant's
plant; he has smelled the fumes from the steel
plant a mile or so ; the sugar factory was built
in Benjamin twenty years ago; the pea vinery
four or five, he guesses; he didn't want s1noke
from a brickyard in his back yard ; there are
some disagreeable features to a brick yard (Abs.
273) ; he doesn't like the smell of those industries
{Abs. 274).
Mr. Hawkins, another appraiser for the plaintiffs,
appraised the damages at 14.7% of the appraised value
that he placed on the property, and the appraiser Anderson, for the plaintiffs (a brother of Rufus Anderson,
one of the plaintiffs) appraised the damage at 13.2%
of the appraised value, the same percentage as that
used by the Court. The appraiser Johnson for the
plaintiffs depreciated the land of Thomas Ludlow 10%,
3.2% less than the Court.
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The fact that the damages allowed by the Court are
excessive appears certain when the evidence is considered, showing that the Court's damage exceeded the
percentage of depreciation allowed by two of the plaintiffs' appraisers. It equalled a third. The values of the
property upon 'vhich this percentage of damage operated, as found by the Court, exceeded plaintiff's own
appraisal by $400, and amounted to three times the
appraisal placed upon the property by the Tax Commission. This damage was allowed in spite of the fact
that the land will bring to its owner the same income
with the plant there as with the plant removed. The
$1,360 damage was awarded with no damage shown
and with the use to which this plaintiff puts his property
resulting in odors as offensive to some as the odors resulting from defendant's operations. In any event, this
plaintiff utilizes his property for industrial purposes,
namely, stock feeding, and has acquiesced in and consented to the operation of defendant's plant from the beginning by utilizing the services offered by defendant's
plant in disposal of the animals which die on his land
while feeding them there, and by purchasing by-products of the defendant's plant for the feeding of livestock
upon his premises.
In arriving at this result, the Court entirely ignored
all of the evidence of the defendant introduced by four
totally disinterested appraisers who made a careful and
detailed study of the situation, taking into consideration
all of the circumstances surrounding the community.
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Let us look further into the evidence of the expert
witnesses who testified for the plaintiffs. We have already
discussed Mr. Thomas' testimony. Mr. Hawkins testified:
He is engaged in farming and the live stock
business in Benjamin; he was formerly county
assessor of Utah County for ten years (Abs. 287);
he has made some appraisals for the purpose of
loans ; the only general experience he has had was
as county assessor; he knows of no sales between
individuals that didn't involve foreclosures in
that community; he has had no experience with
the sale of property in that community or elsewhere (Abs. 289); he is different from many of
the plaintiffs ; he couldn't work in the plant; the
values which he gave were the percentage of
depreciation which he would place upon the land
because of his feelings toward the odor of defendant's plant (Abs. 292) ; the entire community
is a cattle and farm land community; some of
the pastures and lands of the plaintiffs are used
largely in different parts of the year as stock
yards and feed lots for the owners of cattle; he
made no difference in the values he placed between
lands used for stock yards and lands used purely
for the growing of crops; he thinks chicken coops
would be depreciated on account of the smell just
as much as a home; he didn't take into consideration the fact that in many instances (Abs. 299)
the products of defendant's plant are used for
chicken and cattle feed by the plaintiffs; he didn't
take into consideration the fact that the defendant's plant is a benefit to the community; there
used to be a stock loading chute three-fourths of
a mile away from the plant; a beet loading or beet
storai'e arrangement on the Union Pacific tracks
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was located on the san1e property as the plant;
beets "'"ere stored there, cleaned and hauled on
cars; that industry continued for a long time;
there 'vas a wool loading platform there; the
brick yard 'vas there for t\venty years; during
that time the property of the defendant was used
for industrial purposes; the sugar factory is within a mile and a half; there are three features he
considered in depreciating the property: odor,
disease and obnoxious condition of flies (Abs.
300).
It will be noted that there is no evidence to sustain
any danger from disease, and the evidence shows that
the fly situation is the situation common throughout the
county. The Court made no specific finding on anything
but odor. It is difficult to see how much weight could
be placed upon Mr. Hawkins' testimony when his testimony is predicated upon such assumptions. Furthermore, he is the neighbor of the plaintiffs in Benjamin.
The witness Thomas M. Anderson, as heretofore
stated, is a brother of Rufus Anderson, one of the plaintiffs in this action. He testified:
He never made appraisals in the district or
in the vicinity of defendant's plant; his only experience is making appraisals as a member of the
Spanish Fork Farm Loan Association; he never
made any appraisals by himself; no one has ever
acted on his judgment alone as to the value of
lands (Abs. 307); he has never gone into the
question of cost of building or replacement values ;
he has only been interested in seeing that they
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had adequate security for the loans which they
make (Abs. 309).
We call the Court's attention especially to his cross
examination appearing at Abs. p. 316. It is apparent
from his cross examination that the results reached in his
appraisals on the various farms of the plaintiffs are not
consistent, one with the other.
The other expert witness, Lawrence C. Johnson, testified: (Abs. 331.) (He appraised land only.)
He never had any experience with any other
industrial plant depreciating property; he knows
there are other industrial plants in Benjamin; he
doesn't think the pea vinery depreciates Rufus
Anderson's home; there would be no depreciation
on account of the pea vinery, no matter how close
the house was to it; there would be depreciation
to land for living purposes close to a sugar factory; there is no depreciation in the value of the
land for farming purposes; if there is any depreciation it is for living purposes; he bought land
in 1929 and 1930 and some in 1925 a mile from the
plant; he owns quite a bit of land and he is interested in keeping up the value of the land; he
is looking to the time when he may sell his land;
his mind is centered on doing everything he can
to keep the price of that land up; he doesn't
know much about the real estate business (Abs.
331); he farms, that is all; except for a sale along
about 1930 of two acres with a four room brick
house on it, that is the only sale he has had with
other people ; he doesn't recall any other sale ; the
State Tax Commission re-appraised all the land
in Benjamin about 1936; he took that appraisal
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into consideration; they appraised lands as A,
B, and C land; he doesn't remember how many
acres he gave Rufus Anderson in Class A; he has
an idea 60% ; he believes the rest would be Class
B lands (Abs. 332).
In connection with the further cross-examination of
this witness, we call the Court's attention to the defendant's proposed Exhibits 18 and 18-A, see Assignment
of Error 49 (Abs. 437). These are the exhibits which
indicate the State Tax Commission's classification and
appraisal of these lands. This witness likewise admits
that it is the ability of land to produce good crops which
determines whether it is good or bad land.
It was this last witness who depreciated T. E. Ludlow's land only 10%, while the Court awarded damages
to the extent of 13.2%.
EARL LUDLOW
The Court found Earl Ludlow's property to be worth
$6,400 (Abs. 397). Earl Ludlow testified that he paid
$6,000 for it fourteen years ago; he thinks it is now
worth $9,500 (Abs. 133), but there is no evidence to show
that prices of land were higher in 1938 than in 1924.
Still the Court finds Earl Ludlow's property to be worth
$400 more than he paid for it, with a forty year old
house on it and no new improvements. Evidently the
Court failed to depreciate the home in the last fourteen
years in arriving at this excessive valuation. Based on
that excessive valuation the Court allowed 14.8% damage.
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It is difficult to understand why the property of
Earl Ludlow, located 3300 feet west of the plant, should
be allowed 14.8% damage, and his father, only 2915 feet
northwest of the plant, should be allowed only 13.2%.
Otherwise, the situation existing on both of these farms,
as shown by the evidence, is substantially the same. They
are both used primarily for stock feeding, and the pic..
tures attached to Exhibits 17-D and E, and Exhibits
3, 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 indicate the nature of the property
for which the Court has allowed thirteen and fourteen
per cent depreciation on account of the presence of defendant's plant. We call the Court's attention especially
to the dead carcasses strewn throughout the feeding
yards of Thomas Ludlow in Exhibit 3, the pile of burnt
carcasses in Exhibit 4, the dead sheep in Exhibits 11
and 12, and the condition of the stock yards of Earl Ludlow in Exhibit 10. These exhibits, it is contended by
defendant, indicate more eloquently than words the nature of the community in which defendant's plant is located, and the necessity in that community therefor.
In viewing this damage it must be kept in mind that
these places are more than half a mile away from the
plant of the defendant. Mr. Thomas in his appraisal
only allows 14.2% depreciation as against the Court's
14.8%. Mr. Hawkins allows 17.3%, Mr. Anderson
15.2% and Mr. Johnson 10% depreciation of the land.
The Court allows 14.8%, in spite of the fact that defendant's expert witnesses found no damage to this property,
half a mile away.
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EDWIN B. SELENE
We pass to the case of Edwin (or Edward) B.
Selene, with a 40-year old home occupied by Mr. Selene
'vhile he "Torked for the defendant company as its employee..A. picture of this property is attached to Exhibit
17-G. The plaintiff himself appraised this house at
$2,000. The Court awarded this plaintiff $2,176 damage,
$176 more than the total value of the home as fixed
by the plaintiff himself. The condition of this property
is shown on Exhibits 8 and 9. Note the close proximity
of the stock yards to the home.
The Court appraised this total property at $5,484.20
(Abs. 397), and the damage at almost 40%. Mr. Thomas
depreciated it 54%; ~fr. Hawkins 60%; Mr. Anderson
59%. 1Ir. Anderson arrives at this 59% by taking
30% depreciation on the land and 100% depreciation on
the house and on the barn yard improvements. The Court
outdid Mr. Anderson by allowing 40%. We respectfully
submit that this must, under any view of the case, be
taken as excessive. From a look at the pictures of the
house and the improvements of the plaintiff Edwin B.
Selene, Exhibits 8 and 9, and the further fact that Mr.
Selene for some time was an employee of and is now
a competitor of this very industry, it is difficult to see
how there is any justification for any damage, much less

40% allowed by the Court, or the 100% allowed on the
house and improvements by the appraiser Anderson.

Mr. Johnson allowed 33V3 % on the land.
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It should be born in mind that the properties shown
In the exhibits last referred to with reference to the
Selene and Ludlow properties were described in the supplemental complaint of the plaintiff as a precinct ''distant from general traffic and industrial manufacture
where the inhabitants are chiefly engaged in farming
and agricultural pursuits; that on account of the situation and natural surroundings this locality has for more
than fifty years last past been distinguished as a residential and farming section; that the principal and most
valuable improvements in said precinct are rich farming
lands, commodious and valuable hon1es surrounded by
yards and gardens highly improved, ornamented and
beautified; that on account of the repose, beauty and
comfort of its situation and surroundings, said locality
is peculiarly attractive and desirable as a farming community and is especially valuable for residential purposes.'' This allegation of the complaint, of course,
was never sustained by any proof, but entirely disproved
by all the evidence and par_ticularly by the exhibits
accurately portraying in photograph the exact nature
of this locality.

MARGARET D. HANSEN
The property of Margaret D. Hansen is described
in the complaint as 25.80 acres. Plaintiff's evidence is
to the effect that the portion of their property on which
the home is located and on which the son lives, is nine·.
teen and a fraction acres; that this land stands in the
name of his mother, Mrs. Margaret D. Hansen, otherwise
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known as :nrrs. Heber Hansen, a plaintiff in this action,
and the remaining sixteen acres in the estate of Heber
Hansen, deceased. This would make a total of 35 acres.
Whether the 25.80 acres described in the complaint is a
part of this nineteen and sixteen acres is not disclosed
in the evidence. ,~Vith the record in this condition as to
title and ownership, the Court has taken into consideration a value placed upon 25.80 acres and finds that
acreage, together with the improvements, to be worth
$7,944 (Abs. 398), and has depreciated that sum 14.2%
allowing this plaintiff $1124.40 in damages.
Plaintiff's testimony is that the total value of the
property is $10,000, made up as follows: 26-year old
home, $5,000; barns, pig-pens, etc, $2,100; and water,
$3,000. This makes a total of $10,100 without any value
placed on the land, in spite of the fact that the complaint
alleges $10,000 as the total value of all, and the plaintiff's
son testified that the entire property is worth $10,000.
The Court in its findings finds the total value of all
of the property would be $7,944. This must of necessity
include the water, just as in the case of Edwin B. Selene
there was $800 worth of water included and depreciated
40% because of the presence of defendant's plant. In
Mrs. Hansen's case we have $3,000 worth of water depreciated 14.2%.
Why should the Court depreciate this property
14.2%, only 1695 feet removed from defendant's
plant, when it depreciates Earl Ludlow's 14.8%, nearly
twice as far away, 3300 feet, and T. E. Ludlow 13.2%,
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2915 feet away~ Mr. Thomas depreciates this same
property the same percentage as the Court, 14.2%; Mr.
Hawkins 19.6% and Mr. Anderson 21.4%. Mr. Johnson depreciates the land 20%. Exhibit 17-C and Exhibits
6 and 14 are typical pictures of the industrial agricultural
section in which these plaintiffs live, and not the exclusive residential district pleaded.
JOHN ANGUS
The home of John Angus is 1875 feet away from
the plant, roughly 200 feet farther than that of Mrs.
Hansen. The Court awards Mrs. Hansen 14.2% damage
and John Angus 23%. John Angus alleges in the complaint that his property is worth $3,000; that his property at the time defendant built its plant was worth
$2,685, to which $400 has been added since, making a
total of $3,085. His property is shown in Exhibit 17-B.
For some unexplained reason the Court appraised this
property at $3,568.50 (Abs. 398)-$900 more than the
property was admittedly worth at the time the defendant built its plant-and the damages are 23% of this
excessive appraisal, whereas in the case of Mrs. Hansen,
living closer to the plant, the Court's appraisal was more
than $2,000 below hers, and only 14.2% of the lower
appraisal was awarded her in damages. It is submitted
that there is nothing in the evidence to justify 40% for
E. B. Selene and only 13% for Thomas E. Ludlow except
the difference in the distance of the property of the respective plaintiffs from the plant, and that there is
nothing to justify the greater percentages allowed the
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more distant properties, as in the case of John Angus
and as we have already pointed out in the Earl Ludlow
case.
Mr. Thomas, plaintiffs' appraiser, depreciated this
property only 21%, 2% less than the Court, and his
appraised value 'vas less than the Court's. He allowed
in dollars and cents $7 40 damage, and the Court awarded
$824. Hawkins awarded 39%, Anderson 30% and John . .
son 20%. The Court is 3% higher than Johnson on
Johnson's depreciation of the land.
John Angus testified he owned $350 worth of water,
23% of which he was awarded as damages, with no
evidence whatsoever as to any depreciation or loss of
value in the water; in fact, none is conceivable. Hawkins
depreciated the property of John Angus 20%, Anderson
15% and Johnson 20% on the land, whereas the Court
depreciated the Angus property 23%, higher than any
one of the four appraisers of the plaintiff, and on a
basis of $900 more than the plaintiff testified the property was worth. Here is a clear case in which the Court
has exceeded, so far as the depreciation of the land is
concerned, the appraisements of all of the witnesses, the
plaintiff included, and has allowed, in addition, the damage to the depreciation on the water. This is one of
the numerous inevitable results of a misjoinder of eleven
common law causes of action for damage in one action.
Such an error on the part of the Court could not have
been made, had there not been this misjoinder. This
does, however, compel a reversal of the judgment of the
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lower court, because this appraisal of damage is beyond
any evidence offered in the case.
We are basing these comparisons upon percentage
rather than upon any other basis because, so far as can
be ascertained from the findings of fact, the Court figured the damage on a percentage basis, as is definitely
shown by the Court's Findings of Fact Nos. 15 and 16
( Abs. 400, 401). This basis was also resorted to by the
expert witnesses for the plaintiff. By careful analysis
predicated upon a percentage basis, the excessiveness of
the judgment is clearly demonstrated with mathematical
exactness.
JOHN ANDERSON
The property shown in the name of the plaintiff
John Anderson was depreciated 48% and he was given
damages for that amount in the sum of $1,050, without
having proved any title to the property. In fact, Mr.
Anderson testified : ''None of this property stands in
my name. It is in the wife's name." (Abs. 114.) The
wife was not a party to the suit. With no other evidence
concerning the title the Court allowed John Anderson
damages. This, of course, is a prejudicial error to the
defendant because this action would not bar the owner
of the property bringing an action in her own right.
John Anderson's home is farther away from the
plant than that of Edwin B. Selene. Selene's property
was depreciated 40% and John Anderson's, ten feet
farther away from the plant, 635 feet, was depreciated
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48%. The plaintiff testified the value of his home was
$1,240. The amount of damage awarded, $1,050, is almost 100% of the value of the home. This item of damage
carries ''ith it -±8% of $450 worth of water. It is the
exact amount of damage in dollars and cents allowed by
~lr. Thomas, representing 51% of the appraised value
of ~Ir. Thon1as. ~Ir. Hawkins allowed 62lf2%, Mr. Anderson 66%, and Johnson 331j3% on the land. To arrive
at 66% ~fr. Anderson depreciated the house, the barn
and other farm improvements 100% and the land 30%,
18% less than the Court depreciated the land. Mr. Thomas depreciated the land 25%, the Court 48%. Plaintiffs'
Exhibit B and Defendant's Exhibits 19 and 20 show the
condition of this property.
The John Anderson damage amounts to practically
$200 an acre, and represents an amount equal to the
total value of the land. Whatever improvements were
placed upon this land were placed there after the plant
was built. He testified (Abs. 108) that he started to build
there in December 1934, a year and a half after the
defendant located its plant there in April or May, 1933.
(Abs. 57.)
According to the rule of law for which we contend,
it is the value of the property at the time the business
was initiated that controls. (See p. 100 of this brief.)
This would place John Anderson, if he were the owner, in
the same position as Edward Ludlow and Maylan Carter, with unimproved land, for which the Court has given
him damages in excess of 100% of the value of the land.
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This is another glaring result of not only a misjoinder
but a confusion of causes of action. The machinery of
the law is not set up to try ten separate and distinct
common law actions for damage at one and the same
tilne.
RUFUS ANDERSON
The home of Rufus Anderson, depicted in defendant's Exhibit 17-A, is 970 feet from the defendant's
plant. The complaint alleges his property to be of a
value of $7,000 (Abs. 5, 30). The plaintiff's testimony
was to the same effect (Abs. 118), of which $7,000
$1,000 was water (Abs. 120). The Court finds the value
of this property (Abs. 400) to be $7,396.60, and awards
the plaintiff 28.4% thereof in damages in the sum of
$2,099.32. The value found by the ~ourt is more than
four times the appraised value of land and improvements
as found by the State Tax Commission. The home on
this property is 25 years old. The Court finds, Finding
15 (Abs. 400), that the land, exclusive of the improvements, is worth $4,296.60; that the improvements as now
constructed on the land are worth $3,100.
At the time defendant commenced its operations the
improvements on the land were $1,200. The additional
improvements were added between the time defendant
began its business and the time its plant burned down
in 1937. The Court allowed 20% damage on the land
and 40% on the improvements as they now are and as
they were at the time the plant was rebuilt. The Court
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does not find in any of these cases the value of the land
at the time the defendant con1menced operations, namely, Apri11933, but makes all of its findings with reference
to land as of the date of the trial, which is not the controlling date, as will specifically hereinafter appear (see
p. 100 of this brief), and except for the improvements
on the lands of Rufus Anderson and Paul E. Swartz,
there is no finding as to what the value of the improvements was at the time the defendant began its operations.
In the cases of Rufus Anderson and Paul E. Swartz,
even after n1aking this finding with reference to the
value at the time of commencement of operations by defendant, the Court does not use the figure thus found,
but rather the value of the improvements at the time
of the remodeling or rebuilding of the defendant's plant
in 1937. This, it is contended, leaves the record with no
evidence on which to predicate values as of the controlling date, in the event the Court were to find that the
plaintiffs were entitled to recover permanent rather than
temporary damages. This being the case, the Court has
awarded excessive damages to Anderson in any event to
the extent of 40% of the difference between $1,200 and
$3,100, and has likewise in this case included 40% of the
$1,000 worth of water in the total value depreciated.
Thomas depreciated the property 36.6%, Hawkins
62%, Anderson depreciated his own brother's property
57%, and Johnson depreciated the land 33V3%. But even
depreciating his own brother's property, the appraiser
Anderson only depreciated the lands of his brother 30%,
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whereas the Court depreciated it 20%, with no evidence
to sustain a finding of any injury to the land, its productivity, its fertility, or the income therefrom, its value having, therefore, not in any wise been affected. by defendant's plant. The Court depreciated the land as much as the
plaintiffs' appraiser Thomas, that is, approximately
20%. Rufus Anderson appraised his own 25 year old
home at $2,600. The damage of $2,099.32 almost entirely
wipes out the value of the house.
PAUL E. SWARTZ
According to the Court's finding, Paul E. Swartz
lives 2335 feet from the plant. According to Exhibit
17-H, it is 3960 feet, % of a mile. It was assumed
throughout the trial that Swartz' home was the farthest
away from the plant of any. If the 2335 feet figure of
the Court is correct, then Earl Ludlow is the farthest
removed.
The Court depreciated this property an average of
15%, based on a total value of $8,250.40 (Abs. 401), the
value of the property at the time the defendant rebuilt
the plant. This damage was actually arrived at by taking
12% of the value of the land at the time of the trial and
20% of the value of the improvements in 1937 at the
time of the fire. The Court can certainly not be right
in taking the value at both dates; either one date or the
other 1nust control, and in the theory of defendant's
case, neither time can control but we must go back to 1933
when defendant began its operations. The temporary
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break in operations during the rebuilding of the plant
after the fire does not present a controlling date. The total
value at the time of the trial was found by the Court to
be $10,252.40. The plaintiff alleged a total value of
$10,000 ( Abs. 6, 31), and in his oral testimony the
plaintiff claimed $3,000 (_..<\_bs. 107) of that value was in
water.
Thomas depreciated the total property 14.6% as
against the Court's 15%, Hawkins' 27.6%. This property was not appraised by Anderson, and Johnson depreciated the land 20%. The value found by the Court
is higher than the allegations of the complaint and the
percentage of damage greater than that found by plaintiffs' appraiser Thomas.
MAYLAN CARTER
There was no finding by the Court as to the distance
the land owned by Maylan Carter was removed from the
plant. This 15.48 acres is unimproved property. The
complaint alleges a total value of $2,500 (Abs. 5, 31). The
Court found a total value of $2,786.40 (Abs. 399), $286.40
more than the allegations of the complaint, and awarded
23% of this $646.60 damages on this unimproved property. The appraiser Thomas for the plaintiff appraised
the damage at $619.20, substantially less than the Court,
at 20.5% of Thomas' appraised value. Hawkins appraised
the loss at 41%, Anderson at 30% and Johnson at

33V3%.
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There is no evidence of any damage to this land.
There are no improvements on the land which could
have been damaged. No one has ever lived on the land,
so far as the evidence shows. Defendant contends there
is no basis whatsoever for the allowance of damage in
this case.
This value of $2,786.40 includes a full water right,
the value of which was not given in evidence.
After both parties had rested, the Court dismissed
the case as to Maylan Carter (Abs. 259), on motion of
the defendant (Abs. 145), on the ground and for the
reason that there was no evidence adduced by the plaintiff and no evidence before the Court in support of any
allegation of the complaint of the plaintiff, so far as
Maylan Carter was concerned. Thereafter, without any
further proceedings, Maylan Carter appears as a plaintiff in the supplemental complaint. The original action
was also dismissed as against Edward M. Beck and
James Albert West. Edward M. Beck was likewise joined
as a party to the supplemental complaint. The joinder
of Beck and Carter was error, unless we proceed upon
tlie assumption that after the case has been partially
tried to the Court as an equity case and the Court makes
and enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law
as to certain of the plaintiffs, and dismisses the others
from the equity case, retaining jurisdiction of the case
so far as the remaining plaintiffs are concerned for
further action at law, that anybody and everybody,
strangers to the original equity proceedings, might then
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

61
be joined in a suit (in equity), along with the remaining
plaintiffs, to have their legal causes of action determined
by a court of equity rather than by a court of law, and
be judged by evidence adduced at the main hearing
before they became parties. The mere statement of such
a proposition should cause it to fall by its own weight
as being 'vholly unsound and depriving the defendant of
its right of trial by jury. The cause of action alleged
in the supplemental complaint in favor of Edward M.
Beck was finally dismissed by the Court, but Carter was
awarded his damages as indicated.

EDWARD LUDLOW
The Court awarded Edward Ludlow 25% damages
on account of the injury to his 8.15 unimproved acres of
land, although he testified:
The record title in these ten acres is not in
me. It hasn't been, I think, for two years. It
hasn't been since this law suit started (Abs. 137).
Thomas would have allowed him 331j3 %, Hawkins
50%, Anderson 29.4% and Johnson 331j3 %. There was
no finding by the Court as to the distance of Ed Ludlow's property from the plant. The Court depreciated
plaintiff's water rights to make up damage allowed.

Value of Water Rights
This gave to the plaintiffs a total judgment of
$11,868.19 against the defendant. We have the evidence
of six plaintiffs as to the value of their water rights
and the value of the water rights of the other four are
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not shown by the evidence. $1992.50 of this $11,868.19 is
represented by depreciation to the water of these plaintiffs. How much more than this we do not know. If the
same_. proportion holds out for the other four that has
for these six, this $1,992 might well be increased by twothirds, making roughly $3,320 damage on account of depreciation of water out of a total damage of $11,868.19.
For such a result there is no legal justification. In order
that there be no question as to how defendant arrives at
the $1,992, the following figures are given:
Value of
Water Depreciation
E. B. Selene ________________ $800
40 %
$320
M. D. Hansen ____________ 3000
426
14.2%
80.50
23 %
John Angus ---------------- 350
John Anderson __________ 900
432
48 %
Rufus Anderson ________ 1000
284
28.4%
Paul E. Swartz __________ 3000
450
15 %

$1992.50
DEFENDANT'S APPRAISERS
Throughout the foregoing discussion defendant has
merely mentioned the fact that its expert appraisers
found no damage in the value of the property on account
of the operation of defendant's plant. Defendant's appraisers were entirely disinterested. Charles S. Woodward testified :
His business is real estate; he lives in Salt
Lake. He has been familiar with the town of
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Benja1nin and surroundings since 1898. He knows
the people 'vho live there and is related to most
of them (Abs. 183). He had twenty years' experience with Ashton-Jenkins Company and Toronto Company selling, buying and appraisin~ real
estate. In his business with Ashton-Jenkins Company he had occasion to appraise property in Utah
County and as far south in Utah as Cedar City.
He has been familiar with property in and about
Benjamin for the past eighteen years, and been
a licensed realtor for twenty years. Hi5 appraisals as testified are contained in Exhibits 17 to
17-H, inclusive, set forth in the appendix to the
abstract of record, and gives in each instance the
basis of his appraisal (Abs. 184).
This witness testified in the original trial when the
only question before the Court was the granting of injunctive relief, and at a time when no damages were
asked or sought by the plaintiffs.
Mr. Heal, who made an appraisal together with
William Parry of Springville and Henry Jeppson of
Payson, testified:
He lives at Provo. He has been in the real
estate business exclusively for twenty-five years
in Utah County. That has been his sole occupation. He is generally familiar with land values for
agricultural, industrial and home purposes in and
about Benjamin. At the request of the defendant he made a survey and arrived at what he considered the fair market value of the plaintiff's
property in the action (Abs. 351).
Mr. Parry, of Springville, testified:
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He has been in the real estate business for
13 years and maintains an office in Springville;
his real estate business involves transactions and
listings in Spanish Fork down to Lake Shore, including Benjamin; he is familiar with land values
in Benjamin; he has purchased and sold property
for his customers in Utah for 13 years (Abs. 365);
he has a regular real estate dealer's license from
the State of Utah (Abs. 366).
Henry Jeppson, of Payson, testified:
He has lived in that vicinity since 1909 and
is intimately acquainted in Benjamin. He is a
building contractor (Abs. 366) and holds a general builder's license from the State of Utah; he
has been actively engaged in the contracting business since 1928; there are very few people in the
town of Benjamin he is not acquainted "\Vith; he is
familiar with the location of defendant's plant
and location of the pea vinery; the odors of the
pea vinery ar~ so much worse than the plant that
there is no comparison; the odors of the sugar
factory are not so intense as the pea vinery; he
has been present at the defendant's plant and
on the premises of these plaintiffs at various
times (Abs. 367); he had a conversation with
practically every one of the plaintiffs as he made
his survey; all made statements as to the density
of the smell and called his attention to that fact;
in making these appraisals he_ took into consideration what was said by them, as well as his own
observations (Abs. 368).
The appraisers for the defendant found that the
values they gave were the fair values of the property
either with or without the plant, and testified, so far as
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the Court would permit the1n so to testify that the section
was industrial, and that the plant was located in a suitable place.
There "\Yere introduced in this case Exhibits 21
and 21-A to 21-G, inclusive. These pictures were taken
from the roof of the defendant's plant, Clyde Hicken,
manager of defendant's plant, testifying concerning them
as follows:
Exhibit 21 is a view of the Ed Selene property
on the opposite side of the railroad and' spur
track, leading to defendant's property. 21 is looking north; 21-A represents a view immediately
left of 21; 21-B a view left (Abs. 204) of 21-A.
The camera is looking sort of to the northwest
when 21-A was taken. 21-B you are looking west.
21-B shows the homes of Thomas Ludlow, Earl
Ludlo'v and Jack Angus. The Thomas Ludlow
property is marked with circle (1). Circle (2)
is Earl Ludlow's property, and (3) is Jack Angus'
property. C is immediately left of B; the home
of Rufus Anderson is shown in this picture at
the left edge and across the tracks ( Abs. 205).
This is the property on which the appraiser, Anderson, brother: of one of the plaintiffs, depreciated the
home and farm buildings 100%, and that the Court depreciated 40%.
21-D is immediately to the left of 21-C. The
Hansen home is shown below the mark (1) in the
circle. The home is located on the other side of
the state highway. The old sump of the brick
yard is shown in the foreground. You are looking
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south in 21-D. 21-E is to the left of D and looking
southeast; the property of Ed Ludlow is immedi..
ately between the road and the fence shown in
the foreground and immediately adjoining the
property of the defendant. Exhibit 21-F is to
the left of E, shows the roof of the plant in the
foreground and beyond that the su1np. The distance away from any homes on the east is readilY,
noted. This is looking about east. Exhibit 21-G
is to the left of F and to the right of Exhibit 21.
On this exhibit the houses of the defendant and
John Anderson's house are shown. The John
Anderson house is in the background (Abs. 205).
The witness, Clyde Hicken, lives in the house in the
foreground belonging to the defendant, with his wife and
one child, 300 feet from defendant's plant. He says:
I have lived there a year and have not been
bothered by the odors which emanate from this
plant. It has not in any wise prevented me fro1n
eating my meals regularly or affected my sleep
or my health. My wife and child are in good
health (Abs. 206).
Appellant, in light of foregoing, should have been
granted a new trial because of the excessiveness of the
damages awarded, and this on the assumption that a
cause of action for damages was proven, something appellant strongly urges was not done.
Inasmuch as this case was tried and considered by
the lower court as an equity case, it is proper for this
Court to review both questions of law and fact, upon
this appeal.
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Although it is appellant's contention that from the
plaintiffs' evidence alone it is apparent that the dam. .
ages awarded by the Court are excessive, and that in fact
no cause of action exists because of the nature of the
community and the propriety of the location of defendant's plant as located, appellant nevertheless feels justified in calling the Court's attention on this appeal specifically to the evidence offered in behalf of the defendant, which, to arrive at the result the lower Court did,
had to be wholly ignored.
Defendant's Exhibit 16 illustrates the locality surrounding defendant's plant and the approximate distances to the lands of the plaintiffs and others from
defendant's plant. This exhibit shows the relative location of the railroad tracks and just how sparsely populated the land is around the plant. The one home nearest
the plant belongs to the defendant.
...

After plaintiffs had rested and defendant began its
case, plaintiffs' case was re-opened for the purpose of
taking the testimony of Lloyd N. Farner, a licensed
physician and surgeon (Abs. 153). He testified that he
was a deputy state health commissioner. On cross examination (Abs. 156) his attention was called to defendant's
Exhibits 3 to 14, consisting of pictures of plaintiffs'
homes and surroundings.
He stated in reference to Exhibit 3 that it
presented an unsanitary condition which the local authorities should see is cleaned up; that
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Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, show unsanitary
conditions from which odors emanate and per~
meate the homes that are shown in the pictures;
that these pictures of the premises surrounding
the homes of the plaintiffs show a condition conducive to the breeding of flies and rats; that the
plant of the defendant (Abs. 157) is the only
rendering plant in the State he ever visited;
(Abs. 159) that he particularly observed when he
visited the plant that there were not very many
live flies; he found some dead ones; outside of the
plant he found a septic tank that took care of
the contents from the plant (Abs. 160); that was
a proper place to have them go (Abs. 161); Exhibits 2 to 14, inclusive, show a community in
which you would expect to find a lot of flies (Abs.
162) ; he didn't smell any odor from the defendant's plant in any one of the homes of the plaintiffs; he thinks the odors from defendant's plant
would be stronger and would carry farther in the
atmosphere than the odors emanating from the
corrals and barn yards in the vicinity of the
plant (Abs. 163).
Defendant's first witness was a man by the name
of William Bona, who testified :
He lives in Benjamin south of the plant; he
rents the house directly across the road from
Mrs. Hansen, one of the plaintiffs ; half a mile
from defendant's plant and three-fourths of a
mile from the pea vinery (Abs. 164); he didn't
smell the odors from the plant as long as he
has lived in the house ; before the plant came dead
animals could be found in the · fields, very few
were buried; since the plant came he has seen
very few dead animals lying around like they
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used to (Abs. 165) ; he has seen thirty head out
in the field dead at the same time (Abs. 166).
William Chambers (Abs. 166) next testified:
That he had never had any connection with
the plant or its employees or the owner; that he
sa\v dead animals around before the plant started;
that since the plant can1e he hasn't noticed any.
Joseph Hughes, of Spanish Fork, a physician and
surgeon of twenty-eight years' practice, and deputy
county physician, the family physician of some of the
plaintiffs, testified: (Abs. 168)
That he has observed the odor at one of their
homes; that it is his opinion defendant's plant
is a sanitary method of disposing of dead animals and animal matter; that the plant serves
a needed purpose in that community; that the
community since the establishment of this plant
with reference to dead animals and refuse is in a
condition better than it was prior; that the odors
emanating from the plant are not injurious, just
disagreeable; they could not in any wise affect
health (Abs. 170); odor from the pea vinery is
just about as bad as the odor from the defendant's plant; that disagreeable odor comes from
the pulp dump at the beet factory; (Abs.175) that
the odor is more pronounced at Mr. Anderson's
home; the one that lives near the plant; that
would all depend on the trend of the winds; that
he hasn't smelled the odor of the plant in any of
the homes of the other plaintiffs (Abs. 176); flies
are not bred in this plant; they are generally
bred around manure piles, pig pens and barn
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yards; you don't have rats around cement floors;
he was familiar with the fields of the plaintiffs
prior to the coming of the plant '(Abs. 177); generally dead animals were left to decay in the
open ; he has had to notify the marshal to see
that they were buried; a scene of the kind shown
in Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 14 were not uncommon
in the Benjamin district; these pictures show
places conducive to the breeding of flies and rats;
they are not sanitary and not entirely inoffensive
as far as odor is concerned ; these pictures show
a situation worse than the defendant's plant.
Why, in view of this statement of the plaintiffs'
own family doctor, did the Court find that this plant
is a nuisance to these plaintiffs in that community? Can
they hold others up to a high standard of sanitation and
require them to maintain an odorless business when their
own business of feeding cattle in the same vicinity creates
a worse situation~ How could the lower Court, in making its findings and sitting as a court of equity, ignore
the testimony of both Dr. Farner, produced by the plaintiffs as a witness, and Dr. Hughes, known by the Court
to be the most eminent physician in that community?
The doctor finally says (Abs. 180):
That he knows enough about the odor of the
pea vinery to know that it is worse than the odor
coming from defendant's plant when you get up
to it.
Fred R. Taylor was next called and testified: (Abs.
180).
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That he is a physician and surgeon residing
in Provo, with nineteen years' experience as a
practitioner; that he gave the employees of the
defendant's plant a physical examination and
found them to be healthy and to be suffering
from no ailment in any wise attributable to their
employment in defendant's plant (Abs. 181);
that the plant as maintained and operated is in a
sanitary condition.
Charles S. Woodward, the next witness, has lived
in the community and has been acquainted with the community all his life. He likewise testified to the fact that
animals were permitted to rot where they fell (Abs. 185);
that the odors emanating from John Angus' place were
such that he could not determine whether the odors came
from his manure pile or defendant's plant (Abs. 186).
Zora Warthen ( Abs. 192) lived in the same house
as the witness Bona across the street from Mrs. Hansen
for fifteen months, during which time she did not smell
any odors from the defendant's plant, that far away.
The witness, Ed C. Thomsen (Abs. 193) is engaged
in cleaning out ditches around the community; he testified that before the plant came there were always dead
animals lying along the ditch, dead cows, horses and
sheep. Now he does not find them there.
John W. Staker lives half a mile southeast of the
plant (Abs. 194); has lived there thirty-three years; he
thinks that the plant is a good thing for the community;
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it gets rid of dead an'imals; that he had smelled the
plant only once since February, during heavy winds.
Clyde Hicken, manager for the defendant testified:
(Abs. 197)
That he has purchased for the defendant dead
animals from Thomas Ludlow, Paul Swartz, Gene
Hansen, Earl Ludlow, and they have purchased
the products of the plant; he has sold them tankage, which consists of cooked meat and bones;
it is the product of the cooker; it is used to fatten
pigs; Exhibits 1 to 14 are further explained by
this witness, pointing out specifically the dead
animals shown in these pictures on the premises
of plaintiffs ; these pictures were taken during the
trial (Abs. 207) ; the operation of the plant was
detailed by the witness.
Dr. Maurice G. Taylor of Salt Lake City Board of
Health investigates causes and sources of disease (Abs.
213) ; stated that all germs are killed in the cooking process of the defendant plant; he does not know of any
disease present in Utah which could be carried by flies
from defendant's plant; health agencies generally consider dead animals should be disposed of by some heatIng process.
Warren E. Rasmussen (Abs. 219), a veterinarian
duly licensed to practice his profession in this state stated
that he is familiar with the rendering plants in other
counties in Utah; that the Benjamin plant is maintained
and operated in a sanitary condition.
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R. W. Richter ( Abs. 221) testified:
That he has been en1ployed by the Cudahy
Packing Company for 22 years; is the supervisor
of the by-products plant there; the Cudahy Packing Company maintains a similar plant to defendant's plant under the same roof with their packing
plant at Salt Lake City where fresh meat is packed
for human consumption ; the rendering plant has
been operated there for 22 years; the process
being used by defendant is substantially the same
as in the Cudahy plant; the defendant's plant is
operated in a sanitary condition; he never saw
any employee of the Cudahy Packing Company
working in the rendering plant become ill because
of his employment; the gases are condensed or
burned and thus killed (Abs. 224); he knows of
no better way to dispose of the gases of the
cooker than by burning; there are homes within
two blocks of the Cudahy plant; never heard of
any people complaining about the odors from the
rendering plant (Abs. 224); the Cudahy plant is
in as much of a residential section as defendant's
plant in Benjamin (Abs. 225); they take care of
all of the dead animals from the stockyards in
North Salt Lake and all animals that are found
diseased through federal inspection and ordered
killed are handled in their rendering plant.
Clyde Hicken resumed his testimony concerning the
operation of defendant's plant: (Abs. 227)
90% of the animals handled by the defendant
come from Utah County (Abs. 231); not one of
the plaintiffs ever complained to him about the
plant; he was employed before the old plant
burned down; the old building was corrugated
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tin; the floors were concrete and frame; the new
building is all concrete and brick; they never had
any condensers in the old plant ; then the steam
and the odors from the cooker went straight into
the air; Thomas Ludlow told him within the year
the new plant was a great improvement over the
old; that the plant was being kept in good condition.
Iona Rigtrup, an employee of the defendant in Idaho
Falls, and her sister, Lenore Hicken, the wife of defendant's manager at Benjamin, testified they did not
get the odors from the plant in their home and had never
observed it in Clyde Hicken's home when they have
visited there.
P. H. Soble, general manager of the defendant testified: (Abs. 238)
They operate twenty plants located in Texas,
Colorado, Utah, and Idaho; in Utah they have
rendering plants in Logan, Ogden, Spanish Fork
and Heber City; in Salt Lake City they have a
hide and fur house; the last plant to be built was
the Spanish Fork or Benjamin plant, begun in
1933 and operated continuously there ever since,
even during the time they were burned down they
operated as a receiving station (Abs. 239); the
building as it now stands represents an investment
of approximately $30,000; the plant is just east of
the Union Pacific and west of the D. & R. G. (Abs.
240) six-tenths of a mile from the pea vinery;
two miles from the sugar factory (Abs. 241) ; all
the gases now enter underneath the grate and are
positively burned; cannot get away (Abs. 242);
the new plant is rat proof (Abs. 243); the only
animals that they take are fresh; they kill 20%
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

75

of the animals themselves; much is fresh meat
from the butchers; the fire box temperature is
approximately 1350 degrees; the hydro1 carbon
gases coming from the cookers are consumed at
550 degrees temperature; the Ogden plant is within the city limits of Ogden; homes are within
2% blocks.
It 'vas stipulated that Dr. Flescher, a graduate
chemical engineer, residing in Salt Lake City, and Mr.
Harrison, a graduate combustion engineer and consulting engineer residing and practicing his profession in
Salt Lake City (Abs. 258-9), would testify that the gases
which come from the rendering of animal substances, as
the non-condensable gases, are hydrocarbon gases, and
hydrocarbon gases are entirely consumed at temperatures
between 550 and 650 degrees, and that the temperatures
to which these gases were previously subjected in defendant's plant on occasions was as low as from 500 to
600 degrees; that since lowering the point of injection of
these gases in the furnace they are now compelled to
pass through a temperature of from 1200 to 1350 degrees. This evidence stands uncontradicted.
This judgment of $11,868.19 which the Court has
awarded the plaintiffs is on the basis of damage to 189.15
acres, or $62.75 per acre without water, almost as much
as the land is worth. Damage to such an extent cannot
under any circumstances be upheld as reasonable and
not excessive, in light of all the evidence in this case.
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SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 1
Specification of error No. 1 is based upon errors
arising out of the overruling of the general and special
demurrers of the defendant to the amended and supplemental complaints of the plaintiffs.
The demurrer and motion filed against the supplemental complaint of plaintiffs presents the question of
the right of the plaintiffs, each claiming to own separate
parcels of real estate, to amend their complaint to the
extent of transforming the action into one for damages,
when the original action was maintained by them jointly
to obtain nothing but equitable relief, and when any
equitable relief had been denied them by the Court.
The basic fact, as we have pointed out, is that this
plant, according to plaintiffs, is located in a residential
district, and to locate such a plant in such a district
made the plant a nuisance regardless of the careful manner in which the plant may have been or might in the
future be operated. The defendant contends that the
plaintiffs cannot, at the conclusion of the equity case,
amend their pleadings and, by means of a supplemental
or new complaint, proceed upon a new theory and join
eleven separate and distinct legal causes of action into
one simply because they had previously been joined
under the original complaint for the purpose of seeking
equitable relief. This complaint is not an amended complaint. It is a supplemental action and is exclusively
legal in character. Defendant cannot by such a method
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be deprived of its right of trial by jury. See State v.
Hart, 26 Ut. 229. ~L\.. supplen1ental complaint serves
the purpose of raising issues which do not exist at
the time of filing the original complaint. If we
treat this supplemental complaint as an amended complaint, then the demurrer should still be sustained. Under the authorities in this jurisdiction, had the allegations of the supplemental complaint been incorporated
in the original complaint, the defendant would have been
entitled to have each cause of action separately stated
and separately tried before a jury. Felt City Townsite
Co. v. Felt Inv. Co., 50 Ut. 364. Plaintiffs cannot deprive
defendant of this right by splitting this cause of action
into an equitable action to be tried first and a legal
one to be tried second.

.Demurrer Should Have Been Sustained to
Supplemental Complaint
Causes of Action Split
Courts have said and, in a way, still say that it
must be established that there is a legal wrong before
equity will interfere. Norback v. Board of Directors, 84
Ut. 506. No court has ever said that a plaintiff should
be required or permitted to establish, first, his equity
right, and then thereafter proceed at law. Such a course
of procedure is an absolute reversal of the order that
was originally established.
The plaintiffs in effect contend that they may split
their causes of action and sue first for equitable relief,
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and· failing in this they may thereafter pursue their
right to damages at law in a court of equity.
In order to properly appreciate the error contained
in the contention of the plaintiffs we must ascertain the
fundamental concept of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and to do this we start with this provision contained in
the Constitution of Utah which is common to all codes.
It provides :
''There shall be but one form of civil action,
and law and equity may be administered in the
same action. ''

Sec. 19, Art. VIII, Utah Constitution.
In the case of Naylor v. Jensen, 38 Ut. 310, 113
Pac. 73, the Supreme Court used the following language:
''The Constitution of this state in section 19
of Article 8 provide 'there shall be but one form
of action, and law and equity n1ay be administered
in the same action.' No doubt the framers of the
Constitution thereby intended to permit the parties to actions to dispose of all questions whether
legal or equitable, in one and the same action."
Certainly neither the Constitution nor the Code
intended that the parties should split up their causes
of action and take part of those causes of action and
join them together with parts of causes of action belonging to other persons, and try the controversy by piece-
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meal or determine the problem upon a consideration of
only fractional parts.
Each of the plantiffs, if we assume the allegations
of this complaint to be true for the purpose of demurrer,
owns a separate and distinct tract of land. The ownership and possession of this land gives rise to a primary
right of quiet enjoyment, and in the last analysis every
nuisance involves an interference with that right to the
undisturbed enjoyment of one's premises which is inseparable from the ownership or possession of realty.
Such a diagnosis must apply to every true nuisance. 1
Street's Foundations of Legal Liability, 212.
Now, suppose the owner and possessor of a piece
of real estate claims that a party defendant has done
him a legal wrong by invading, disturbing and interfering with this right of quiet enjoyment which is a necessary incident to the ownership of any tract of land.
If it is found that that wrong has been committed by
the defendant, then, as we say in this brief, and as it
is recognized in all the authorities, the Court may allow
damages, or, if damages are founa to be inadequate, the
Court may allow equitable relief by way of injunction.
In some instances the Courts have allowed both kinds
of relief, but the mere fact that the relief has a double
aspect does not mean that there are two causes of action
existing in behalf of the owner of any particular tract
of land.
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This is well illustrated by the case of Hahl v. Sugo,
(1901) 169 N. Y. 101, 62 N. E. 135. In this case it was
held that a previous recovery of legal relief bars a
subsequent recovery of equitable relief based on the
same cause of action. In this case the facts were as
follows: the plaintiffs and defendant were the respective
owners of adjoining lots in the City of Buffalo. Defendant, in erecting a brick house on her lot, encroached
on plaintiffs' lot. In 1896 plaintiffs brought an action
to recover the land thus encroached upon. Plaintiffs recovered in this action and upon a second trial recovered
again, and, in 1898, judgment was entered in their favor,
establishing their title in fee to the land in dispute. But
when an execution was issued the sheriff found that the
land was occupied by a portion of the stone foundation
and brick wall of the defendant's house, and he could
not remove the same. Finally, after failure to maintain
an intervening motion in that action, the plantiffs
brought a suit in equity to compel the defendants to
remove said encroaching wall from their land.
The Court of Appeals of New York, in reversing the
judgment of the appellate division, said:
"Let us now see whether the plantiffs have
more than one cause of action arising out of the
wrong of the defendant, and, if not, what that
cause of action is. The plaintiffs are the owners
of a strip of land upon which the defendant has
wrongfully entered and erected a wall, which is
a portion of her house. The facts alleged show
one primary right of the plaintiffs and one wrong
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done by the defendant which involves that right.
Therefore the plaintiffs have stated but a single
cause of action, no Inatter how many forn1s and
kinds of relief they 1nay be entitled to. * * The
plaintiffs· right is to recover possession of their
land. The defendant's \\Trong consists in the entry
upon and use of that land ·w·ithout the plaintiffs'
consent. The particular nature of that wrong
1nay require the application of different remedies
for the enforcement of the right. But that does
not change the nature of the cause of action, nor
entitle the plaintiffs to split it into several
causes of action. The complaint in the first actio11
stated the facts upon 'vhich plaintiffs based
their claim of title and right to possession. Under
its allegations the title as well as the right to
possession could be tested.'' (Citing authorities)
''The right to possession involved the re1noval
of the encroaching wall, for 'vithout such removal
there could be no real transfer of possession.
This in turn required equitable relief, which, under proper pleadings and an appropriate method
of trial, could have been granted' in the same
action in which the title and right to possession
were adjudicated." (Citing authorities) "The
fact that plaintiffs' complaint lacked the averments which would have apprised the court of
their right to equitable relief, and that the course
of the trial furnished no indication that they intended to claim such relief, is no excuse for the
commencement of a separate and independent
action upon the single cause involved in the first
action. It would be novel practice, indeed, to
permit the correction of errors in that summary
and extra-judicial manner. ''
As was said in Stoner v. Mau, 11 Wyo. 366, 72 Pac.
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"It is too well settled to admit of controversy
that, under the code procedure, a party may ask
and obtain several kinds of relief in the same
action.''
The opinion points out that both Mr. Phillip and
Mr. Pomeroy agree that there is but one cause of action,
and as Mr. Pomeroy expresses it, only the union of
remedial rights flowing from one cause of action.
In the Kinsman case, hereafter in this brief discussed in detail, it was said :
''In the very nature of things, any noxious
or offensive odors given off by defendant's plant
would gradually diminish as the distance increases, and the relief to plaintiffs, whose homes
are near the gas plant, might and should differ
from the relief which should be granted to those
whose residences are at greater distances fron1
defendant's plant.''
In other words, one of these plaintiffs might be
entitled to injunctive relief; another might be entitled
to damages, and another might not be entitled to any
relief at all. In order to try the case properly, with the
plaintiffs joined as they are, it would be necessary to
set up the facts showing :

1. The primary right of the owner or owners of
each tract of land.
2. The invasion of that primary right of quiet
enjoyment by the defendant and the nature of the invasion.
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3. The amount of damage suffered by the owner
of that tract of land.
And if it was claimed that damages would not be
adequate then the facts, not conclusions of law, must
show the necessity and the equitable propriety for the
granting of injunctive relief.
If eleven different tracts of land, differently located
and differently affected and separately and individually
owned, are all to be dealt with in one complaint, it must
of necessity follow that we have eleven different causes
of action. To undertake to split each of these eleven
causes of action and allow the owners of each of the
causes of action to take the part that calls for equitable
relief and join those equitable portions, if we may use
that term, together, and then make one cause of action
in one complaint, is to violate the fundamental spirit of
the code. It violates the rule that a defendant shall not
be subjected to more than one trial for the same wrong,
and furthermore it involves the determination of the
damage, if any, to each separate tract of land.
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 2
We have sufficiently discussed the assignments of
error grouped in this specification in our statement of
the facts of this case to call the Court's attention to the
right of the defendant to have the causes of action of
Maylan Carter and Edward Ludlow stricken from the
supplemental complaint. These two causes of action,
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improperly joined, involve land upon which there are
no improvements, and upon which no one lives, thus
basically differing from the other nine causes of action
joined in the complaint.
The element of damage pleaded in the complaint
is the disturbance to plaintiffs as residents upon the
land, residing in homes thereon. No such element of
darnage is applicable to these two plaintiffs, and no other
element of damage is pleaded and none proven by the
evidence adduced under the amended complaint. This
evidence clearly shows the impropriety of permitting
these two plaintiffs to join in the cause of action, when
their complaint presented no such damage as the damage
alleged to be suffered by the other pl~intiffs. If there
is any possible damage to be recovered by these two
plaintiffs, the damage must of necessity be a permanent
damage, and a permanent injury to the land. Such a
damage was neither alleged nor proven before or after
the inclusion of these plaintiffs in the supplemental complaint. The damage, if any, recoverable by any of the
plaintiffs under the pleadings and the evidence in this
case, must be what is known as a temporary damage. If
a cause of action for permanent damages had been
pleaded rather than a cause of action for an injunction
based upon recurring injuries in which no damage was
sought, this defendant would have been entitled to have
its plea of the Statute of Limitations declared a complete
bar to this entire action. This cause of action if it is
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pleaded as a cause of action to recover permanent damages, arose in 1933, by the plaintiffs' own evidence.
Now in the case at bar the land of the plaintiffs
has not been hurt, and yet apparently the plaintiffs seek
by their amendment to recover the depreciation in the
value of their land and at the same time to retain that
land "~ithout its productive capacity being in the slightest respect affected. These damages of a temporary
character 'vould at most relate merely to personal discomfort and annoyance, and could not include the personal discomfort of any men1ber of the plaintiffs' families. Each plaintiff or person injured would have an
entirely different case from every other plaintiff or
person injured, and by no possibility could the personal
claim of any person injured be assigned to another.
These observations are made for the purpose of
illustrating to this Court the character of the cases and
issues which the plaintiffs sought to present to the Trial
Court. The matters involved cannot be tried in one suit
because of their extensive range out into the domain
even of actions for personal injuries. Instead of clarifying and tending to make simple, the clarification is
merely on paper. The substance of the multiplicity is
increased rather than decreased, with all the undesirable
results of confusion.
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO.3
Specification of error No. 3 is based upon the
Court's refusal to dismiss the supplemental complaint
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of the plaintiffs as to all of the plaintiffs. Only by
granting this motion of the defendant could the defendant have secured the right of trial by jury to which it
was entitled. By refusing this motion, the Court permitted the action to continue as an action in equity,
with all of the plaintiffs misjoined, and with their causes
of action improperly united and not separately stated,
and barred by the Statute of Limitations. See State v.
Hart, 26 Ut. 229.

Stockhausen v. Oehler, 186 Wis. 277, 201 N. W. 823
(1925) par. 2 of the syllabi states:
''Constitutional right to jury trial cannot,
under rule that equity having assumed jurisdiction will retain it, be defeated by mere allegation
of equitable cause of action which in fact does not
exist.''
Par. 3 of syllabi:
''To warrant equity in retaining jurisdiction
once assumed, and in granting legal relief, it is
essential that an equitable cause of action growing out of transaction prior to the commencement
of action exists, that equitable action was commenced in good faith, that equitable relief cannot
be had or is impracticable, that constitutional
right of trial by jury will not be denied, and that
ends of justice will thereby be best served.''
In the opinion of Justice Crownhart appears the
following:
''In the McLennan case, supra, the court
speaks of the fact that the practice of granting
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relief 'in the interest of a speedy and economical
settlement of controversy has been so progressive
that it can no longer be properly said that where
the facts of a case warrant only legal relief, and
were known to the plaintiff when he commenced
his action for equitable relief, the court will not,
should not, or cannot afford the former.' But
the court there carefully pointed out, as we have
shown, the limits of that progress. Our constitution provides that the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate. And this court has held
that that provision means the right of jury trial
as it existed in the territory of Wisconsin, at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution. La Bowe
v. Balthazor, 180 Wis. 419, 193 N. W. 244, 32
A. L. R. 862. No progress in the law can be made
by the courts beyond the limits of the Constitution, and none was intended by the language
quoted. In some of the authorities from other
states it will be found that statutes have extended
equity jurisdiction beyond the limits permissible
under our Constitution, and in some cases the
courts, not restrained as here, have progressed
in a similar degree in extending equitable jurisdiction.''
In Reynolds v. Warner, 258 N. W. 462, 97 A. L. R.
1128 (Neb. 1935) the Supreme Court of Nebraska said:
''When the trial court determined that the
interveners were not entitled to equitable relief,
the court was without power to determine the
legal action without the intervention of a jury.
It is a general rule that, where a court in the
exercise of its equity powers acquires jurisdiction for any purpose, its jurisdiction will continue for all purposes, and it will try all issues."
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(Citing authorities.) ''But where there is no
equitable relief granted, a court of equity will
generally decline jurisdiction to enter a money
judgment on a legal cause of action. This is
especially true where such a course would operate
to deprive a party of his constitutional right to
a trial by jury. The constitutional right to a trial
by jury cannot be defeated by an allegation of an
equitable cause of action which does not exist."
(Citing authorities.) "The interveners were not
entitled to equitable relief in this case, and the
parties did not waive their right to a jury trial
upon the question of the amount, if any, due
interveners.''
In the case of Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 105 N. Y.
567, 12 N. E. 58 (1887) Mr. Justice Peckham said:
''When a party alleges a cause of action of
an equitable nature, he must prove one, so far
as the question of a trial by jury is concerned;
and he cannot escape such tribunal by alleging
an equitable cause of action, and, while wholly failing to prove it, obtain a trial by the court of a
common law action arising out of the transaction.''
In Boonville Nat. Bank v. Blakey, 166 Ind. 427, 76
N. E. 529 (1906) the Court said: .
'' * * * under the code, where law and equity are
administered in the same court, a plaintiff cannot be permitted to deprive the defendant of the
right to a jury trial by the making of allegations
whereby an equitable issue is tendered, and then
maintain the finding on the ground that sufficient
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facts 'vere sho""ll to \\Tarrant a recovery in a court
of la,v. ''
In lyan .A.uken v. Damrneier, 27 Ore. 150, 40 Pac.
89 (1895) the Court, speaking by Chief Justice Bean,
said:
"'"\!Jiere the rights of the several plaintiffs
are purely legal, and in themselves perfectly
distinct, so that each party's case depends upon
its own peculiar circumstances, and the relief
demanded is a separate money judgment in favor
of each plaintiff and against the defendant, there
is no 'practical necessity' for the interposition of
a court of equity, and we can find no authority
for holding that it will assume jurisdiction simply
because the parties are numerous. A defendant
is entitled to the constitutional right of trial by
jury, of which he cannot be deprived because
numerous parties are asserting claims against
him, even though such claims may be founded
upon the same questions of law and fact.''

SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 4
A great many assignments of error based upon the
lower Court's erroneous rulings upon evidence appear
in the record. Under Specification No.4 we have grouped
all of these assigned errors, and desire at this point to
discuss specifically those to which the cases cited in this
brief have special application, and indicate the seriousness of the lower Court's errors in prejudicing the
rights of the defendant in the trial of the action:
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(a) In the examination of Paul Swartz, it appeared
that he had on occasions taken his family to the doctor.
If we assume there was any damage which could have
been allowed either under the pleadings or the proof in
this case on account of any personal injury suffered by
the plaintiffs because of the odors emanating from
this plant, we contend that the defendant was entitled
to inquire in detail into the actual causes of illness which
required the attendance of a physician upon the family
of Paul Swartz. If, on the other hand, as defendant
very earnestly contends throughout this brief, the only
element of damage pleaded was an injury to property,
then of course the Court's ruling in this respect did not
constitute prejudicial error. It is submitted, therefore,
that this ruling for its validity depends in turn upon
the view this appellate court takes in reviewing the law
and the evidence in this case.
(b) and (c) The evidence in this case discloses the
fact that the Utah State Tax Commission in 1934 to 1936
made a re-appraisal of all of the lands of Utah County
in connection with similar appraisals throughout the
State of Utah, to arrive at the actual value of property
in the State, together with the actual replacement cost
of improvements thereon, for the purpose of equalizing
taxes throughout the State. It is submitted, to have
denied the defendant the right of this evidence for purposes of comparison was to deny a substantial right.
The defendant was not only entitled to have this evidence admitted, but to have the Court determine, as a
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court of equity, the "reight to be given thereto, taking
into consideration all of the facts and circumstances in
connection therewith.
Even one of the plaintiff's expert witnesses as to
value, La,vrence C. Johnson (Abs. 332), testified that
he helped make the State Tax Commission's re-appraisement in Benjamin about 1936, and took it into consideration in the appraisals he made. He further stated that
the State Tax Commission appraised it from the standpoint of what it would produce. He was one of those
appointed to classify the real estate as ''A'', '' B'' and
"C" land, but upon his cross-examination he couldn't
tell what this classification was with reference to any
of the lands of the plaintiffs. Had these Exhibits 18 and
18A and similar exhibits with reference to each of the
lands of the plaintiffs been a<lm:itted in evidence, this
witness could have been thoroughly cross-examined concerning the same, and caused to state his reasons, if
any he had, why the appraisal he made for the State
Tax Commission based upon what the land would produce did or did not constitute a reasonable market value
therefor, and why it differed from his appraisals given
on this trial.
This presents essentially a different case than the
case of placing in evidence the valuation assessed against
the land by the County Assessor, upon which tax levies
are based. There is no good reason why, in an
equity case in which the Court is called upon to take into
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consideration all of the facts and circumstances, the
assessed value of the land as fixed by the County Assessor for tax purposes should not be taken into consideration for. comparative purposes, where there are eleven
different tracts of land, all in the same vicinity, to be
considered by the Court in a single action. The Court's
error in refusing to permit the introduction of the assessed valuations by the County _Assessor is covered by
sub-division (g) of this specification of error, and it is
submitted should be considered in connection with our
present discussion.
This case does not present the reasons for eliminating this evidence that are present in an action involving but a single tract of land, where the necessity
for comparing the values is not to be found. These
exhibits furthermore showed the farm land to be classified with reference to its fertility, and an appraisal was
placed upon the value. of the various acreages found
in the three classes, ''A'', '' B '' and '' C ''. Johnson, one
of the very men who made this classification, comes into
this case, and defendant is denied the right to place in
evidence the classification which he himself made of
these lands. The prejudicial error is the more apparent
when it is appreciated that Mr. Johnson's appraised
values given in this case made no classification of the
land, and he testified that one acre was as valuable as
another, and appraised all of them at the highest price.
There are several other assignments of error involving this same general principle which we will not
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take the space to conunent on separately, but would
appreciate the Court's consideration of them all in
weighing the seriousness of this basic error.
(d) The error covered by this sub-division may
or may not be an important specification of error. The
Court made no specific finding as to whether the plant
was operated in a sanitary condition or not. If this
Court, in reviewing the evidence, does not consider the
sanitary condition of the plant an issue under the pleadings or under the evidence, then whether the defendant
was permitted to offer evidence to show the sanitary
condition of the plant by those competent through long
experience to speak, would not be serious. If, however,
the damage is in any wise predicated upon the manner
in which the plant was operated or constructed, rather
than upon the premise that it was illegal to operate the
plant under any circumstances in its present location,
denying to the defendant the right to show the plant was
operated in a sanitary condition was an extremely prejudicial error, and went directly to a denial of the defendant's right to mitigate damages which might have
been or were adjudged against the defendant. Here,
again, the question of just what issues were raised by
the complaint is brought into question, and appellant's
position is definitely to the effect that neither the pleadings nor the evidence discloses an issue as to the method
of operating the plant, but is confined alone to whether
such an industry could be operated under any circumstances in that locality.
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(e) Defendant contends that it was entitled to
show on cross-examination of plaintiffs' expert witness
on value, T. M. Anderson, that Anderson did not take
into consideration, in assessing the value of his brother
Rufus Anderson's improvements at 100% loss, that
these improvements, for the most part, were placed upon
the land after defendant's plant began operations.
In the first place, there would seem to be no reason
why it should not be competent for defendant to show
exactly what the expert appraiser took into consideration and what he did not, in order that the proper estimate or weight to be given to this testimony might be
intelligently determined by the Court. By all of the
authorities, an expert is entitled to be subjected to the
most scrutinizing cross-examination to determine not
only his knowledge and experience but the actual basis
upon which he predicated his assessment, and to develop,
if possible, essential elements which he failed to take
into consideration. His is essentially opinion evidence.
Furthermore, it is one thing for a man to say that his
property is 100% depreciated by the presence of the
defendant's plant when the plant came after his property was improved. It is . essentially a different situa..
tion when the improvements are placed upon the property after the plant is in operation, and it is submitted
any fair appraisal would have to take this into consideration.
(f)
trolli~g

If there is one issue in this case more conthan any other, it is the issue as to the nature
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of this community. The Court in its findings says it is
not industrial. This finding is contrary to all the evidence. Counsel could not understand upon the trial of
this action and cannot no"" understand what possible
justification the lower Court could have had in denying
to the defendant the right to offer evidence pertaining
to the industrial nature of this community, even though
the question in substance and form called for the conclusion of expert appraisers. Here, again, it was important to obtain the opinion of appraisers in determining their view point, and thus explaining their appraisal.
It was defendant's purpose to show that this defendant's appraisers appraised said land as industrial
and considered the coming of industry into that section
a circumstance to increase rather than decrease the
value of real estate. The values which they gave which
appear in Column 11 and 12 of Exhibit 1 appearing in
the appendix to this brief are the values of the property
with or without the plant there. Defendant endeavored
to show that this opinion was predicated in part upon
the fact that the highest possible value obtainable for
this land would be for industrial purposes, and that the
value of farm lands for use strictly for residential purposes would never amount to anything unless it were
residences for industrial workers. To deny the defendant the right to go into this question of the nature of
the community in the light of this Court's decision in
the Dahl case was not only erroneous but prejudicially

so.
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SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 5
(a) 1. Elsewhere in this brief we have commented
upon the fact that the evidence of the plaintiffs clearly
showed that John Anderson, Ed Ludlow and Mrs. Hansen were not the owners of the property described in
the supplemental complaint. In spite of this fact, the
Court found, as we point out in sub-division (a-1) of
this specification of error, that the plaintiffs were the
owners of the lands and farms. No evidence as to title
was introduced except the statement of the plaintiffs
themselves, and when their testimony discloses a title
vested elsewhere, there is nothing left upon which to
predicate this finding by the Court.
It is an essential element of the case, and without
it these plaintiffs would not be entitled to the damage
the Court awarded them. It would, therefore, conclusively appear that regardless of the validity of any other
contention of the defendant, the judgment of the Court
including damages to these plaintiffs was erroneous and
obviously prejudicial.
(a) 2. That defendant's premises were far less
objectionable than plaintiffs'; so far as manure and the
drainage therefrom is concerned, is clearly established
by the evidence. In this respect the defendant's plant
was maintained in a far more sanitary and a much less
objectionable condition than the very back yards of the
plaintiffs, and, therefore, the Court grievously erred in
finding that the surroundings of defendant's plant caused
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noxious odors to be discharged into the surrounding
atmosphere, and in failing to find that these ''noxious''
odors were the same identical odors emanating from
each of the 1nanure piles, each of the barn yards, each of
the pig pens and chicken coops of the plaintiffs.
The lo\ver Court certainly did not use the word
"noxious" advisedly, because there was no evidence
throughout the trial that any odor of any kind emanating from defendant~s plant was a "noxious" odor. The
definition of "noxious" would clearly indicate that the
lower Court did not mean ''noxious'' as that term is
properly understood, but rather intended simply '' objectionable'' or ''unpleasant'' odors, harmless to human
beings, animal or plant life. If the Court intended more
than this by the use of this term, then this use is clearly
contrary to and not supported by any evidence in this
case.
The Court found as a fact that the deposit of
manure on defendant's premises is partially covered
with cinders (Abs. 182). Dr. Taylor testified that it
was covered with lime and cinders (Abs. 371). Mr.
Soble testified, ''We throw the waste matter on the
premises and sprinkle it with fresh lime all the time."
The Court might well have found the fact to be that the
manure at defendant's plant was covered with lime, as
well as cinders. We urge the Court, as a court of equity
reviewing the facts as well as the law, to compare this
method of treatment with the condition of the plaintiffs'
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premises, as shown by the exhibits and the testimony of
the doctors.
(a} 3. This subdivision forms the basis of a good
deal of discussion concerning the industrial nature of the
community in which defendant located its plant. It is,
therefore, at this point simply submitted that the Court
erred in finding that this area was not industrial, and
likewise erred in failing to find its true nature. It is
furthermore urged that whether the community be classified as industrial or not, the Court does not find it was
an improper community for the location of such a plant
as the defendant's, and there is no law which justifies
the conclusion that defendant's plant could not be built
outside of an industrial area; in fact, its propriety in a
section strictly agricultural, where the basic agricultural
industry is stock raising, would seen1 to be too clear
for argument.
It is appellant's contention that the Dahl case, hereafter in this brief discussed in detail, controls in light
of the evidence in this case, regardless of whether the
community be called agricultural or industrial. The fact
remains that this was a proper place for the location
of this plant-proper when the plaintiffs' witness Greer
located it there for the defendant ;-proper when the
plaintiff Selene worked there ;-proper when the plaintiff
John Anderson worked there before the fire ;-proper
when the plaintiff John Anderson helped to rebuild the
plant and worked there after the fire; and proper
throughout its entire history as the various plaintiffs
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came there with their dead animals to be disposed of,
their live animals to be killed and disposed of, and to
purchase the products of the plant for the feeding of
their live stock in their own agricultural business. It was,
moreover, a proper location for the establishment of:
1. Union Pacific Railroad main line.
2. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad main line.
3. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. sugar factory.
4. Pea vinery to handle local crops.
5. Flour mill for local wheat.
6. Brick yard for local building materials.
7. Alfalfa mill for feed for local live stock.
8. Cattle feed yards-local stock yards.
9. Stock loading yards on both railroads.
10. Beet storage and loading chutes on both railroads.
11. W oolloading platforms and storage on railroads.
12. Steel plant near by.
13. Defendant's rendering plant for local use.
(a) 4. This finding goes to the elements of damage.
This finding is not supported by the evidence, in view of
the conditions existing around these homes and on the
premises of the plaintiffs themselves. Furthermore, the
elements of damage therein found would only be properly
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trict, that is to say, a finding that the plant was located
in an unreasonable and, therefore, improper or unlawful
location. Such findings do not appear in the record, and,
as contended throughout, none is justified by the evidence.
The damage allowed is permanent when temporary
damages at best could be recovered. The damages allowed
is to property; the damage proven is the personal discomfort of plaintiffs.

Temporary as Distinguished from Permanent Damages
(Spec. of Error No. 5)
(b), (c) and (d). In the case of Johnson v. UtahIdaho Cent. Ry. Co., 68 Ut. 309, in discussing the case of
a railroad constructing a road along a street in the city
of Ogden constituting a nuisance to the property owners
whose residences fronted said street, the Court, quoting
from Wood on Limitations, (3d Ed.) Sec. 180, says:
''But while this is the rule as to nuisances of
a transient rather than of a permanent character,
yet when the original nuisance is of a permanent
character so that the damage inflicted thereby is
of a permanent character, and goes to the entire
destruction of the estate affected- thereby or will
be likely to continue for an indefinite period, and
during its existence deprive the landowner of any
beneficial use of that portion of his estate, a recovery not only may but must be had for the entire damage in one action, as the damage is
deemed to be original; and as the entire damage
accrues from the time the nuisance is created and
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only one recoYery can be had, the statute of limitations begins to run fron1 the time of its erection against the tnvner of the estate or estates
affected thereby.''
Again, in the case 0 'Neill v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L.
R. R. Co., 38 Ut. 475, 114 Pac. 127, the plaintiff sought to
enjoin the Inaintenance of a spur track claimed to constitute a nuisance. Our Court again in this case says:
"True, in cases like the one at bar the damages must be recovered once for all in one action,
and must be assessed as having occurred at the
time when the first injury to the property arose
because a con1plete cause or right of action then
arose in favor of respondent. To this right nothing could be added, since it was just as complete
a cause or right of action after the first train
passed the house and shook it and injured it to
some extent as it was after a hundred trains had
passed and had shaken it, and injured it more.''
See also 104-56-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933.
Under statutes such as 104-56-1 it is said in the
note in 61 A. L. R. 937 :
''Where there are statutory proVIsions for
relief from a nuisance either by enjoining it or
allowing damages to compensate for the injury
ascribable to it, the court may consider the detriment to the plaintiff from denying injunctive relief and the hardship to the defendant by granting such relief, and, if the business or industry
complained of is a lawful one, injunctive relief
may be denied where to grant such relief would
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subject the defendant to a loss much greater than
any advantage to the plaintiff, and the latter will
be left to pursue the statutory remedy for damages. Daniels v. Keokuk Waterworks (1883), 61
Iowa 549, 16 N. W. 705; Madison v. Duckstown
Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. (1904), 113 Tenn. 231,
83 S. W. 658; Union Planters' Bank & T. Co. v.
lviemphis Hotel Co. ( 1911), 124 Tenn. 649, 39
L. R. A. (N. S.) 580, 139 S. W. 715; Cowper v.
Laidler (1903), 2 Ch. (Eng.) 337 referred to in
annotation in 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 899."
Where a nuisance consists of the use of a structure
which is lawful and not in itself a nuisance the relief
should be by enjoining such use and not by destruction
of the structure. There are nuisances of a permanent
character and nuisances of a temporary character. Of
course, where a single plaintiff is granted equitable relief against a nuisance it is proper to award that plaintiff such damages as he has already suffered; but where
there is a permanent nuisance a plaintiff cannot recover
entire damages, past, present and prospective, and also
obtain equitable relief. If the plaintiff wishes permanent
damages he should elect to proceed to recover the same,
and his election must be as between such damages or for
a removal of the nuisance by means of an injunction. He
cannot have both, and it is submitted that he cannot try
first for one and then for the other and keep the door
open so that he may thereafter elect to take that which
is most beneficial to him.
The doctrine of election requires a determination
by the party who is required to exercise it at the time he
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commences his first suit. It is not permissible even on
the trial to change the theory upon which the suit was
brought, and certainly it is not pern1issible to try the
case out upon one theory and then have its determination held in abeyance, allowing the case to stand without
final decree until the plaintiff tries out another inconsistent theory. See Cook v. Covey Ballard Motor Co.,
69 Ut. 161, 253 Pac. 196.
The finding of the Court here complained of
:finds an element of permanent damage, whereas the evidence discloses nothing but a temporary or intermittent
damage, a subject which is thoroughly discussed in this
brief. Furthermore, the element of damage is again
predicated upon the existence in this vicinity of a strictly
residential community, in which industry in its various
phases would be unlawful.
The alleged wrongs are intermittent and occasional.
Permanent damages are not recoverable for such injuries. To allow a recovery for alleged depreciation of
plaintiffs' properties would be contrary to and against
the law, in that the same would not be the lawful measure of damage for any personal discomfort that has been
suffered by any of the plaintiffs. The result of this contention, if sound, requires a reversal of the judgment
and a dismissal of the action. There is no proof of the
extent of temporary damages suffered by any of these
plaintiffs for or on account of personal discomfort. Plaintiffs have attempted to recover for an alleged decrease
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in the value of their real estate. These are permanent
da1nages. The Court so finds in its findings.
Take the case of any one of the plaintiffs. If he recover the judgment awarded him by the lower Court
he retains the judgment and his property. Then, if the evidence of the plaintiffs were true, if the plant discontinued
operations or moved away, or its operations were enjoined
by someone else, the plaintiffs' property would immediately rise in value in an amount equal to the judgment. The
plaintiff would then have his property with its present
value unimpaired, plus the amount of the judgment in cash.
Certainly such a result cannot be authorized by law, and
the courts do not permit the recovery of permanent
damages under such circumstances. Permanent damages
are barred by the Statute of Limitations.
A clear distinction between the basis of dainages
for a temporary nuisance and the basis for a permanent
nuisance is drawn by the courts, and the use of the wrong
basis is reversible error. For a temporary nuisance, the
basis is a loss of use, or a depreciation in rental value;
for a permanent nuisance, the basis is a depreciation in
market value. The lower Court failed to make this distinction. In its findings (No. 13 of its Memorandum decision as incorporated in Finding No. 1, Ab. p. 391) it
found the odors sufficient to injure the plaintiffs by
making their homes substantially less desirable as dwelling places and by making their lands less attractive to
tenants. It was error to give a judgment of a depreciation in market value which follows this finding of temporary injury.
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Vogt v. City of Gr-innell, (Iowa 1094), 98 N. W. 782.
In this case the defendant discharged its sewer
into the river opposite plaintiff's farm. A judgment for
the plaintiff was reversed, the Supreme Court saying:
"The mere fact that the city sewers 'vere of
permanent construction did not render the nuisance occasioned by them permanent also, for the
municipality had the right at any time to abate
it. In this respect cases like the present one
differ from Powers v. City of Council Bluffs, 45
Iowa 652, 24 Am. Rep. 972, for there, as was observed in Hunt v. Iowa Central Ry., 86 Iowa 15,
52 N. W. 668, 41 Am. St. Rep. 473, 'the whole injury was regarded as having occurred at one time,
and, that time having been more than five years
prior to the commencement of the suit, it was held
to be barred. The injury was of such a character
as to be beyond the defendant's power to remedy. It would be compelled to go onto lands of
others to erect barriers to prevent the damage. In
this case, as is shown by the evidence, the remedy
is in the defendant's own hands, by work done
upon its own land.' Again, it was pointed out in
Bennett v. City of Marion (Iowa), 93 N. W. 558,
that the injury in the Powers Case was beyond the
city's power to repair. 'The remedy to be applied
there, if any, was the construction of a wall on
plaintiff's premises, where defendant had no right
to go. Here the remedy could be applied on defendant's own premises, and there can be no
doubt of its duty to abate the nuisance.' ''
The Court continued :
''The measure of damages flowing from a
continuing nuisance is not, as suggested in the
motion, the depreciation of the market value of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

106
the land, for it may be abated some time, but
ordinarily the loss in its use caused thereby, and
such special damages as may result therefrom.''
The case of Bartlett v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 92
W.Va. 445, ~15 S. E. 451, 27 A. L. R. 54 (1922), is both
interesting and instructive. The judgment was for $15,500 in favor of a farmer owning and residing upon a
tract of land containing about 137.5 acres, and was
against a corporation owning and operating a large industrial plant situated on a 160 acre tract owned by it.
In this plant the Chemical Company reduced zinc ores,
and it was claimed that certain gases, smoke, dust and
fumes coming from the furnaces of the chemical plant
injured the agricultural, residential and market values
of the farm. These fumes, gases and dust were carried
over the land of the plaintiff by air currents and spread
over it through the air. One of the deposits complained
of was zinc oxide, which, having been deposited on vegetation on the farm and eaten by live stock proved to be
deleterious and fatal in some instances. Another deposit
was sulphur dioxide, and this caused an excessive acidity
of the soil, resulting in diminution of its fertility and
producing capacity.
This brief statement, without going further, will
illustrate that the damages were substantial. The Court
pointed out in its opinion that it was an important factor in the determination of the character of an injury
to real property to determine the character of the wrong
itself. It said that the injury or wrong might be slight
and readily compensable in damages. On the other hand,
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it n1ight be of considerable 1nagnitude and yet not be
continuous. There might be a continuing cause without
a continuing injury. After such consideration the Court
said:
"There al'e son1e general propositions, ho"\vever~ that can be asserted with safety, as to the
requirements of a cause of action for original and
pern1anent damages. The injury must be constant
and continuous, not occasional, intermittent or
recurrent. ' '
Later on it is pointed out that it was an important matter
to determine whether the cause of the injury was temporary or intermittent. If under certain circumstances
the plant can be operated without doing any harm and
yet under other circumstances it may do harm, then the
injury is of a temporary character. Permanent damages
are given on the theory that the cause of injury is fixed
and interminable, and that the property injured must
always remain subject to it. The Court then said:
''This requisite element of permanency does
not exist and cannot be found in those cases in
which the structure, business or other agency of
injury is unlawful and may be abated, at the instance of the injured party. To make the cause
of the injury permanent in the legal sense of the
term, there must be legal right to maintain it in
force or operation. If, against the will of him who
has set it in force, it may be abated by legal process, at the instance of the complaining party, it
must necessarily be temporary and the damages
temporary, and so the authorities say.''
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Now, to think, using John Anderson's property as
an illustration, that Anderson could recover and collect
a judgment for substantially fifty per cent of what the
Court found to be the market value of his property, after
he had actively participated as an employee of the defendant in the operation of the old and the construction
of the new plant, and then go on and enjoy that same
property in its entirety, is indeed an extraordinary peculiarity of the law, if such is the law. Would not every
person owning property similarly situated to that of Anderson have a like right to recover fifty per cent of
the value of his property, or at least some percentage?
If the judgment is awarded and paid it is on the theory
that the property has been permanently damaged and
that the owners of the plant have paid that permanent
damage and have a continuing right to maintain and
operate the plant, inasmuch as Anderson's property is
concerned. This certainly could not bind some other person who owned other property in the vicinity of the plant
who has not recovered a judgment in this case, particularly John Anderson's wife, in whom the title to the
property vests. The other owners of property, including
John Anderson's wife, might see fit to have the alleged
nuisance removed and do away with the cause of the depreciation, and might also in another action succeed. The
payment of all of the judgments which might ultimately
be given against the defendant in this and in future suits
might well bankrupt the defendant and thus compel defendant to abandon its plant and business. Such an abandonment would immediately restore the value of plain-
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tiffs' properties to the values claimed for said properties
in the absence of defendant's plant. Here again, the
plaintiffs 'vould have their property without depreciation
and the amount of the judgment also.

The ''1 est \rirginia Court further said: (par. 5 of
syllabi)
''Damages to land, occasioned by emission of
smoke, gases, dust, and fumes from smelting furnaces maintained and operated on an adjoining
or neighboring tract of land, causing deposits or
chemical substances which impair its enjoyment,
productiveness, and value, are temporary in the
legal sense of the term, and permanent damages
are not recoverable for such an injury.''
In the case of Thackery v. U. P. Cement Co., 64 Ut.
437, 231 Pac. 813, this Court cited this West Virginia
case and seemed to approve of the distinction the West
Virginia Court made between temporary and permanent
damage. This Court says :
"No good reason appears, therefore, why, if
the parties so elect either by agreement or by
acquiescence, the Court should not permit a recovery of compensation as for a permanent injury
in one action.''
The Thackery case rests upon the fact that the record shows an agreement or acquiescence of the parties
plaintiff and defendant, for the Court to permit a recovery of compensation as for a permanent injury. It was
suggested by the defendant in the Thackery case that
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the Court had no power to permit such a recovery, but
the Supreme Court held that the trial court did have
power, where both parties had acquiesced and agreed to
the Court making an award as for a permanent injury.
The difference between the Utah case and the West
Virginia case cited by the Utah Court appears to be that
the Utah Court permitted the parties to acquiesce in the
recovery of permanent injuries, whereas, the West Virginia Court concluded that the case had been tried upon
an altogether erroneous and untenable basis and disregarded the effect of acquiescence.
There has been no agreement or acquiescence in this
case. The appellant has at every step insisted there can be
no recovery at all, and has specifically made its objection relying upon the distinction between temporary and
permanent damages. It has said and now says that the
wrong, if wrong there is, is merely a ten1porary one
and can only be compensated for while it continues. If
this defendant should in some manner acquire these properties that are owned by the plaintiffs, and all other
properties similarly situated or affected, then it should
not be required to pay damages as might be sustained
or suffered by these properties after defendant became
the owner thereof, or if the plant went out of business
or was lawfully abated by injunction, the award made to
the plaintiffs by the lower Court would be grossly unjust
and excessive. It is submitted that under the facts and
circumstances as they exist in this case, there is no cause
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of action for per1nanent dan1ages, because the presence
of the rendering plant inflicts or causes no such injury.
The plaintiffs have proceeded on an erroneous and untenable basis, and the lower Court has fallen into the
same error. See Ehlert u. Galveston H. & S. A.. Ry. Co.,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 274 S. W. 172.

In Theisen v. Pittmans & Dean Co., 162 N. W. 76, the
Michigan Supreme Court said :
''The case at bar was instituted for the purpose of recovering the difference between the
market value of the property at the time it was
purchased by the plaintiff and the market value
at the time he sold it upon the theory that the
erection and maintenance of the structure in
question constituted a permanent nuisance. The
court at the close of the plaintiff's case directed
a verdict in favor of the defendant upon the
ground that under the facts of the case the nuisance complained of was not permanent, and therefore that depreciation in the property itself could
not be recovered, and, as plaintiff did not claim
anything in this action on account of the depreciation of the usable or rental value, he could not
recover.
''The sole question presented by appellant's
four assignments of error is whether the trial
court was in error in directing a verdict for
defendant upon the ground that the erection and
maintenance of a barn on the premises adjacent to
those of the plaintiff did not, under the authorities, constitute a permanent nuisance.
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''Under the decisions of our own court, we are
of opinion that the action of the learned trial
judge was proper. . . .
''Judgment is affirmed.' '
What is the true nature of the cause of action~ Is
the action one for permanent damage~ Have permanent
damages been established by the proof~ The damage is
mere personal discomfort suffered for part of one day
and perhaps not suffered again for several days. If a
visitor or an employee of the plaintiffs suffers such personal discomfort which results in actionable injury, this
visitor or employee cannot be compensated for the inconvenience suffered by awarding the owner of the property damage for its depreciation on that account. This
would be giving to the owner a damage which he had not
sustained, because he was not present when the visitor
or employee endured this personal discomfort. The recovery of such a damage by the owner would not defeat
the visitor's or the agent's cause of action. If it existed
at all, it would continue to exist in spite of the award,
and even the payment, of such damage to the owner of
the land. The true nature of the cause of action, if any
there be, is a temporary personal injury, and the plaintiffs, without any acquiescence on the part of defendant,
have attempted to obtain damages which do not proceed
or at all result from the injury complained of in the
evidence. These plaintiffs have undertaken to prove personal injury of a temporary character, and then recover
for a .permanent injury to real property.

Surely the
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lav~T

will not permit such a recovery as permanent damages 'vhen the injury is at the very most only temporary
and purely personal. This appellant seriously contends
that there is no competent proof in this record of any
da1nage or injury that has been done.
In considering the "'-rest \Tirginia case the Court
must keep in mind that the injuries done did affect and
materially injure the land, and the crops that would ordinarily be grown thereon. There was strictly temporary
damage to the land. In the Thackery case dust from the
cement company's plant passed over and settled on the
land. The Supreme Court held that this was ''a recurring nuisance." There it was claimed that there was an
injury to grown and growing crops and hay stored on the
premises. It also held that even though the plaintiff had
delayed in bringing his action for ten years, still it could
not be said that the injury was a permanent one so as to
bar the phtintiff 's right of action by lapse of time. The
Court said that this nuisance was recurrent in its nature
and not ''uninterruptedly continuing'' in its nature. If
the nuisance had been a permanent one, as contradistinguished from a temporary or recurrent one, the statute

of limitations would have barred the plaintiff's right to
recover. In both the West Virginia and the Utah Thackery case there was a substantial injury to the property.
In the case at bar there is no injury to the property.
Personal discomfort complained of, if within the zone
occupied by plaintiffs' property, would be just as great
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to a person not owning property as to a person owning
property.
Paragraph 13 of the Court's original memorandum
embodied in its Finding of Facts No. 1 (Abs. 391) specifically finds that the odors emanating from defendant's
plant do not constantly permeate the homes of any of
the plaintiffs, and the extent to which they permeate the
homes of the plaintiffs is not the same in each instance,
but rather depends upon the direction of the wind and
the distances separating the plaintiffs' homes from defendant's plant. The evidence further shows that some
of plaintiffs complain of the odor of the manure pile in
the defendant's yard, others the odors from the cooker
only when the cooking operation is carried on. This i~
intermittent, some days longer than others and some
days not at all. This is clearly a finding by the Court
of a temporary injury rather than a permanent injury.
The Court makes no conclusion of law as to whether the
damages are permanent or temporary.
In Cross v. Texas Military College, (Texas Civ.
App.) 1933, 65 S~ W. (2d) 794, the plaintiff alleged that
because of the odors of defendant's slaughtering pen
the reasonable market value of plaintiff's premises was
reduced to the extent of $300, and that by reason of the
fact that plaintiff was forced to abandon his home and
could not rent the premises to other parties, he was damaged in the sum of $200. The Court said:
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"It is e-vident that the nuisance alleged, and
that "'"hich the testimony tends to establish, could
have been abated, either voluntarily ren1oved or
avoided by the aggrieved party, and the alleged
value of appellant's property restored. In fact,
the record sho\YS that the nuisance had been reInoved at the time of the institution of this suit.
It is well settled in this state that, in such cases,
the depreciation in rentals and such consequential
personal inconvenience and hurt as may be the
nature and direct proximate result arising from
such a nuisance are the elements of damage recoverable~ and not the depreciation in market value of such property. City of San Antonio v.
Mackey·s Estate, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 145, 54 S. W.
33, 34; City of Paris v. Jenkins, 57 Tex. Civ. App.
383, 122 S. W. 411; Baugh v. Railroad Co., 80
Tex. 56, 15 S. W. 587; City of Honey Grove v.
Jfills, (Tex. Civ. App.) 235 S. vV. 267.
"In the case of City of San Antonio v.
Mackey~·s Estate, supra, involving a cause of action based on stenches and bad odors similar to
the case at bar, the court said: 'Such being the
case presented by the evidence, the depreciation
in the market value of the land was not the measure of damages, and the judge presenting that
issue to the jury can have no other tendency than
that of misleading them. As to a nuisance capable of abatement, the depreciation of the value
of the property can have no applicability. The
settled rule of damages in such cases is the difference in the rental value with and without the
nuisance.'

''In consonance with this holding, our Supreme Court, in Baugh v. Railroad Co., supra,
announced the terse rule that: ' * * * When the
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nuisances complained of are of a temporary character, such as may be voluntarily removed or
avoided by the wrong-doer, or such as the injured
party may cause to be abated, only such damages
as have accrued up to the institution of the suit
or (under our system) to the trial of the action can
be recovered. For such damages depreciation in
the value of the property affected by the injury
is not a measure, and in such a suit the a1nount
of such depreciation cannot be recovered.'
''We conclude that the trial court did not err
in sustaining appellee's motion for an instructed
verdict.''

In Oates v. Algodon Manufacturing Company, 217
N. C. 488, 8 S. E. (2d) 605 (1940), the plaintiff recovered
damages for pollution of a stream across plaintiff's farm.
The Court instructed the jury:
'' 'and that damage would be the difference
that you find between the value of his land immediately prior to the pollution of the stream, if
you find it was polluted, and the reasonable marketable value of his land immediately after it was
polluted and in addition thereto, any inconvenience and annoyance by way of odors suffered by
him to his land, any damages by virtue of not
being able to use the stream for the watering of
his stock and any other usual use the stream
could be put to during those dates.' Exception.
''The trial court inadvertently fell into error
in stating that the measure of damages would be
the difference between the reasonable market
value of the land immediately before and after
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the injury·. 'In cases of this kind, 'vhen the damage is due to a cause that may be removed or a
nuisance that may be abated, the measure of damage is not the difference in the market value of
the land before and after the injury, but is estimated by comparing its productiveness before
and after the flooding. S pilnzan v. Roanoke N avigation Co., 74 N. C. 675 (16 Am. & Eng. Enc. 984.'
Adams v. Durham &!; N. R. Co., 110 N. C. 325,
14 S. E. 857, 860 ~ Jones v. J( ramer & Bros. Co.,
133 N. C. 446, 45 S. E. 827; Garrett v. Board of
Com·rs., 74 N. C. 388.
"For the error, as indicated the appellant is
entitled to a new trial. It is so ordered."

In City of Ada v. Melberg, 160 N. W. 257 (Minn.
1916), the plaintiff brought an action to enjoin the flowing of sewage across his land and asked for damages.

The Court said :
''The court instructed the jury that they
might assess the damages to the appellant by
reason of the injury to his land, and that the
measure of damages was the difference between
the value of the land with the sewer on it and the
value thereof without the sewer. The jury found
for appellant. Respondent moved for a new trial,
which was granted on the ground :
'That the court erred in instructing
the jury upon the question as to the measure of damages and in the admission of
evidence with reference to damages.'
"This appeal is taken from the order granting a ·new trial.
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''The only question presented on this appeal
is whether or not the court laid down the correct
rule of damages. The trial court evidently submitted the case to the jury on the theory that the
noxious odors, the noisome deposits, and the flow
of tainted water from the sewer would continue
permanently, and thus constitute a permanent
injury to the land, leaving out of consideration
appellant's right to cause the nuisance to be
abated by injunction. Examination of the record
leads us to the conclusion that this is a continuing
nuisance, and that the learned trial court properly
granted a new trial. It will not be presumed that
the nuisance will be continued, or that the municipality will make no effort to abate it. Sloggy v.
Dilworth, 38 ~finn. 179, 36 N. W. 451, 8 Am. St.
Rep. 656; Gilbert v. Boak Fish Co., 86 ~[inn. 365,
90 N. W. 767, 58 L. R. A. 735. It is very probable
that this will be done. The attitude of the city
officials at the trial justifies us in this assumption.
"We cannot treat this action as in the nature
of an assessment for damages in a condemnation proceeding. It was not such a case, and nowhere in the record is the suggestion made that a
verdict rendered in this action would give to the
city of Ada any greater rights in appellant's land
than it had before the action was brought. The
case has resolved itself into an action for damages
for the maintaining of a nuisance, and we may
not, especially in the absence of statutory authority, convert it into a condemnation proceeding.
''That the action was begun by the respondent as an equitable action for an injunction, and
that the appellant in his answer sought equitable
relief, have no material weight here. We have to
do with substance rather than with form. The
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remedy sought was merely pecuniary compensation for injuries to the appellant and his family,
his personal property and his land, between the
1st day of January, 1912, and the date of the trial.
Nothing further was demanded, and, as we have
already said, it is not to be presumed that the
nuisance 'Yill be continued.
~'It

is urged that the structures and the sewer
system being pern1anent, the injuries to appellant's land must necessarily be permanent. But
the test whether an injury to real estate is permanent is not necessarily the permanent character
of the structure causing the injury, but'' ''vhether the "c-hole injury results from the
original wrongful act, or from the "\Vrongful continuance of the state of facts produced by such
act.' Bowers v. Mississippi & Rum River Boom
Co., 78 Minn. 398, 81 N. W. 208, 79 Am. St. Rep.
395; Heath v. M., St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 126
~linn. 470, 474, 148 N. W. 311."
In City of San Antonio v. Mackey's Estate, 54. S. W.
33, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals emphasized the
error that the court in the case before us committed.
The case involved the recovery of damages for stenches
arising from the deposits of garbage and filth by the defendant city near plaintiff's home. The Court said:
''The jury returned a verdict, not only for
loss in rental value and care of premises, but for
$3,732.55 for depreciation of property. The verdict was clearly erroneous, and was in effect,
allowing double damages, but it was in direct response to an instruction to the effect that, in
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case they found the injury permanent, the measure o.f damages, in addition to the rental value
thereof, was the depreciation in the market value
of the property. The loss of rental value is never
made a part of the damages, where there is
permanent damage to the value of the property,
because full compensation is given by the recovery of the loss in value of the land. In a case
decided by the supreme court of Pennsylvania,
cited by Sutherland in his work on Damages (section 1042), it was said that 'damages for use must
not represent in any part the damages for the
permanent injury; it is the duty of the court to
see that one does not overlap the other.' Seely
v. Alden, 61 Pa. St. 302."
See also Racine v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago (Ill.,
1937), 8 N. E. (2) 210.
The foregoing cases show how the lower court has
committed error in granting damages based on the depreciation of market value:
1. By basing its judgment for permanent damages
partly upon findings of temporary damage-loss of rental
and usable value.
2. By using a basis of permanent damage for its
judgment when the evidence shows that the odors are
only intermittent and are abatable at any time by the
defendant.
3. By using a basis of permanent damage when
the statute of limitations has run against permanent dam-
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age. Plaintiffs' evidence shows. that the defendant's
plant 'vas established about September, 1933 (Abs. 50).
The statute of lin1itations 'vas pleaded, and is urged.
Plaintiffs are in a dilemn1a. Either the action was brought
for permanent injuries, in which case the cause of action
arose prior to 1934, and the statute has run, or the
action was brought for a continuing nuisance, with temporary damages, in which case the measure of damages
was wrong.
In either case there is reversible error.
4.

There is no evidence upon which to predicate either a finding of fact or a conclusion of
law as to what prospective purchasers might or might
not take into consideration in arriving at a market
value for this land. The element of damage here attempted to be found is too speculative and remote, beyond any of the pleadings or the evidence in the case,
and not in any wise directly attributable to or a proximate cause of the injury here complained of.
Some future prospective buyers, in the light of all the
evidence in this case, would undoubtedly look upon this as
industrial property, as did the expert witnesses for the defendant, who were men long experienced in the business.
It would be more appropriate to speculate upon such a
hypothesis than that assumed by the Court in this socalled finding of fact.
Specification of Error 5(d) (p. 55 herein)
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The defendant Company is itself a potential prospective buyer for this property of the plaintiffs as homes for
its employees in the future, the same as in the past. Its
value for such purposes would in no wise be depreciated
by the presence of the defendant's plant. It is the plant
which would give it its value.
Specification No. 5 (e)
Value of Plaintiffs' Lands
The value of plaintiffs' property as alleged in plaintiffs' amended and supplemental complaints is denied.by
the answer of the defendant. The appraised valuation,
as fixed by the State Tax Commission in its state-wide
re-appraisal of lands, is specifically set forth in the appendix to the abstract of recordandappellant'sExhibitAappearing in the appendix to this brief. The total appraised
value of fhe properties of the plaintiffs as fixed by the
State Tax Commission's re-appraisal, is $18,648, exclusive of Carter's. The total value alleged in the complaint is $62,000, exclusive of Carter's. It is rather hard
to believe that property reappraised for purposes of
equalization at a total value of less than $19,000 can have
at the same time a market value of $62,000. The damage
of $11,868.19 represents more than 62% of this appraised
value.
There Is No Competent Evidence or Proper Measure
of Damages Shown by the Evidence

We have the testimony of expert witnesses Thomas,
Hawkins, Anderson and Johnson upon the subject of
values. These values relate to but two situations:
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(1) \ . .alue of the property of any plaintiff without
the plant, that is, \vithout the plant being located as it
is; and
(2)

Value of the property with the plant located as

it is.
No consideration was given by any of the witnesses
for the plaintiffs as to what the value of the plaintiffs'
properties would be if there were some other industry
located on the site of defendant's plant in place of the
defendant's plant, such as the brick kilns that were
formerly located there. The values testified to are the
opinions of these witnesses based on the assumption that
there is no industry whatsoever located on the site of
defendant's plant.
Let us consider the brick plant. Were we to proceed
logically upon the theory of the plaintiffs, the brick plant
itself would make the lands of the plaintiffs less desirable
for residential purposes, because of the presence of this
industry in close proximity thereto. Only a question of
degree separates the brick yard on the one hand and the
defendant's plant on the other, at best. It is this difference in degree alone that could be recovered in damages.
This degree of difference, even on their own theory, the
plaintiffs failed to prove. The Court's findings are for
the full amount without subtracting therefrom the percentage or degree of depreciation caused or which
would have been caused by the continued maintenance
and operation of the brick yard as it was operated for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

124
twenty years preceding defendant's operations on the
same tract. Which one of these plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest sold this property to the brick yard,
to be used by the brick yard for industrial purposes~
Would he now be entitled to recover back damages after
having received the full purchase price of the property
sold for the purpose of being used for industrial purposes~ The question answers itself. If the proper measure of damage had been applied, the plaintiffs would
have been required to offer some evidence upon which
to base an award of damage measured by the proper
scale. The findings of the Court could then have been
predicated upon evidence relating to the proper measure
of damage rather than to the measure of damage adopted
by the Court, and we might say in passing that it is impossible to determine from the findings what measure of
damage the Court d1d adopt. The damage allowed does
not conform in any case to any of the proof adduced
either by the plaintiffs or the defendant, but "\vould seem
on its face to represent some opinion of the Court not
in any wise taken from the evidence.
It is, of course, possible that if testimony had been
taken upon the subject there would have been some elements in relation to the operation and maintenance of
brick kilns and a brick yard on the premises occupied
by the defendant, which would have reduced the market
value of plaintiffs' premises as much as the presence of
defendant's plant. This might readily be the case if the
extent to which the premises were occupied as a brick
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kiln "?ere sufficiently great in comparison to the small
plant of the defendant as to 1nake the deteriorating effect
of each industry equal, in "'"hich case even on plaintiffs'
theory there could be no recovery of damage.

The evidence of plain tiffs ' expert witnesses further
revealed the fact that they did not depreciate the plaintiffs' property any because of its close proximity to the
main lines of railroad running through the neighborhood, nor did they depreciate the property any on account of the pea vinery, the sugar factory or any other
industry. If all of these industries are to be overlooked
in arriving at damage, then clearly it must be upon the
theory, and the theory alone, that this is an industrial
community, in which event the discomfort suffered by
the plaintiffs on account of the odors emanating from
defendant's plant is just a further inconvenience to be
suffered because of the industrial nature of the vicinity.
Whether considered as legal or equitable, there is
no competent proof upon which a finding of damage can
be predicated. The detracting influences, if such they
may be called, have had their effect upon these properties
of the plaintiffs for the last twenty years, and there is
no proof from which it may be inferred or found that
the coming of the defendant's plant affected or depreciated the value of these properties here involved in any
respect whatsoever. No expert witness of the plaintiffs
has told us what would be the value of any one of the
properties with the brick yard operating as it did for
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ence in value of any of the properties of the plaintiffs
with the brick yards operating, in one instance, and the
defendant's plant operating, in the other. Assume that
all these conditions are thrown aside. It is submitted
that the finding of the Court as to the damage is without
foundation in the evidence and is excessive in fact.
It is submitted that the weight of the testimony, in
view of all that has been said and done in this case,
compels a finding that no plaintiff has been in any respect
damaged by having the value of his property in any wise
depreciated by the presence of defendant's plant.

Speculative Value of Lands too Remote to Be
the Predicate of Damages
It is common knowledge that what will make property
more attractive to one person will in some cases make it
less attractive to another. There is no dispute about the
fact that a great many people consider that properties
have been decreased in value when even churches are located in close proximity thereto. Others will have the viewpoint that properties are made less valuable by the coming
into the community of certain individuals.· A bad neighbor
can often make your home very undesirable. Trespassing
children, especially when they belong to someone besides
yourself, often have a tendency to decrease the joys of
life. The presence of negroes is always regarded as
detrimental by the whites.
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But the law of the land cannot speculate and deal
with all of these various peculiar tastes of men or future
speculative values of land. The law itself recognizes
that it has a very narrow zone within which it may
properly function. l\Iatters of taste and the congeniality
of neighbors or of neighborhoods, and their standing
socially or in the business 'vorld, even their color or
their integrity, must be disregarded by the law of the
land; otherwise all society would be in a constant jangle
and furore.
Assume for the argument, and for that purpose only,
that the value of the plaintiffs' homes has been materially
decreased by the presence of the defendant's plant. The
finding of the Court is that the real estate will grow just
as good and just as much garden produce with the rendering plant present as with it absent; that no one's
health living in any of the plaintiffs' homes will
be affected; then it seems that under those circumstances,
logic and reason drive us back to the conclusion that this
decrease in value, if any decrease exists, is because of
personal taste or personal discomfort, and the rule of
law seems to be very well established that individuals,
as members of society, must tolerate a certain amount
of personal discomfort.
Before anyone can say that there have been substantial damages to be recognized by law, he must make it
manifest to any fairly instructed eye, and it must be such
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as can be shown by a plain witness to a plain juryman.
There is not a particle of doubt that the passing of a
heavy engine at a high rate of speed through Benjamin,
the blowing of whistles and the ringing of bells and the
·vibrations that are incident to this event, all make life
a little less desirable in any of the residences that are
even within 2500 feet of the railroad; and there is not a
particle of doubt that any one living in any of these
houses in and about Benjamin must endure these noises
and these vibrations. Whether he likes it or not the
law affords him no ground of complaint. All the plaintiffs live as close, if not closer, to the railroad than to
defendant's plant.
This subdivision 5 (e) involves a specification of error in which is included the specific findings of the Court
with reference to ownership, value and damage in the
case of each of the ten plaintiffs. We have already
pointed out the in1propriety of such findings with reference to the plaintiffs John Anderson, Edward Ludlow
and Mrs. Hansen. Included within this specification of
error is likewise the basic error to be found throughout
the Court's findings, conclusions and decree in finding
a nuisance value of the property and damage.
The Court finds (Abs. 384) Finding No. 1 of its
original findings, that the plaintiffs are the owners of
the lands respectively referred to and described in the
amended complaint, thus including in this finding the
lands of John Anderson, which he testified he did not
own, but that his wife owned; the lands described as
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the lands of Margaret D. Hansen, a substantial portion
of 'vhich belongs to the estate of her deceased husband;
and the lands described as the lands of Edward Ludlow,
the title to 'Yhich he testified 'vas Yested in his son. These
are all the general basic grounds upon '""hich this specification of error rests.

Specification of Error 5(f)
In addition to those already pointed out, there are
some detailed specific grounds covered by subdivision (f)
applying to one plaintiff and not the other. Specifically
these latter consist of the evidence which shows that much
of the improvements placed upon the lands of John Anderson, Rufus Anderson, Paul E. Swartz and John Angus
were placed thereon after the beginning of the original operations of defendant but before the rebuilding of the defendant's plant. The Court has allowed in these specific
findings full value and full damage for all such improvements placed upon the lands of the various plaintiffs
between the original date of commencement of defendant's plant and the date of the fire.
One of two situations must be ultimately determined
by this Court on appeal, either that the damage was permanent, on the one hand, as found by the lower Court,
in which event the cause of action became complete at
the commencement of defendant's operations, and barred
by the Statute of Limitations, or that the damages are
temporary, intermittent and occasional, in which event
the decision of the lower Court would have to be reversed
as based and predicated upon a fundamentally wrong
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basis or measure of damage. In either event, the decision
of the lower Court must be reversed.

SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 6
This specification of error is based upon the lower
Court's conclusions of law. The principal arguments in
this brief are made for the purpose of demonstrating that
just the contrary should have been the Court's conclusions, that is to say, that there was no nuisance, plaintiffs
are not entitled to damage, and that the Court erred in
not concluding that the defendant's plant as located was
reasonable and lawful.

SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 7
It would necessarily follow if any of the contentions
of the appellant herein are correct the decree of the lower Court would of necessity have to be reversed either
in whole or in part.

SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 8
It is respectfully submitted that this defendant was
entitled to have the lower Court find:
(a) That the defendant's plant has actually benefited the health and comfort of the community by the
removal of carcasses and offal that were formerly left
on the premises of the plaintiff to stink, decay and ultimately bleach. So far as the plaintiffs' testimony is
concerned, it simply confirms in part, if not in its en-
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tirety, the contention of defendant's witnesses with reference to this in1portant n1atter. Sueh a finding would
determine the propriety and the reasonableness of the
location of defendant ·s plant.
That since the building of defendant's plant
the plaintiffs Edwin Selene, John Anderson, Rufus Anderson and Paul Swartz have all built improvements on
their property. This was a fact defendant was entitled
to have found, in order that the appropriate law could be
applied thereto and any element of d~mage or depreciation to these improvements eliminated from the judgment
(b)

of the Court. The lower Court appreciated the rule of
law, but it is submitted applied it to the improper period,
namely, since the rebuilding of the plant rather than from
the beginning of operations.
(c) That the plaintiffs had profited by the building and operation of defendant's plant, had patronized
it, and had even acquiesced in its location and existence
to the point of assisting in its operation and construction,
and originally in the selection of the site by the defendant for the purposes used. Such acquiescence in the beginning does not and cannot support the present objections of the plaintiffs. The cases so holding are cited
elsewhere in this brief.
(d) As to the condition of the property upon which
its plant is located, and particularly the sump, during the
twenty-oda years the property was operated as a brick
plant.
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(e) That the defendant operated its plant in a
sanitary manner. To this effect is all the competent evidence in the case.
Throughout this extensive record, there is no evidence of the plant itself being operated improperly or
in an unsanitary manner. There is some evidence that
the manure pile maintained in connection with the rendering plant is unsanitary, but the evidence even of the
plaintiffs' witnesses is to the effect that it is no more
unsanitary, if as much so, as the manure piles and the
stock feeding yards of the plaintiffs, in which there is
to be found manure up to the belly of the stock being fed.
(f) That the action was dismissed as to Maylan
Carter. This is the fact, as we have heretofore pointed
out.
(g) That the non-condensable gases produced by
defendant's cooking operations were consumed in passing
through the fire of the boiler, and that nothing but the
smoke irom their consumption reaches the atmosphere.
There is no evidence to the contrary. This fact is clearly
shown by the evidence which we have herein pointed out.
(h) The installation of screens over all openings
since the original trial of the case. In page 8, Findings
of Fact No. 8 of the Court's original findings, included in
par. 1 of the Court's final findings by reference, the
Court found:
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"That the defendant's plant has been operated "~ithout screens and tends to attract flies and
the particular specie8 of flies kno\Yn as blo'v flies.''

In Finding No. 4 (Abs. 395), the Court finds, upon
the second trial of this case, that the defendant's plant
at the time of re-opening of the case and the trial of issues relating to damage, was being operated in a manner
similar to that described in the Court's former memorandum, entirely ignoring, although it stands uncontradicted, the evidence of the defendant (Abs. 370: Mr.
Soble) that they have made some changes in the plant
since the last hearing of the case; that they have entirely
equipped the building with screens and made changes in
the grease basin or septic tank so that there is no refuse
that goes into the pond except clear water.
In spite of the fact that the only allegation of injury
either in the amended complaint or in the supplemental
complaint is the odors produced by the defendant's plant,
the Court permitted a very large amount of evidence to
be received concerning flies and rats, and no doubt the
Court took the finding above set forth in its original
findings into consideration in arriving at the damage, but
it is respectfully submitted that this element of damage
is entirely beyond the scope of the complaint or any
pleadings in the case.
The Court's 9th Finding of Fact is interesting in
this particular and would tend very definitely to establish
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the conclusion that the defendant's plant was not a
nuisance. Finding No. 9 reads: (Abs. 389)
"That the operation of defendant's plant, if
operated in a proper location and sanitary Inanner is desirable and beneficial in the interest of
public health and sanitation since it results in the
gathering of carcasses of animals which "\Vould
otherwise, in many cases, be left unburied or insufficiently buried and be allowed to contan1inate
the surrounding atmosphere with noxious odors
as well as constitute a feeding and breeding place
for flies and vermin."
The Court makes no finding of fact that the location
of defendant's plant is not a proper location, nor does
it find that the plant is operated in an unsatisfactory
manner. Without a finding to this effect it is to be
assumed that the plant, from the findings as found by
the Court, is a decided benefit to the specific locality in
which it is located. If so, its location would almost
necessarily be a proper location.
(i) The defendant was entitled to a finding that
plaintiffs' lands were not depreciated by the defendant's
plant. This, together with sub-divisions (j), (k) and
(I) are thoroughly discussed throughout this brief, and
needs little further discussion at this point.
There is no finding of fact by the Court as to the
character of the community. In paragraphs 10 and 11
of the lower Court's original memorandum decision,
adopted by reference in the Court's Finding of Fact No.
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1, we have the only finding the Court made as to the
nature of the locality. In. paragraph 10 it is true the
Court says (Abs. 390):
''that the area occupied by defendant's plant cannot be classed as an industrial area.''
This is a conclusion of law, pure and simple, and is not a
finding of a fact or the statement of a fact.

When the Court finds that there is a pea vinery, a sugar factory, a railroad and formerly a brick yard it is finding the facts. It should have also found two railroads, several stock and feed yards, flour mill, and formerly an alfalfa mill, ·w·oolloading platforms, beet storage and loading
station and cattle loading yards and chutes on the railroads and the steel mills not far away. There is no conclusion of law that in view of these facts this area is a
residential district; in fact, there is no finding of fact
from which the conclusion that it is a residential district
could be drawn, and certainly no evidence to sustain any
such finding. The very beginning of paragraph 10 "that
the defendant's plant is located in an area which is essentially agricuRural'' is likewise a conclusion of law, but
the decree is not based upon any such conclusion, because
the Court does not include any such conclusion of law in
its ''Conclusions of Law'' as filed. If we take paragraphs
10 and 11 above referred to and consider the actual findings, then only one conclusion can possibly be drawn
therefrom, and that is that the defendant's plant IS
properly located, so far as environment is concerned.
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THIS IS A SUIT IN EQUITY
This action is basically one for equitable relief,
permanently enjoining, forbidding and restraining the
defendant from further continuing to operate the rendering plant at Benjamin. The sole ground for recovery
pleaded is the odors produced by defendant's plant.
The damages allowed by the Court were not confined
to the pleadings (see par. 8 of the Court's findings, Abs.
389).
As has been suggested heretofore, this is an equity
appeal, and appellant is entitled to a review by this
Court of the facts, as well as the law. The degree of
proof to substantiate an equitable cause of action properly pleaded exceeds that which is required to satisfy
a law court, that is to say, something besides a mere
preponderance of the evidence is necessary to properly
invoke the extraordinary relief granted by a court of
equity. There is neither evidence nor finding to satisfy
such a requirement of proof. Unless this Court, sitting
as a court of review, is satisfied far beyond a mere
preponderance of the evidence, the granting of equitable
relief could not be justified. In the recent case of Starley
v. Deseret Foods Corporation, 93 Ut. 577, 74 Pac. (2d}

1221 to 1225, this Court said, in speaking of equitable
relief:
''The evidence must be clear, convincing and

~ :;:fy6~
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·~lo

Right in Trial Court to Retain Jurisdiction for
Pttrpose of . .-1ssess'ing Legal Damages.

If the legal demand is incidental to equitable relief,
and is averred and proved along with the equitable deutand, it n1ay be detern1ined in a court of equity, but
unless there is some substantial ground of equitable
jurisdiction~ both alleged and proved, then there is
nothing to 'vhich the legal demand may attach itself,
and consequently equity has no jurisdiction to retain.
The real purpose of the action was not to regulate the
operation of the plant, and no allegation was made that
it was improperly or negligently operated, but it was
to abate and prevent all operation.
In Graeff v. Felix, 200 Pa. St. 37, 49 Atl. 758 (1901),
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said:
"It is quite true, as held by the learned
judge below, that equity, having acquired jurisdiction of a case, may decide all matters incidentally connected with it, so as to make a final determination of the whole subject; but this rule does
not extend to a case where only some incidental
matter is of equitable cognizance, and thereby
enable the court to dra'v in a main subject of
controversy which has a distinct and appropriate
legal remedy of its own."
And in Broadis v. Broadis, 86 Fed. 951 (1898) it is
said:
"While a court of equity, having taken jurisdiction of a case for one purpose, will, in general,
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retain it for all purposes, so as to do complete
justice, still, where it has obtained jurisdiction
only to pass upon the validity of a decree of foreclosure, it cannot go further, and pass upon the
validity of the mortgages themselves, and of the
title sought to be conveyed thereby."
These two cases are merely illustrative of the rule
that incidental matters, even though of equitable cognizance, cannot constitute a basis for the retention of
jurisdiction to grant legal relief where all substantial
grounds of equity jurisdiction have failed of proof.
The substantial ground in this case was that the
rendering plant in its location in Benjamin was a nuisance because Benjamin was a strictly residential community. It was not claimed by the plaintiffs that there
had been any negligent operation of a rendering plant
that was properly located, but it was claimed that because of the character of the community the plant could
not be located in that community at all; that to locate it
and operate there even with most extreme caution was
unlawful.
This basic claim of the plaintiffs failed of proof.
This basic claim not only was asserted as a ground of
recovery, but was a predicate upon which the right of
the plaintiffs to join was sustained by the trial Court.
The cause of action stated by the plaintiffs as joined
was the alleged wrongful location of this rendering
plant, and when the location was shown to be legal and
not unlawful, then the right to join failed along with
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the right to abate. The cause of action, if any, which
each of the owners of the separate and distinct tracts
of land had to recover damages for depreciation of the
value of that land is not in any sense joint. There are
eleven different tracts of land, and if causes of action
exist at all for damages, consisting of a depreciation of
the value of this land, they are eleven separate and
distinct causes of action.
The case as presented is son1ewhat similar to that of
Benson v. Rozz·elle, 85 Ut. 582, 39 Pac. (2d) 1113, decided
by this Court in 193-±. In that case the Trial Court found a
partnership, ordered a dissolution and directed an accounting. The case was brought to this court upon appeal
and by means of a writ of review, and on inspection of
the record it was found that there was no evidence
whatever of a partnership. This court then held that
there being no partnership, the Trial Court was without
jurisdiction to order an accounting. The writ of review
was sustained and the judgment of the Trial Court was
reversed.
Apply the reasoning of the Rozzelle case to the case
at bar, and is not the conclusion compelled that when
the Trial Court has denied the equitable relief of injunction and abatement, that court is then without jurisdiction to retain the case for the purpose of attempting
to assess damages~ In this case the Trial Court has
refused to enjoin, has declined to grant any equitable
relief, has found against the plaintiffs below, in and so
far as the matters of equitable cognizance are concerned,
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and consequently the Trial Court has no jurisdiction
to retain.
It is submitted that under the case of Dahl v. Utah
Oil Refining Co., 71 Ut. 1, there is and can be no right
of recovery, either at law or in equity, by the plaintiffs
below, and that the Trial Court was without jurisdiction
to proceed to a determination of any issue of damagesin fact, there is no cause of action existing in favor of
any plaintiff.
The Dahl case controls in fact, the case at bar. It conclusively appears that damages cannot be awarded either
as a substitute for equitable relief or in addition to equitable relief, or even as the consequences of an action at law.
We get right down to where this Court got in the Dahl
case, except that that case did not involve a misjoinder of
parties or of causes of action, which makes it all the more
decisive as to the present case. The Dahl case further
differs from the case at bar because in that case evidently
the trial court found that the question was one for the
jury. Though this Court on an appeal of a law question
would and should hesitate to interfere with the judgment of the trial court, who has seen the witnesses and
noticed their demeanor on the stand, yet this Court in
the Dahl case unanimously reversed the trial court because they were unable to say, as a matter of law, that
a case of unreasonable use or actionable nuisance was
made out. This Court emphatically said:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

141
••No precedent for sustaining liability under
siinilar circwnstances has been cited and we have
found none. (71 Utah, 14)
H

In the case at bar, on the contrary, this Court is
charged w·ith the duty of reviewing the evidence, as
well as the law··, 'vhich distinction between the two cases
makes the ruling of this Court in the Dahl case more conclusively in favor of the appellant herein. This opinion
was concurred in by the entire Court, including my
worthy opponent on this appeal, Judge Elias Hansen.
The only consequence that has resulted from the presence of the plant or is shown by the findings of the Court is
that there has been some personal discomfort. That personal discomfort, if such there was, has undoubtedly been
sustained by every person who lived in the vicinity of the
plant or happened to be in that vicinity. Such personal
discomfort is not and cannot be in any wise connected
with the ownership of the realty. It does not form the
proper basis for joinder of plaintiffs. It would make
not a particle of difference as to the effect of that discomfort whether a man owned ten acres, one acre or not
even a foot of property in the vicinity of the plant. If he
merely happened to be in the community he might endure some slight personal discomfort that is occasionally caused by the presence of any industry, either defendant's plant or such a plant as the Columbia Steel
plant a little farther up the tracks. If one could so torture the evidence as to make out a personal injury to
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someone who might breathe in the odors, it would be a
strictly personal action. A remedy for such an injury
is wholly disassociated from the ownership or possession
of real or personal property, or of the action here
pleaded. Here again we call attention to the Wasatch
case. In paragraph 15 of the syllabi (92 Ut. 50, 63 Pac.
(2d) 1071):
"'Vhere case is one in equity, rule that equity
having once taken jurisdiction of cause will retain it for purpose of administering full and complete relief, does not apply when facts relied on to
sustain equity jurisdiction entirely fail of establishment. ' '
The Court in this case dealt with the Kinsman case,
Kinsman v. Utah Gas cf; Coke Co., 55 Ut. 10, 177 Pac.
418. After reviewing the facts in that case the Court
said:
''The Kinsman case stands for this: That
where the evidence shows actionable nuisance but
there is an intervening fact such as delay on the
part of plaintiff in bringing the suit so that the
equity court will not enjoin the operation of the
plant, damages will be assessed in lieu of equitable
relief and that such damages will be fixed by the
court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.''
If there is no actionable nuisance proven, the fact that
the Court finds an intervening fact such as delay on the
part of the plaintiff in bringing suit, as the lower Court
did in this case, cannot justify the application of the rule
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above announced, and thereby confer jurisdiction on the
part of the equity court to assess damages. Its basic
jurisdiction n1ust be predicated on a finding properly
supported by the evidence that there is a nuisance such
as to justif~- the intervention of equity.

In the Kinsman case !fr. Justice Gideon said:
"The cause is therefore remanded, with directions to the district court to allow amendments
to the pleadings if desired, and proceed to hear
testimony and determine the past and future
damages to each plaintiff by reason of the continued and perpetual operation of the company's
plant at its present capacity, and to make separate findings upon such issue of fact, and enter
judgment or judgments accordingly; or the court
may call to its assistance a jury to determine the
amount, if any, of such damages, as in other equitable proceedings.'' (Italics ours) 53 Utah, 24.
~Ir.

Justice Frick cited cases from the United States

Supreme Court and from the State of New York. The
Court then said :
"In the foregoing cases it is held that where
business enterprises constitute a continuing nuisance, like defendant's gas plant, and an injunction is refused as a matter of right, the damages
may, nevertheless, be assessed in the equity action; that is, the court may deny the injunction as
a matter of right, but may assess the damages
caused by the nuisance in that action."
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It is plain from these quotations that this Court, in
deciding the Kinsman case, treated and considered the
damages which it ordered assessed as equitable and
not legal in character. It may be that the Court erred
in considering the delay of the plaintiffs in bringing their
suit in the Kinsman case as an intervening fact, just as
the lower Court in this case may have made the same
error, but nevertheless the principle upon which the
Kinsman case was decided was that the delay was an
intervening fact and that such intervening fact prevented
the granting of an injunction as a matter of right. The
Court, however, granting damages in lieu of such injunction, never for one moment stepped out of equity and
into the law. It is hardly to be presumed that this Court
failed to appreciate the distinction which exists between
an action where eleven plaintiffs join in a complaint
seeking an injunction and abatement, and a case where
eleven plain tiffs join seeking the remedy of damages,
the damage of each plaintiff being different from the
damage of each other plaintiff.
In the case at bar, the lower Court undertook to
find, if anything, legal damages, not equitable damages.
The damages were for loss of market value of real estate,
as found by the Court, whereas, as disclosed by the
evidence, they were for personal discomfort. The Court
exercising such equitable powers need not call in a jury,
and, as in the case at bar, gave to the defendant no
opportunity for a trial by jury. Whenever in such a
case the basic ground of equitable jurisdiction has been
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established by the evidence, which, of course the appellant contends 'v-as not the case in the case at bar, then
the case remains as it was in the beginning, equitable in
character, and the relief granted, whether that relief
consists of an injunction or a decree for specific performance or damages in lieu of such drastic remedies, is
equitable and not legal. This is clearly the effect of the
decision of this Court in the case of Wasatch Oil Refining
Company v. Wade.
The action which this Court atten1pted to try commencing October 17, 1939 (Abs. 393) was not one action,
but it was eleven actions at law to recover eleven different judgments. In any one of these eleven judgments the owner of the property would have a separate
and distinct ownership from that of all other plaintiffs.
The cause of action, if cause of action there was, would
be entirely different from that which might exist, if one
could exist, with reference to each other piece of property. In the instant case, one of these eleven causes of
action was dismissed.
We have heretofore in discussing these several cases
definitely pointed out how separate and distinct they
are, and how in the various causes of action we find different facts and circumstances, different defenses, and
cases calling for different results, even upon the assumption that there is a nuisance maintained by defendant.
Personal discomfort, as has been pointed out, may be
suffered by a man who owns no property. Even the chi}..
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dren of plaintiffs' families may have suffered personal
discomfort. From that standpoint each such personal
discomfort is actionable. Those children would have just
as sound a cause of action as would any of the plaintiffs. It would be a suit in the nature of a personal injury, certainly not a suit involving a nuisance, either
as defined by the statutes herein quoted or by the common
law. It would not be assignable. It would be similar to
infecting a person with germs, or exposing him to the
yellow fever. These actions would be actions at law,
where the pain, suffering, loss of health or employment
would all be elements to be considered in determining
the amount of any verdict that might be rendered. No
lawyer would contend that such an action to recover for
such an injury would have the slightest equitable feature
about it, or permit of numerous such suits to be joined
in one action to collect damages.

There Being no Basis for Equitable Relief, There Is a
Misjoinder of Parties Plaintiff.
Since the plaintiffs have no joint or common interest in the damages sustained by each other, and the
actions of the plaintiffs thus are misjoined, the suit
must be dismissed. The lower Court erred in failing so
to do.
This contention is based upon the assumption, indulged in for the purpose of argument only, that each of
the owners of the eleven tracts of land is the owner and
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has a cause of action, legal in character, to recover damages from the defendant because of the maintenance and
operation of its plant.
See the case of Reynolds v. liVarner, heretofore in
this brief discussed in connection with Specification of
Error N" o. 3 (page 87).
It may be added that the statutory prohibition against
misjoinder of parties plaintiff, and the improper union
of cause8 of action, cannot be defeated by alleging an
equitable cause of action which does not exist.
It might be said that no demand was made for a
jury in this case. The original trial of this case commenced the 3rd of April, 1939 and continued to April
27th. The cause of action stated in the complaint then
was strictly equitable in character. Of course no demand
for a jury was made prior to the trial. It would be a
ridiculous proposition to think that part of the case
could be tried without a jury and then part of it tried
with a jury. When the equitable features failed of establishment the defendant's plea of misjoinder commenced
to operate. It did not operate merely to a partial extent.
It operated to the extent of requiring a dismissal of the
action. If a jury had then been called it would have acted
only in an advisory capacity. On the theory upon which
the Court resumed the trial on Oct. 17, 1939, that the
action was still equitable, the demand for a jury would
have availed nothing. The plea of misjoinder of parties
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plaintiff stood out as a bar against a judgment in favor
of any plaintiff in any amount whatsoever. At that point
the Court should have permitted the separation of the
causes of action. Its refusal to do so made a demand
for a jury trial an impossibility. We have pointed out
that no court, much less a jury, has the machinery for
determining property elements of alleged damage in
eleven distinct and different types of injury. The only
reason that a joinder of the plaintiffs could be allowed
was that the lower Court found an equitable cause of
action stated in their complaint, in which they were all
jointly interested. The point of common interest was
the injunction, but the trial was had and this common
point failed of establishment in the proof, as required
by the ruling in the case of Wasatch Oil Refining Company v. Wade. Then the equitable feature was gone.
We know that the existence of a nuisance is a matter of fact and law. Courts of equity should require a
person claiming the existence of a nuisance to make out
that existence in a court of law before he comes into
equity. Norback v. Board of Directors, 84 Ut. 506.
Personal discomfort, if it can be worked into a cause
of action at all, must constitute a personal action. The
idea of saying that a man has been legally wronged by
some act of the defendant and that the injury is that of
personal discomfort, and then undertaking to establish the
damage that should be allowed by hearing proof which
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tends to sho'v a depreciation of the value of unimproved
real estate o'vned by the person who endured the personal
discomfort, but upon 'vhich no one lives to be personally
discomforted, is 'vholly unsound, because this would result in the principle that only those 'vho happen to own
real estate could join or recover. Other men living in the
same community and suffering the same amount of personal discomfort, or even a greater amount, could not
recover at all, because they did not own real property
at the time the alleged unlawful injury was inflicted upon
then1. The extent of personal discomfort varies with the
physical and mental constitution of the injured person.
One would suffer more than another in the same community. The extent of such suffering does not depend
upon the ownership of real estate. This makes it clear
that the alleged causes of action are strictly personal
in nature, that they are non-existent as a matter of law.
The personal discomforts complained of are of the kind
of annoyances and inconveniences that everyone in such
a community is required by law to endure. There is no
special damage to the plaintiffs other than that suffered
by the public generally.

It Is Contended by the Plaintiffs That They May
Join Together in One Action.
This contention is made in the face of the fact that
there are at least eleven separate, individually-owned
tracts of land described in the complaint. The proposition has often been laid down that several persons injured
by a nuisance common to all may unite in seeking equitSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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able relief, although they own distinct property interests
and the injury is not joint but merely common, and this
statement, when properly understood, is true, but they
cannot join when the object of the suit is to restrain
that which is a distinct and special injury to each of their
properties.
In the case of Davidson v. Isham, 9 N. J. Eq. 186,
the Court said :
''Where several complainants unite in a bill
of this kind, the injury or grievance complained of
must be common to all. The several complainants cannot unite their distinct and individual
causes of complaint, and by their combination
make a case of nuisance, which separately would
not establish the complaint.''
The same equitable principle was applied to the
Kinsman case, in which it was said:
''In the very nature of things, any noxious or
offensive odors given off by defendant's plant
would gradually diminish as the distance increases, and the relief to plaintiffs, whose hon1es
are near the gas plant, might and should differ
from the relief which should be granted to those
whose residences are at greater distances from
the defendant's plant."
We are not dealing in this case as in the Kinsman
case with rows of homes built close to each other on
small city lots (all 59 homes were within a radius of
132 to 800 feet from the plant) but rather with a few
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ranch houses separated by tracts of land located in different directions from the plant and at distances varying from 650 ft. to three-quarters of a mile.
It 'vould be rather fanciful to assume that the odor
would be so substantial three-quarters of a mile away as
to justify the granting of an injunction. Yet plaintiffs
would undertake to make these complaints about odors
near the plant which are distinct, individual causes of
complaint, 'vork a nuisance in favor of the most remote
plaintiff. This under the ]\T ew Jersey case cannot be
done, and under the Kinsman case was not done because
the Court, by authorizing the amendment on remand,
treated the causes of action of the individual plaintiffs as
separate and distinct, even suggesting separate appeals
as to each plaintiff.
The case of Fogg v. Nevada C. 0. R. Co., 20 Nev.
429, 23 Pac. 840, was decided in 1890 by Chief Justice
Hawley, one of the most learned judges who ever graced
the bench. What did he say in the case cited~ Three
plaintiffs, Fogg, Brookins and Peterson were the separate owners of three certain town lots in Reno, Nevada.
Each of said plaintiffs had a dwelling house upon his
lot in which he resided with his family, consisting, among
others, of children of tender years. The said premises
abutted and fronted on East street. The defendant railroad company had constructed a railroad track in the
middle of the public street and raised it six or eight
inches above the level of the street. It was claimed that
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said tracks and railroads so constructed ''are an existing,
continuing and constantly recurring nuisance and obstruction in said East Street." It was claimed that it
made the street extremely dangerous, especially for
children of tender years, and rendered destruction by
fire of each of said plaintiffs' houses extremely probable;
that it interfered with the approach of vehicles to each
of the plaintiff's residences; that freight cars were left
standing for hours at a time in front of these houses;
that these annoyances and others of a kindred character,
not necessary, to specify, were constantly recurring, and
greatly decreased the value of the premises of the
plaintiffs, all to their irreparable damage. The prayer
No damages
was for an abatement and an injunction.
were asked.
Now, it seems that we have a case directly in point
with the complaint in the case at bar. It will not do to
say that Judge Hawley did not understand the legal
and equitable procedure. He said:
''Did the court err in sustaining the demurrers to this complaint~ To enable the plaintiffs
to maintain this action, it must he clearly shown
that they have sustained or will sustain, a special
and peculiar injury, irreparable in its nature,
and different in kind from that sustained by the
general public.''
He then quoted Section 3273 of the Nevada statutes,
which is identical with Section 7240 of the Compiled Laws
of Utah, 1917. In fact, a comparison reveals no dif.
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ference, even in phraseology, between the two statutes,
and he said:
"This statute, instead of changing, simply
affirn1s the rule above stated.'' (Citing authorities) ''It '""as copied from the statute of California, and, prior to its adoption by the l~gislature
of this state, the supreme court of that state, in
construing the statute, held in Blanc v. Klumpke,
that if the nuisance con1plained of only affects 'the
plaintiff in common with the public at large, although in a greater degree, he cannot have his
private action.' 29 Cal. 159''
He then points out that this same principle, under
the same statute, was ultimately affirmed in other California cases, citing them.
What becomes of the argument to the effect that
the injury to the plaintiffs in the case at bar was the
same in kind but different in degree!
Hawley said, quoting the Supreme Court of Califorrna:

''If it only affects the plaintiff in common
with the public at large, although in a greater
degree, he cannot have his private action.''
After discussing the claims of the appellant, he said:
''The averment relative to the branch track
does not merit any consideration, as it is not
specific enough to enable us to determine whether
or not any special injury other than is alleged by
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the construction of the main track, is occasioned
thereby.''
Again he says :
''Injunctions ought not to be granted in cases
of this character, unless 'the threatened use of
property or the act sought to be restrained is
clearly shown to be such as leaves no doubt of
its injurious results; such results as are recognized to be substantial legal injuries. The bill must
set forth such a state of facts as leaves no room
for doubt upon the question of nuisance, for, if
there is any doubt upon that point, the benefit
will be given to the defendant. Mere allegations
of conclusions or opinions as to the contemplated
injuries are not sufficient, the precise manner in
which he is to be injured must be stated.' Garnett
v. Railroad Co., 20 Fla. 902. In Lewiston T. Co.
v. Shasta & W. W. R. A. Co., the court said, citing
from previous cases, 'that where the damages are
special-that is, such as do not necessarily arise,
or are not implied by law, from the act complained
of-the facts out of which the damages arise must
be averred in the complaint.''
And then he takes up the question of the sufficiency
of the allegation of danger, and he quotes from Wood on
Nuisance as follows:
''The courts very wisely have unswervingly
adhered to the rule that an individual, in order to
be entitled to a recovery for injuries sustained
from a public nuisance, must make out a clear case
of special damages to himself, apart from the rest
of the public, and of a different character, so that
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mon injury resulting therefron1. It is not enough
that he has sustained n1ore damage than another;
it 1nust be of a different character, special and
apart fron1 that \vhich the public in general sustain, and not such as is common to every person
\vho exercises the right that is injured.'' Wood
on }luisance, 646.
We are entitled to infer from the allegations of
plaintiffs' complaint that the great damage is suffered
by the entire con1munity, that is, the public at large. It
is not alleged that the damages of the plaintiffs are different in character or special and apart from those which
the public in general sustain. Later on in the opinion
Justice Hawley says:
''The mere fact that the alleged inconvenience
and annoyance is greater in degree to the plaintiffs than it is to other citizens does not authorize
a private action to be maintained. All the authorities agree that, to support the action, the damage
must be different, not merely in degree but different in kind, from that suffered in com1non; hence
it has been well settled that, though the plaintiff
may suffer more inconvenience than others from
the obstruction by reason of his proximity to the
highway, that will not entitle him to maintain an
action.''
A long list of authorities is cited, and he then passes
to the question of misjoinder. He says:
''The bill is objectionable on the ground of a
misjoinder of parties. The complainants are owners of several and distinct lots, having no common
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interest, but seeking to enforce several and distinct claims. They seek to enforce no common
right, as in case of right of common, nor to obtain
relief against a common wrong. * * * The bill
seems to have been framed under the impression
that the nuisance was a grievance common to all
the land-owners, and therefore, that all might
properly be joined. But each complainant seeks
relief for special injury to his own property by
the construction of the railroad. On this ground
the bill is clearly demurrable.'' (Citing authorities)
In Hudson v. Maddison, 12 Sim. 416, 35 Eng. Chane.
362, 59 Reprint, 1192.
''In the present case the bill is filed by five
persons each having a separate tenement; and
they represent that the erection of the steam
engine and chimney will operate as a nuisance to
all of them. They, therefore, have joined their
cases together. It is obvious, however, that as
each of them has a separate nuisance to coinplain
of, that which is an answer to one may not be an
answer to the other; and if, upon such a bill, a
decree were to be pronounced, it must be a decree which would provide for five different cases;
and I do not think that such a decree could be
made.''
In Burroughs v. City of Dallas, 276 Fed. 812, the
plaintiff sought to restrain the operation of a scenic
railway as a nuisance. This scenic railway was maintained on the exposition grounds of the City of Dallas
and it was alleged that it disturbed the occupants of the
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plainti:ff~s

property, a boarding house, resulting in a

substantial in1pairment of the value of that property,
lessening the revenue and rendering it less beneficial.
There was a conflict in the evidence and the lower Court
denied the injunction. The Circuit Court of Appeals of
the Fifth Circuit said:
"It is familiar law that injunction will not
issue to enforce a right that is doubtful, or to restrain an act the injurious consequences of which
are merely trifling. If the evidence be conflicting
and the injury doubtful, this extraordinary remedy
properly may be withheld when it is applied for
before the asserted right has been established at
law. Consolidated Canal Co. v. Mesa Canal Co.,
177 U.S. 296, 20 Sup. Ct. 628, 44 L. Ed. 777; Parker v. Winnepiseogee Lake Cotton & Wollen Co.,
2 Black 545, 17 L. Ed. 333. ''

City of Pana v. Central Washed Coal Co., 260
ill. 111, 102 N. E. 992.

In this case a decree had been found for the complainant and an appeal was taken from that decree. The
facts were reviewed and the Court laid down this rule :
''The existence of a nuisance not having been
established by an action at law before bringing
this suit in chancery, under all the authorities
the facts must be clearly established, and the law
be without question before an injunction \vill issue. No such strong or exceptional case of such
pressing necessity as would justify the interference of a court of equity exists here.''
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See also Stoddard v. Snodgrass (Ore), 241 Pac. 73.
''The law cannot take notice of things which
are not offensive to normal persons. If it did there
would be no limit to litigation."
''Since the defendants have expended large
sums of money in constructing the building and
preparing the same for carrying on the business,
should they be enjoined from conducting their
business in said building it would result in great
loss and hardship to them.''
The injunction was denied, although this undertaking
establishment was in the vicinity of dwellings and had
a depressing effect upon the occupants of the dwellings.
See also Pearson v. Bonnie, 209 Ky. 307, 272 S. W.
375. The Kentucky court refused to enjoin the conducting of an undertaking business in a residential portion of the City of Louisville, Kentucky, because the
injuries were not sufficiently substantial to justify an
interference by equity with the harsh remedy of injunction.
The business of the defendant in the case at bar is
not a nuisance. The persons who have organized
the defendant corporation have made a large investment.
It is true it is not comparable in value with many of the
greater plants that exist throughout the country, but the
Court knows from the evidence that it is a substantial
investment; that it means much to the stockholders in-
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terested in the defendant eorporation. Nothing appears
in this co1nplaint to sho\Y that this location of the plant
was made in bad faith or \Yith n1alicious intent to annoy
the plaintiffs, and nothing is alleged to show that there
was an objection by the plaintiffs to the location of this
plant.
The rase of Ki/nsnz.an v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 53
Utah 10, 177 Pac. 418 (1918), is the case relied upon
by the plaintiffs for a justification of their application
for alternative relief. It seems that fifty-nine plaintiffs
joined together in an action to enjoin the operations of the
gas plant by the defendant. In the lower Court they
obtained a decree. Each plaintiff had a separate and
individual claim or right of action for damages growing
out of the same trespass. (Quoting Judge Gideon's opinion.) Both Judge Gideon and Chief Justice Frick rendered opinions, whereby they suggested that even though
equitable relief was denied, the plaintiffs might be allowed to amend and the amount of each plaintiff's damages might be determined without requiring the plaintiffs
to bring separate actions.
Chief Justice Frick and Justice Gideon relied upon
statements made by l\{r. Pomeroy in his work on Equity
Jurisprudence, where he states the law to be as follows:
"If a person appeals to a court of equity for
an injunction to restrain the maintenance or to
compel the removal of the structure, the court to
which such appeal is made has the power to deterSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mine the amount of unpaid damages, and to withhold an injunction, and to direct that the structure
be permitted to remain and be operated, provided
the assessed damages are paid.'' Pomeroy's
Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 473.
Justice Gideon makes the following quotation:
'' The rule has already been stated, as one of
the foundations of the concurrent jurisdiction,
that where a court of equity has obtained jurisdiction over some portion or feature of a controversy, it may, and will in general, proceed to
decide the whole issues, and to award complete
relief, although the rights of the parties are strictly legal, and the final remedy granted is of the
kind which might be conferred by a court of law.''
Porn. Eq. Jur. 3rd Ed. Sec. 231.
But notice this portion of Justice Frick's opinion:
''A majority of the court doubt both the
propriety and the necessity of enforcing the alternative relief suggested in the quotations from
Pomeroy; therefore both Justice Gideon and myself defer to their judgment, and have yielded
assent to the judgment as stated."
From this quotation it appears that the majority
of the Supreme Court, consisting of Justices McCarty,
Corfman and Thurman, did not accept the suggestions
made by Justices Frick and Gideon, but however that
may be, it is submitted that on account of the peculiar
facts as they are shown by this record, there cannot be
any retention of jurisdiction in this case for the purpose

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

161
of adjudicating the alleged purely legal rights of the
plaintiffs.
Compare later case of Norback v. Board of Directors,
84 Ut. 506.
The following cases cited by Justice Gideon in his
opinion in the K~insman case are decided by the Federal
Courts and by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and by
the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court.
Take the case of Waite v. O'Neil, 72 Fed. 348, and
76 Fed. 408. This is the same case as decided by the
trial court and as decided by the appellate court. In the
trial court Judge Hammond denied specific performance
on the ground that the enforcement of the· covenant
would be unconscionable, and yet held that there was
such a show of equitable cognizance in the bill that the
case would be retained for the purpose of affording such
other relief, even purely legal in character, as the proofs
might justify. He said that the unconscionable character
of the covenants did not arise out of the covenants themselves but out of the construction that was thereafter
put upon them. In other words, intervening facts had
made the covenants unconscionable, and under those
circumstances he retained the cause for the purpose of
granting legal relief.
When the case came to the Court of Appeals, Circuit
Judge Lurton held that though specific performance was
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

162
zance that the cause should be retained for the purpose
of affording other relief, even purely legal in character,
and it is also shown in this case that there was a failure
to make the objection that the bill was without equity
at the earliest possible moment.
These two cases can be laid aside as having no
application to the case at bar.
The case of Combs v. Scott, 76 Wis. 664, 45 N. W.
532, is a case for specific performance, but it appeared
that pending the suit the statute of limitations had run
on the contract. Therefore, the plaintiff was deprived
of his remedy at law. Under those circumstances, and
because of this intervening fact, the Court retained the
case for the purpose of granting purely legal relief.

Goddard v. American Queen, 59 N. Y. S. 46, is also
a case for specific performance, where to grant it would
inflict an injury upon parties innocent of any wrong.
Under those circumstances the case comes within the
well known principle that damages may be allowed in
lieu of specific performance.
It would seem that according to the opinions of Justices Frick and Gideon the rules adopted in actions where
specific performance is sought are applicable to suits for
injunction.
In 25 R. C. L., p. 345, Sec. 172, the subject of damages
in lieu of specific performance is discussed. It is pointed
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out that a bill for specific performance of a contract will
not be retained for the assessment of damages where a
case is not made out for specific performance and no
other special equity is shown which will support the
jurisdiction of the Court.
'' The rule has been laid down that a court
of equity will not grant pecuniary compensation
in lieu of specific performance unless the case presented is one for equitable interposition such as
'vould entitle the plaintiff to performance but for
intervening facts, such as the destruction of the
property, the conveyance of the same to an innocent third person, or the refusal of the vendor's
'vife to join in a conveyance. ''

Bradley

1:.

Aldrich, 40 N. Y. 504; 100 Am. Dec. 528.

This case was decided in 1869, after the adoption of
the Code of Civil Procedure in New York. It applies with
peculiar force to the case at bar, because it appeared
that damages were not alleged in the complaint nor
claimed upon the trial. The Court said :
"It does not appear that the plaintiff at any
time treated the action as brought to recover damages. No such idea could be suggested by the
complaint; no such claim appears to have been
made at the trial. ' '
Under such circumstances the Court of Appeals of

New York held that the plaintiff, not being entitled to
equitable relief, could not in that action recover damages.
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Dobler v. Smith, 294 Pac. 1089, decided by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in 1930, states:
"We are cognizant of the fact that in certain
cases a court of equity, when unable to grant
specific performance of a contract, will not dismiss the petition, but will retain jurisdiction and
a'vard darnages in place of such performance.
Cornell v. Rodabaugh, 117 Iowa 287, 90 N. W. 599,
94 Am. St. Rep. 298 ; Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v.
Martin, 227 Ill. 260, 81 N. E. 417, 10 Ann. Cas.
227. But the rule in this regard is that a court
of equity will not grant relief unless the parties
asking the relief bring themselves clearly within
the rule entitling them to specific performance,
and that specific performance cannot be awarded
for the reason that the corpus or the thing in action has been disposed of, or for so1ne reason
that a decree for specific performance would not
give the complaining party an adequate remedy.
Marks v. Gates (C.C.A.), 154 F. 481, 14 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 317, 12 Ann. Cas. 120; 25 R. C. L. 346. In
cases of that nature, that is, cases falling under
the special circumstances indica ted, no special
pleading in regard to damages is required.''
In Bourget v. Monroe, 58 Mich. 563, 25 N. W. 514
(1885), Justice Campbell says:
''It is claimed, however, that, if specific performance cannot be granted, complainant can have
a decree for damages. But there is no authority
for holding that equity can grant damages unless
there is some case of equitable relief made out
also, to which the damages would be applicable or
subsidiary.''
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See also Schook v. Zimmerman, 188 Mich. 617, 155 N. W.
526 (1915). The Supreme Court of Michigan said in this
ease:
'' ''Thile equity will retain jurisdiction to settle controversies for 'Yhich courts of law afford
adequate relief 'vhen they are involved with and
grow out of an equitable cause which gives the
chancery court jurisdiction, the bare pleading in
connection therewith of equitable rights not proven, does not confer jurisdiction to try con troversies, 'vhich otherwise are of exclusive law
jurisdiction, and legal remedies administered in
equity must be connected 'vith and grow out of
an equitable right, both alleged and proven.''
See also Toledo R. R. v. St. Louis R. R., 208 Ill. 623, 70
N. E. 715 (1904).
As was said by Vice Chancellor Reed in the case
of Stout v. Phoenix .Assurance Co., 65. N. J. Eq. 573, 56
Atl. 691:
''A court of equity in this state. can deal
with legal questions only so far as their decision
is incidental or essential to the determination of
such equitable question. Merely because a court
of equity has acquired jurisdiction for one purpose, it is not empowered to retain the case for
complete relief.''
Chief Justice Beasley said in Loder v. McGovern,
48 N. J. Eq. 279, 22 Atl. 200:
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"It is not true, by any means, that when a
court of conscience has acquired cognizance for
one purpose, it thereby acquires cognizance over
the entire controversy for all purposes.''
But it may be said that these are cases from New
~T ersey, where equity and law are still separate and
distinct. Let us pass to West Virginia:
In Wyoming Sales Co. v. Smith-Pocahontas Coal Co.,
105 W.Va. 610, 144 S. E. 410, 62 A. L. R. 740, it is said:
"The rule that equity will retain jurisdiction
once assumed, and dispose of all rna tters in litigation, is limited to cases where that jurisdiction has
been rightfully invoked. An equitable right must
be both averred and proved before a purely legal
right will be adjudicated by a court of chancery."
And quoting from the opinion :
''The rule is that where a cause of action cognizable at law is entertained in equity on the
ground of some equitable relief sought by the bill,
which it turns out cannot, for defect of proof or
other reason, be granted, the court is without jurisdiction to proceed further, and should dismiss
the bill without prejudice.''
10 R. C. L., Sec. 120, p. 370.
This section states the general doctrine, which is to
the effect that a court of equity once having assumed jurisdiction of a cause on any equitable ground will reach
and draw into its consideration and determination the
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entire subject matter, and will dispose of all matters involved in the controversy, even though it is required to
pass on strictly legal questions or grant legal remedies.
That is the general rule, but in Section 121, on page 372,

the rule is laid down as follows :

""Thile it is true that a court of equity, having once obtained jurisdiction of a cause, will retain it for all purposes and administer complete
relief, it is generally conceded, despite the existence of a few opposing decisions, which 1nay be
characterized merely as variants from the general
rule, that in order to authorize relief which can
be obtained in a suit at law there must be some
substantial ground of equitable jurisdiction, and
if there is no equitable ground of jurisdiction and
the remedy sought can be as well obtained in an
action at law, a court of equity cannot retain
jurisdiction and grant a purely legal remedy.
Mere statements in a bill on which the chancery
jurisdiction might be 1naintained, but which are
not pro~red, will not suffice to authorize a decree
on such parts of the bill as, if standing alone,
would not give the court jurisdiction, but to justify the retention of a cause not only must some
special and substantial ground of equitable jurisdiction be alleged, but it must also be proved on
the hearing. For instance, a bill for specific performance of a contract will not be retained for the
assessment of damages where a case is not made
for specific performance, and no other special
equity is shown which will support jurisdiction
of the court. So in general when the jurisdiction
fails, all the power of the court also fails, except
to ~ive judgment for costs. Otherwise, as the
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courts have frequently pointed out, a litigant, by
a pretended claim for equitable relief, might deprive his opponent of advantages incident to an
action at law, as for instance, his constitutional
right of trial by jury."
1 Pomeroy's Equity Jurispr-udence, Sec. 237, p. 341.

''The award of mere co1npensatory damages,
which are almost al,vays unliquidated, is a remedy
peculiarly belonging to the province of the law
courts, requiring the aid of a jury in their assessment, and inappropriate to the judicial position
and functions of a chancellor. It may be stated,
therefore, as a general proposition, that a court
of equity declines the jurisdiction to grant mere
co1npensatory damages, when they are not given
in addition to or as an incident of some other special equitable relief, unless under special circumstances the exercise of such jurisdiction may be
requisite to promote the ends of justice.''

Wimer v. Wagner, 323 Mo. 1156, 20 S. W. (2d) 650,
79 A. L. R. 1231, was a suit for specific performance, decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1929. It
holds:
''The rule that equity, having once become
possessed of a cause, will retain it for the purpose
of administering full and complete relief, does
not apply when the facts relied on to sustain the
equity jurisdiction fail of establishment.''
And in Marks v. Gates, 154 Fed. 481, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said:
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'• The facts presented in the complaint are
not such as to entitle the court to retain the case
for the assess1nent of such damages as the appellant Inay haYe sustained for breach of the
contract. ...\._ court of equity will not grant pecuniary con1pensation in lieu of specific perfor1nance
unless the case presented is one for equitable interposition such as "rould entitle the plaintiff to
performance but for intervening facts, such as
the destruction of the property, the conveyance
of the san1e to an innocent third person, or the
refusal of the Yendor 's wife to join in a conveyance.'' (Citing authorities.)
There are, in fact, no intervening facts in the case
at bar. It must be assumed that all of the plaintiffs knew
the character of the community in which they lived. They
may have chosen to call it a residential community, but
you cannot change the character of a community by
calling it one thing or the other. There was no ground
here for equitable cognizance, and it is submitted there
is no ground for legal cognizance. In practically all of
the cases above discussed taken from the opinion of the
Court in the Kins1nan case, there was no issue raised as
to a misjoinder of parties or causes of action, as there
is in the case at bar. All of the facts which have been
developed by the evidence, both before the filing of the
supplemental complaint and after, should come before a
jury if the matter is to be tried as an action at law.
Each plaintiff should be required to bring his own action,
and stand upon his own feet. The idea of trying an
action as if it were strictly equitable in its nature, and
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then, after the completion of the trial, transforming it
into a law action, certainly cannot be commended.
All of the evidence admitted by the Court prior to
the filing of the supplemental complaint in the equity proceedings was considered by the Court in determining the
issues raised by the supplemental complaint. The Kinsman case, when read and thoroughly considered, is not
an authority for the contention made by the plaintiffs
that they may try their case as they have tried it, contending at every point that it was a suit in equity and
not one for damages; that they might proceed up to the
point where the Court was ready to sign findings of fact,
conclusions of law and decree and then, upon motion,
have the Court re-open the cause, amend the complaint
and transform it into a suit for damages. Such a consideration of the Kinsman case makes inevitable the following conclusions :
1. That portion of the op1n1on of Chief Justice
Frick which reads:
''A majority of the court doubt both the
propriety and the necessity of enforcing the alternative relief suggested in the quotations fron1
Pomeroy. Therefore, both Justice Gideon and
myself defer to their judgment and have yielded
assent to the statement as stated"
makes it extremely doubtful in the mind of the writer
whether the opinion can be considered as an authority
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for the proposition that 'vhere an injunction is denied
as a matter of right, a Court of equity may still retain
the case and assess damages caused by the alleged nui-·
sance.

2. Does not the Kins,rnan case, if accepted as authority for the proposition that a court of equity may retain
a cause, 'vhere an injunction is denied as a matter of
right, and assess the damages as a matter of law, constitute a severance of each plaintiff from every other
plaintiff, and thereby transform one action into fifty-nine
separate actions~ (There were fifty-nine plaintiffs in the
Kinsman case.)
It will be noticed in the opinion of Justice Frick that
he says:
''Nor does such procedure affect the right of
appeal of any one or all of the parties to the
action. In actions where the rights of the parties
are separate, but where they join in one action,
to avoid a multiplicity of suits or for some other
good reason, each one may prosecute an appeal
independently.''

(He also discussed the right of the defendant to appeal as
to any one or more or all of the plaintiffs.)
3. Has it ever been supposed that merely because
many persons have been separately injured in one accident, or by reason of one wrong, in order to avoid a
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multiplicity of actions all the persons thus injured could
join~ Is such a test an accurate one by which to determine the right of plaintiffs to join in one suit~
The cases cited and relied upon by Justice Gideon,
to-wit: Robinson vs . .Appleton, 124 Ill. 238, 15 N. E. 761;
Browder vs. Phinney, 30 Wash. 74, 70 Pac. 264; Waite v.
O'l~leil, 72 Fed. 348; Waite v. O'Neil, 76 Fed. 408; Combs
v. Scott, 76 Wis. 664, 45 N. W. 532; Goddard v. American
Queen, 59 N. Y. S. 46, are each and all, with only one
possible exception, predicated upon the doctrine that
equity would have granted relief except for an intervening right, and did not involve multiplicity of parties
plaintiff or misjoinder of causes of action. Furthermore,
in the Kinsman case the finding of a nuisance by the
Court was sustained by the evidence. In the case at bar
it is not.
In Browder v. Phinney, supra, the action was one for
damages based upon the ground that the defendant had
wrongfully evicted the plaintiffs from certain leased
premises. It appeared that the plaintiffs were put in
possession in October, 1899 ; that they paid rent for the
months of October and November, and said rent was
accepted by said defendant; that on the 12th day of
January, 1900, they were evicted from the premises. The
contract or lease upon which they relied was claimed to
be invalid in law, because it was not acknowledged, and
it was claimed that the facts showing part performance
of the contract could be enforced in equity but could not
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be sho'"~ in an action at la\v. For this reason upon motion of the defendant, the action was dismissed. The Suprenle Court of
ashington held that the Court was
empo,vered to try all of the features of the action and
that it \vas a question for the jury whether there was
sufficient testimony to establish part performance.

'T

If the case at bar were a case by a single plaintiff,
then the ele1nent of misjoinder would be eliminated,
but the question of a right to a jury trial would still be
present. In the 'Vashington case there was no question
of misjoinder. The action was one at law and was being
tried before a jury. In the case at bar all the evidence
has been taken before the Court without a jury.
Under the Dahl case, the plaintiffs have no right
to recover in an action at law, and it is well settled that
the equitable principle of retaining jurisdiction has no
application to a case where there is no right to recover
either at law or in equity. Hennessy v. City of Boston
(Mass.), 164 N. E. 470, 62 A. L. R. 780.
4.

To summarize the foregoing contentions, defendant
claims:
1. Plaintiffs had no right to re-open their case, and
an order allowing them to re-open it is an abuse of
discretion and constitutes reversible error.
2. The suit as originally commenced and tried was
one in equity. The right to join could exist only in equity.
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Equity jurisdiction has failed. To transform the action
now into one at law is not supported by any legal or
equitable rule of procedure.
3. To permit the case to be reopened and the action
to be determined as one at law for damages denies the
defendant's right to insist upon a misjoinder of parties
plaintiff, a misjoinder of causes of action, and denies
defendant's right to a jury trial.
To sustain the decree in this case would not only
permit every nuisance suit instituted to follow the same
procedure, but would invite this practice. Such a practice would forever defeat every future defendant's right
to a trial by jury in a nuisance action. There is hardly a
nuisance conceivable affecting more than one person which
would not lend itself to such treatment. Such a practice,
once established, would be a departure from due process
of law, and violative of the basic and constitutional rights
of litigants.

Multiplicity of Suits Alone Does Not Justify
Equitable Interference
The mere fact that eleven plaintiffs have a community of interest in the questions of law and fact presented
by this controversy will not warrant the interposition of
equity.
The case of Tribette v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 70
Miss. 182; 35 Am. St. 642, 12 So. 32, 19 L. R. A. 660,
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is one of the leading authorities of the country. If it is
the position of the plaintiffs that mere multiplicity of
suits can justify the Court in retaining jurisdiction of
this case, and determining the right of each individual
plaintiff to recover damages as against the defendant,
then the Tribette case is a complete answer to that position.
Cunzberland v. Willianzson, 57 So. 559, was decided
in 1912. The Supreme Court of Mississippi again reviewed the contention to be found in so1ne of the editions
of Mr. Pomeroy's work on Equity Jurisprudence, and
refused to accept that doctrine.

See also Turner v. City of Mobile, 135 Ala. 73, 33 So.
132. In this case the Supreme Court of Alabama, speaking through Chief Justice McClellan, reviews what is
known as the doctrine of multiplicity of suits and holds:

''Where several persons hold tracts of land
under different titles, and there is no privity between them, but a person brings an ejectment suit
against each of them, plaintiff's cause of action
in each depending on the same state of facts and
principles of law, there is no ground for equity
jurisdiction to prevent a multiplicity of suits.''
In the course of the opinion Chief Justice McClellan
says:
"We have considered the position of Mr.
Pomeroy on this question thus at length because
the views of no text-writer of the law are entitled
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to more consideration than his, because his work
is the authority mainly relied upon by the appellants in this connection, and because we are disinclined to repudiate any proposition advanced
by him without a thorough examination of it."
When it is remembered that Chief Justice McClellan at one time said in substance that the only place
he had disagreed with Pomeroy was upon this question,
then the force of the Alabama opinion is made manifest.
He quotes Judge
Cooley's quotation may
sentence: ''Suits do not
because of their number

Cooley very extensively, but
be summed up in one pointed
become of equitable cognizance
merely.''

The Alabama Court also quotes Judge Nelson of the
Federal bench in part as follows:
''There is scarcely a suit at law or in equity
which settles a principle, or applies a principle
to a given state of facts, or in which a general
statute in interpreted, that does not involve a
question in which other parties are interested, as,
for instance, the doctrine of trusts, and the statutes of descents, of frauds, of wills, and the like;
yet no lawyer would contend that such an interest
would justify the joinder of parties as plaintiffs,
in cases arising under the law of trusts, or under
any of the statutes mentioned. The same may be
said of questions arising under the revenue laws,
such as the tariff and the excise laws, which are
the subject of litigation in the courts almost daily.
Large classes of persons other than the parties to
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the suit are interested in the questions involved
and deter1nined. To allow them to be 1nade parties
to the suit 'Yould confound the established order
of judicial proceedings, and lead to endless perplexity and confusion. ' '
Justice

~IcClellan

hin1self says:

''It is a palpable non sequitur to say that
when numerous persons have like, but independent, legal estates or legal rights in respect of
which severally they have no right to invoke the
jurisdiction of chancery, yet because they are
numerous, the separate legal right of each is
metamorphosed into an equity right in all, or in
one for all.''
He points out that when each plaintiff has a right
to come into equity on some identical ground, then
several plaintiffs having this common right would be
allowed to come in together, on the theory of multiplicity
of suits, but it does not follow that merely because plaintiffs are numerous, or the suits are many, because
of the multiplicity, equity jurisdiction has been created.
It is submitted that to try the issue between the
defendant and the individual owners of the eleven different tracts of land in one action cannot result otherwise
than in confusion and injustice. This could not be demonstrated more clearly than by the results reached in
this case.
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Neither Plaintiffs' Rights nor lnju·ries Are Common
These properties are in some instances located on
the east, in some on tlie west, in some on the north and
in some on the south of the defendant's plant. Some of
the properties constitute tracts of considerable size and
others are small. Some of these tracts are improved;
others are not improved; some are in close proximity to
the plant, others more than three-quarters of a mile
distant. One of the properties may be subjected to some
odor when the wind is blowing from the plant and toward
that property, whereas the other properties at that time
may not get any odor at all. Some of the properties may
have a large amount of fertilizer upon the properties,
creating an odor as bad as any that could be produced
by the rendering plant. The odors at the worst are
intermittent and cannot affect all of these tracts at one
and the same time.
Going to the owners, some of the owners have had
a pecuniary interest in industrializing the particular tract
whereon the plant is located. Others participated in its
operation and construction. The defenses as to one party
may be no damage at all, whereas, the strongest defense
against some might be in the nature of estoppel. There
is, however, one defense common to all, and that is the
case of Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Company, supra. Under
that decision there could be no recovery at law; certainly
none in equity.
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It 'vould be strange doctrine to believe that the plaintiffs could join together and make an untruthful allegation to the effect that the community was strictly residential and have the evidence show that this allegation
\vas not sustained by the proof, and then have that unsupported allegation continue in its use and only by
the Court's contrary finding serve as a basis for giving
legal relief. This would be one of the most anomalous
positions that was ever insisted upon in a court. Its
novelty, however, is exceeded by its want of merit.
With such several rights and injuries and defenses
there can be no joinder either in equity or at law.

Persons Owning Distinct Property Interests in Severalty
Cannot Bring a Joint Action to Recover Damages
for a Nuisance.
The reason for this rule is that they have no common
interest either in the object of the suit or in the amount
to be recovered. Some of the cases already cited support
our contention. Merely because there are numerous
plaintiffs, or there may be a multiplicity of suits, or, as
one judge put it, a "bundle of separate suits", is no
sufficient reason for permitting a joinder, either at law
or in equity.
As Mr. Justice Peckham said, speaking for the
United States Supreme Court in Hale v. Allinson, 188
U. S. 56, 47 L. Ed. 380:
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"It might be that the exercise of equitable
jurisdiction on this ground'' (referring to multiplicity of suits), "while preventing a formal multiplicity of suits, would nevertheless be attended
with more and deeper inconvenience to the defendants than would be compensated for by the
convenience of a single plaintiff.''
One learned author has referred to bills of complaint
of this character as '' spurious bills of peace.'' We know
that each plaintiff must make his own case upon the
facts. One might succeed and another fail, and to perrnit
persons so severally interested to join in either a legal or
equitable suit would confound the established order of
judicial proceedings and lead to interminable confusion
and embarrassment.
In Bliss on Code Pleading, Third Edition, Sec. 76,
the following is found:
''This permissive union of parties is limited
by the terms of the rule. All who would unite
must be interested in the subject of the action and
in the relief. It may not be possible to define with
absolute precision the phrase ''subject of the action', which is used in different parts of the Code,
but we may say, in general, that it is the matter
or thing concerning which the action is brought,
and though one may be interested in that matter,
unless he is also interested in the relief which is
sought by another, he is not permitted to unite
with him.
''Thus, to take the cases which have been
cited, two or more owners of mills propelled by
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water are interested in preventing an obstruction
above that shall interfere with the downflow of
the "Tater, and 1nay unite to restrain or abate it
as a nuisance; but they cannot hence unite in an
action for dan1ages, for, as to the injury suffered,
there is no con1munity of interest. There is no
more a co1nmon interest than though a carrier
had, at one time, carelessly destroyed property
belonging to different persons, or the lives of
different passengers. The abatement or prevention of the nuisance involves but a single judgment, in obtaining which all the mill-owners are
interested, and by 'vhich they are all benefited;
but to enable them to unite in an action for their
several damages, there must be some connectionsomething in which they have a common interest.''

Nahate v. Hanson, 106

~finn.

365, 119 N. W. 55

(1908) :

''All persons whose property is affected by
a nuisance, though they own the property in
severalty, may unite in an action to abate the
nuisance; but they cannot join with a cause of
action for that relief their several claims for
damages, in which there is no joint or common
interest.''
The Court in its opinion said:
"But plaintiffs have no joint or common interests in the damages sustained, and it is clear
that their separate claims in that respect cannot
be joined with the cause of action for the equitable relief, in which they do have a joint and common interest.''
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In Foreman v. Boyle, 88 Cal. 290, 26 Pac. 94 (1891)
under a code identical with that of Utah, the plaintiff
Foreman, owning a tract of land in which his co-plaintiff
had no interest, joined with another plaintiff Rogers
and brought suit against the defendants because the
defendants had diverted the waters being used by both
of the plaintiffs. Foreman owned water and land and
Rogers owned water and land, but neither plaintiff had
any interest in the water or land or ditch of the other.
The Supreme Court of California laid down the rule
that the plaintiffs had no common interest in the damages, and that they could not unite in an action for
damages, saying:
''Two or more owners of mills propelled by
water are interested in preventing an obstruction
above that shall interfere with the down flow of
water, and may unite in its restraint or abate it
as a nuisance, but they cannot hence unite in an
action for damages, for as to the injury suffered
there is no community of interest.''
This is a quotation from Bliss on Code Pleading, Sec. 76.

Barham v. Hostetter, 67 Cal. 274, 7 Pac. 689 (1885)
was an action brought by eleven plaintiffs to restrain
the alleged diversion of the waters of a certain creek by
the defendant and for damages for such alleged diversion. One plaintiff was alleged to be the sole owner of
60 acres of land affected by the d-eprivation of the water
caused by the defendant; two plaintiffs were alleged to be
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joint owners of 40 acres; another plaintiff of 100 acres ;
another plaintiff of 60 acres ; another plaintiff of 20
acres, and so on until it '\vas shown by the complaint that
each of the plaintiffs owned some particular tract of
land. The Supreme Court of California said:
''The cause of action for dan1ages is not joint
as to all the plaintiffs, but undoubtedly several;
it is joined with a cause of action for an injunc ..
tion which is common to all the plaintiffs.''
The Court then quoted the section above cited from
Bliss. This case is authority for the proposition that a
cause of action for injunction which is common to all
the plaintiffs cannot be joined with a cause of action
for damages which is not joint as to all the plaintiffs but
is undoubtedly several.
It may be helpful to consider the nature of the two
theories upon which the suit in equity for abatement
rests on the one hand and the action for damages rests,
upon the other hand. Evidently the plaintiffs claimed
that the defendant was guilty of maintaining a nuisance
which could be abated or suppressed by a court of equity.
It was claimed by the plaintiffs that the operation of this
rendering plant polluted the air with offensive odors
injurious to health. The Court's findings disclose no
irreparable injury to any plaintiff. The Court does find
common law damages to the lands of plaintiff but no
justification for the joinder.
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Forms of Action Not Abolished by Code

Section 104-7-3, Utah Statutes 1933, in part provides:
''Plaintiffs may unite in the same complaint
several causes of action, legal or equitable or
both," etc.
Section 104-9-5 provides in part:
''A defendant 1nay set forth by answer as
many defenses or counterclaims, legal or equitable or both, as he may have'', etc.
All through the code of Utah and all through the
decisions that have been rendered in construing and
applying that code this Court has recognized what was
known as a suit in equity, and made marked distinctions
between such suits and actions at law, generally holding
that the equitable issues shall be determined before entering upon a trial of the legal issues.
In 1878 Philemon Bliss gave to the bench and the
bar his work upon Code Pleading, and in 1887 he published a second edition. In 1894 a third edition was
published by Elias F. Johnson. In Section 10 he says:
"We have seen that in the States adopting
the New York system, except Kentucky, Arkansas, Iowa and Oregon, the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity are abolished,
either directly or by providing that there shall be
but one form of action. Is the distinction, in
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fact, abolished, and \Yas it necessary to expressly
retain equity jurisdiction in the States named~
''The expression i8 not a happy one, for it
is not easy to see hovv it is possible to abolish
the distinction bet,Yeen these two classes of actions. One or the other may be abolished. The
la\Y-mahing power may say that suitors shall no
longer be entitled to equitable relief-that is, that
hereafter they shall be allowed to sue only for
money or for specific property; or, on the other
hand, that they shall be entitled to equitable relief only-that is, that they may sue for the specific performance of a contract, but not to recover
damages for its breach. But it cannot abolish
the distinction between the two actions; and if
both these remedies continue to be allowed, the
distinction remains. That it does remain is clear.
The codes provide for trial by jury of substantially the same issues as were so triable before
their adoption-that is, issues of fact in actions
for the recovery of money or of specific real
or personal property. This provision covers all
the issues of fact in common-law actions, and
probably a few others; as, where it formerly became necessary to resort to equity to recover a
money debt. They also provide that every other
issue-that is, in addition to issues at lavv, those
which formerly were tried by the chancellor-shall
be tried by the court. Thus the chief distinction between actions at law and suits in equity
is preserved. The distinctions abolished are
simply those which formerly existed between the
two classes of actions in the manner of stating
the facts, in the style of the writ, and the mode
of submitting evidence; those which arise from
the mode of trial and from the nature of the reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lief are as marked as before. * * * Legislation may
affect modes of procedure; it will be found more
difficult to reform a language.''
In Park v. Wilkinson, 21 Ut. 279, 60 Pac. 945 (1900)
the Court said :

"The equitable issues should be first passed
upon by the court, for upon such determination
as to the relief claimed by a defendant will the
necessity of proceeding with the action at law
depend.''
No one can successfully contradict the proposition
that the Code of Civil Procedure, especially in Utah and
in California, abolished forms but retained substance,
and the distinction between law and equity is one of
substance rather than form .. Some court (in Utah the
District Court) has the general jurisdiction to grant or
award either legal or equitable relief. Litigants seeking
such relief all enter the court by the same door. Any
litigant may invoke such court's general power to grant
either or both kinds of relief, but legal relief has not
been made synonymous with equitable relief, and, as
Judge Bliss well said in the section above quoted: ''If
both of these remedies continue to be allowed, the distinction remains. ''
In the note 19 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1075, there is con-

tained a discussion of the effect of code provisions. That
note reads:
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'"The effert of statutory changes providing
for the granting of judgments at lR\V and equitable
relief by the same tribunal, and abolishing distinctions in the for1n of pleadings, 1nay be best
traced in detail in the decisions hereinafter set
forth. It 1nay here be stated, however, that the
inherent distinctions between actions at la'v and
suits in equity are still recognized; and the effect,
broadly stated, of such statutory changes, is to
permit the retention of a case in which the allegations of the co1nplaint to which an answer has
been filed disclose, in addition to a claim for
equitable relief, the existence of a cause of action
at law.
''But "'here the complaint, as framed, discloses onl!~ a cause of action in equity, the court
cannot, upon denying equitable relief, enforce
a legal right disclosed by the proof.''
On Page 1077 the same author says:

"But an allegation of grounds in plaintiff's
complaint for equitable relief and nothing else,
where proof of such grounds fails, does not permit
the court to try without a jury a cause of action at
law appearing to arise out of the transaction.''

Park v. Minneapolis Ry. Co., 114 Wis. 347, 89 N. W.

532:
"It must not be overlooked, that, as a gen-eral rule, legal rights should be enforced in a court
of law, where the constitutional right to trial by
jury is preserved. Only in exceptional cases,
where unnecessary hardship clearly demands,
should courts of equity assume that province.''
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In Schroeder v. Ennis, 5 N. & S. R. 881, it was said:

"It was argued that the court, having once
obtained equitable jurisdiction of the case, should
retain it for the purpose of deciding all the questions and doing justice between the parties. If
this be so, all that a party need do, to transfer
his litigation to a court of equity, is to allege
grounds of equitable jurisdiction, and, upon the
trial, come in with a purely legal cause of action
or defense. It must be the facts, and not the
allegations, which call upon the court to exercise
its equity jurisdiction."

Gentry v. Gentry, 90 Fla. 595, 106 So. 473, on p.
477 the Court says:
''All grounds of equitable jurisdiction having
been properly denied and eliminated, the court
was not justified in decreeing that the appellee
be restored to the offices of president and director,
nor in adjudicating his right to recover the full
amount of his salary from October 1, 1922, to the
date of the decree. This was not germane, nor
incidental to any ground of equitable jurisdiction
existing in the case; all such having been extinguished. * * * The appellee should have been relegated to his legal remedies as to recovery of salary and as to restoration to office."
It is not believed it is logical for anyone to say
that the question being discussed is substantially affected
by the Code of Procedure. That Code, of course, has
never been applicable to federal courts, and yet federal
courts have gone quite as far in administering what is
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known as ''alternative legal relief'' as have any of the
state courts.
Where equitable and legal remedies are granted by
the same court, then as between a single plaintiff and a
single defendant, if, after failure to prove the allegations of a complaint 'vhich would give equity jurisdiction,
enough still remains in that complaint to make out a
cause of action at law, and there is sufficient evidence
to sustain it, the Court should not dismiss the action. It
should give either party an opportunity to demand a
jury trial, and if such jury is demanded it should retain
the case and try it before a jury. If a jury trial is
waived by both parties, then under such circumstances
the Court would have both a power and a duty to render
judgment for such an amount as was established by the
evidence. This is giving full effect to both the letter
and spirit of the Code of Procedure.
But where there are numerous plaintiffs, each owning separate and distinct properties and having no community of interest, except that they are all complaining
of the same alleged nuisance, and are all permitted to
join together, seeking equitable relief in the form of an
injunction, then a failure on their part to prove the
averments of their complaint that would give equity
jurisdiction is fatal to all the jurisdiction that the plaintiffs thus joined had the power to invoke, and the action
must be dismissed either by the plaintiffs themselves,
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without prejudice, or by the court with leave granted to
each plaintiff to sue at law.
If this is not true, then numerous plaintiffs may join
together eleven actions at law, and, as one judge has
said, give eleven cases one complaint and one number in
the clerk's office, and thereby deprive the defendant of
the advantages of separate trials, of all benefit of the
distinctions which exist between legal and equitable
remedies in the trial court, and then in this court materially alter the scope of its power of review. No code
has ever yet destroyed the distinctions referred to, nor
can it so long as we have legal and equitable remedies
for accomplishing the results just delineated.
Considering the rights of the plaintiffs to damages
in actions at law, or, for that matter, in any action, the
object of such matters stands out in direct contrast to
that of the object to be attained by the suit in equity for
injunction. Actions at law have for their purpose that of
compensation for injuries wrongfully inflicted. The compensatory damages, if any are found and allowed, are
not a substitute for or an incident to equitable relief,
but the defendant held liable to pay such damages is
compensating each plaintiff for the injury that the maintenance of the wrongful structure has done.

Nuisance at Law Must First Be Established
Injunctive relief should not be given, except under
exceptional circumstances and with clear and convincing
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proof of the necessity therefor, 'vithout first having the
nuisance established at law. This principle is clearly
recognized by this Court in the recent case of Norback v.

Board of Directors, supra. The Court held:
"The primary purpose of the instant case
is the establishment of an easement based upon an
alleged prescriptiYe user. If plaintiff fails in this
his cause of action fails. The right of injunctive
relief cannot come into existence until the easement has been established. This issue the plaintiff was entitled to have tried to a jury."

The Kinsman case is not cited in the majority opinion
of Justice Moffat, but is cited in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Straup and was, therefore, not overlooked by
the Court.
In the Norback case Mr. Justice Moffat, speaking
for the Court, cites with approval the case of Rhea v.

Forsyth, 37 Pa. 503, 78 Am. Dec. 441, which was an action
for injunctive relief in a court of equity, and quotes
therefrom as follows :
'' 'The American cases are very numerous to
the effect that the right of the complainant ought
to be admitted or established at law before granting an injunction. (Cases cited.) * * * Neither the
equitable jurisdiction of the court below, nor our
jurisdiction, can properly attach until the plaintiff has established his right at law. Has the alley
been in common use so long that the successors
in the title may set up the presumption of a grant 1
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If not, did the defendant dedicate it to the use of
the plaintiff's lot~ These are questions for a court
and jury to decide in an action at law.'
and continues:
"In Taylor v. Wright, 76 N. J. Eq. 121, 125,
79 A. 433, 435, we find :
'' 'If the easement here asserted by complainant exists, it arises from well-defined rules of law
and is a legal as distinguished from an equitable
estate or interest. * * * That tribunal is the proper
tribunal to determine the existence or non-existence of an easement or other legal estate in lands,
and this court cannot properly determine an issue
of that nature except to such extent as may be
necessary to prevent irreparable injury.' (Cases
cited.)
"Whether or not the law courts and the
equity courts were separate courts, the analogy
of the situation is pertinent to the issues in the
instant case. The necessity of establishing the
easement at law before equity principles or
'Equity Juris prudence,' as distinguished by Pon1eroy, may be applied to injunctive relief, is apparent, although under our procedure both may be
accomplished in the same action.''
It is submitted that such contentions as are made
in the dissenting opinion in the N orback case, and as
are made by the plaintiffs in the instant case, are based
upon an erroneous conception of the effect of the Code
of Civil Procedure. That Code was not intended to
destroy the right of trial by jury. As was said in the
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opwon in the Norback case, ''That either party to
an action at la'v has the right to trial by jury when
timely and properly demanded, is supported by the
law and the decided cases.'' ( 8-! Utah, 514.)

On the same page this Court quotes with approval
from Hansen r. Hart, 26 Ut. 229, as follows:

''It has long since been held that under our
systen1 a legal and equitable remedy may be
sought in the san1e action; but each remedy must
be governed by the same law that would apply to
it if the other remedy had not also been asked
for."
It would,be strange indeed if any Court should hold
that the Code of Civil Procedure providing ''that there
shall be but one form of civil action, and law and
equity may be administered in the same action'' (Article
VIII, Sec. 19, Utah Constitution), had the effect of
making actions equitable which had theretofore been
legal in character. It is the substance and not the form
of things that controls. It would be even stranger to
find that equity could be given jurisdiction by means of
false allegations in the pleadings, and then, having acquired jurisdiction by such means, it could determine
the strictly legal rights of the parties without regard
to their right to a trial by jury, and even in disregard of
the misjoinder of parties plaintiff.
What is said with reference to an easement in the
case quoted should be equally applicable to the case of a
nuisance such as we have in the case at bar.
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WHAT IS A NUISANCE
The Utah statute, Section 104-56-1, reads as follows:
''Anything which is injurious to health, or
indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance and the subject of an action.
Such action may be brought by any person whose
property is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance; and
by the judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or
abated, and damages may also be recovered."
Section 103-41-1 reads as follows:
"Whatever is dangerous to human life or
health, and whatever renders soil, air, water or
food impure or unwholesome, are declared to be
nuisances and to be illegal, and every person,
either owner, agent or occupant, having aided in
creating or contributing to the same, or who may
support, continue or retain any of them, is guilty
of a misdemeanor.''
Section 103-41-3 reads as follows :
''A public nuisance is a crime against the order and economy of the state, and consists in unlawfully doing any act, or omitting to perform any
duty, which act or omission either:
(1) Annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health or safety of three or more
persons; or,
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(Applied: Dahl v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 262 P. 269, 71 U. 1)
( 2)

Offends public decency; or

(3) Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or
tends to obstruct, or renders dangerous for passage, any lake, stream, canal or basin, or any
public park, square, street, or highway; or,

( 4) In any way renders three or more persons insecure in life or the use of property.''

These various sections codify and attempt to define
what constitutes a nuisance. It is significant that in none
of these statutes does it define a nuisance as that which
depreciates the market value of lands as home sites. In
this connection it is respectfully submitted that there is
but one basis upon which the Court finds the plaintiffs
entitled to damage. In its Finding No. 4 (Abs. 395) the
Court finds :
''That by reason of such discharge of noxious
and disagreeable odors by the defendant's plant
and the carrying of such odors by movement of
the atmosphere to the lands of the plaintiffs the
market value of such lands has been depreciated
as hereinafter set out, and the said lands have
been made, and by the continued operation of defendant's plant will be made, substantially less
desirable as home sites.''
and in Finding No. 5 the court finds that these

odor~

''are sufficiently intense and obnoxious to injure
each of the plaintiffs by making their lands sub-
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stantially less desirable as dwelling places and
substantially less attractive to tenants and prospective purchasers of farms or home sites.''
and in Finding No. 6 :
''That purchasers of farm lands, such as the
lands described in plaintiffs' supplemental complaint, are usually desirous of acquiring lands
upon which homes can be maintained and the
frequently recurring presence of obnoxious odors
such as are discharged from defendant's plant
depreciates the market value of farm lands adjacent to such plant.''
This Finding No. 6 is purely gratuitous on the part
of the lower Court. No pleadings are to be found in the
case raising any such issue, and no evidence is adduced
from which the Court could properly find that purchasers
of farm lands are usually desirous of acquiring lands
upon which homes can be maintained. This, it is submitted, is not a finding of fact but a conclusion on the
part of the Court, a conclusion in effect that people
generally would seek out property of this nature contiguous to railroad rights of way for the building of homes.
This Court will take judicial knowledge of the fact that
there are many farm lands so located that the owners or
tenants prefer to live in the town and go and come from
the farm as the industry of the farm requires, rather
than to make the farm their home.
These findings clearly indicate that the Court found
nothing more in this action upon which to predicate dan1-
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ages than a depreciation in the market value. In light
of the foregoing statutes of this State, it is submitted
this does not in and of itself constitute a nuisance. It
is no n1ore possible to recover from a neighbor on the
ground that 'Yhat the neighbor la,yfully does upon his
land depreciates the market value of the land in the
vicinity than it is possible for the person who so uses
his land to increase the market value of the community
can recover from those benefited an amount equal to the
increase in the market value of their lands. Land owners
n1ust in the very nature of things accept the unearned
depreciation in lands as well as the unearned increment.
The lower Court has wholly ignored the fact that
with the coming of industry into a community such as the
one in question, the plaintiffs have actually been benefited by this new industry, not only so far as the health
and sanitation of the community are concerned, but likewise from the standpoint of employment and from the
standpoint of the use and occupancy of such homes as
are built in the vicinity of industry by the industrial
workers. The Court does not find damages in this case
because of injury to health, quoting the words of the
statute, or because of anything that is indecent or offensive to the senses or because of an obstruction to
the free use of property, or because of an interference
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, and
those are the only elements for which the first statute
provides; nor does the Court predicate damages upon
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anything which is dangerous to human life or health or
renders the soil or the air or the water or food impure
or unwholesome, as provided in the second section of the
statute above quoted; nor have damages been awarded
because of any public offense peculiarly injuring these
plaintiffs. Throughout these statutes, the term ''use of
property" is used, but nowhere "sale of property", so
that the lower Court has gone entirely beyond the terms
and scope of these statutes to find its basis of damage.
Society could not exist if the peculiar tastes and dispositions of individuals were taken into consideration
and given recognition by the law. There is scarcely a
human activity that does not in one sense annoy some
individual who comes in contact with that activity. There
are many noises and odors that are unpleasant to everyone, and yet life cannot exist without human beings coming into the presence of such odors. It all depends upon
the places and circumstances under which they are encountered as to whether it is reasonable to endure them
or not. When one goes into ·a slaughter house he does
not expect to go into the same atmosphere that he would
expect to find in the quiet of a refined library. Defendant's plant, it is respectfully submitted, is entirely proper
and in place in the midst of stock feeding corrals and is
necessarily incident to the business of stock raising and
feeding.
The law of nuisance proceeds on the theory that one
man must so use his property as not to inflict injury upon
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owners 1n their use of other property. If industrial
workers, by making their homes near industry, could
transform the con1munity from industrial to residential
by virtue of their so establishing their homes, as John
Anderson undertakes to do in this action, industry could
be con1pletely destroyed by these same workers having
the industry declared a nuisance because of their homes
which they built with their wages earned in the industry.
Compare the situation presented in the Dahl case by
the Utah Oil Refining Company plant, within the city
limits of Salt Lake City, within a thousand feet of the
St. Marks Hospital, an institution to promote and restore
the health of those who are suffering physically. Can any
reason be found why the law of this State, as declared
in the Dahl case, should not likewise protect this defendant. Judge Cherry, in his opinion, says :
''There is no claim that the defendant, by any
careless or extraordinary or unnecessary use of
its property, produces the injury complained of.
The sole ground of complaint is that offensive
and disagreeable fumes or odors emanate from
the refinery and are carried through the air to the
plaintiff's house. It is admitted that the odors are
not constant and are not injurious to life or
health, and it is obvious that they cause no direct
or physical injury to property. The extent of the
offense claimed is that the odors are disagreeable
and unpleasant and have at times wakened persons sleeping in plaintiff's house and required
them to shut doors and windows. In these circumstances we are unable to say as a matter of
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law that a case of unreasonable use or actionable nuisance was made out.'' (Citing authorities)
''No precedent for sustaining liability under similar circurnstances has been cited, and we have
found none. The essential facts ·with respect to
the nature, locality, and manner of use of defendant's plant, and the situation with reference thereto of the plaintiff's house, and the degree and
extent of the plaintiff's annoyance and discomfort,
are so clear that the question presented is one
of law. We therefore conclude that the trial
court erred in not directing a verdict for defendant and in denying defendant's motion for a ne'v
trial.''
It is well to remember that this Dahl case was a law
case tried before a jury, and was predicated upon the
depreciation of the value of plaintiff's property as a
place to live. The plaintiff in that action had not engaged
in any industry, as have the plaintiffs in the suit at
bar. The property of the plaintiff was a city home,
located on a city lot. This Court had no discretion, but
was bound strictly by the rules of law that required the
evidence to be in such a condition as. to permit of but
one conclusion in the minds of reasonable men, and yet
this Court, having that rule of law in mind, was compelled
to reverse the trial Court for not directing a verdict in
favor of the defendant. When this is fully appreciated,
then the power. of the Dahl case is manifest. Surely it
will not be contended that it takes less evidence to establish a nuisance in equity than it does at law. The rule

is clearly settled to the contrary. One must prove the
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existence of a nuisance, and he n1ust prove every element
that is required for recovery on the law side of the
court, and then only is he entitled to proceed with the
necessary additional proof to recover in any wise in
equity.
First Establish Nui.sance at Law Before
Seek,ing Equitable Relief
The rule that a litigant must first establish his claim
to damages at la\Y before seeking equitable relief is still
as salutary a rule as it ever was, regardless of the fact
that some courts have not adhered strictly to this rule.
See case of Norback v. Board of Directors, 84 Utah 506.

In the Dahl case Mr. Justice Cherry cited with approval Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co., 251 Mass. 479, 146
N. E. 787 (1925). 190 plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
maintained in the City of Everett a nuisance by reason
of causing the emission of noisome and offensive gases
and odors and by reason of the occurrence of loud and
violent explosions and frequent and dangerous fires, all
of which acts and conditions were alleged to have been
done in the conduct of its business. Those plaintiffs
sought an injunction and an assessment of damages as
a result of the alleged nuisance. Testimony was taken
before a master and it was finally reviewed by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.
It is submitted that one cannot read this case without coming to the conclusion that the finding in the case
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at bar must be for the defendant. When one compares it
with the Dahl case he will be forced to the conclusion,
however, that the Dahl case is a stronger authority than
is the Strachan case, for the reason that in the Dahl case
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the
verdict of a jury, whereas in the Strachan case the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts merely affirmed
the findings of the lower court.

If the coming of the railroad, the brick yards, the
pea vinery, the sugar factory, the flour and alfalfa mills,
the beet dump and the loading racks, the stock feeding
yards and the other industrial activity testified to does
not to some extent alter the character of a community or
determine its character as industrial rather than residential, then it is difficult to see ·how this small rendering plant of the defendant could change the character
of the community in the slightest respect, or disturb the
residential character of the same. Compare the slight
effect this little plant has upon the community as com,,

pared to the steel plant at Springville or the industries
that have grown up incident thereto in a community
which a few years ago was given over to farms and
small industries such as now exist in the vicinity of de ..
fendant's plant.
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Mere Diminut,ion in the r·ahte of Property, Without
Irreparable Mischief, Will Not Furnish Any
Foundation for Equitable Relief.
. .~re we not to be bound by an authority so well
established as Story ·s Equity Jurisprudence, when he
declares the law to be
~'So

a mere diminution of the value of
property by the nuisance without irreparable mischief will not furnish any foundation for equitable
relief.''
(2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 1253, 13th Ed.):

To apply this rule to the case at bar entirely defeats the
Court's finding of nuisance. If no nuisance exists there
is no equitable jurisdiction, and no jurisdiction to retain
the case for the purpose of awarding damages, a subject
upon which appellant elsewhere herein addresses itself.
The case of Biber v. O'Brien, 32 Pac. (2d) 425, Dist.
Ct. of Appeal, Cal., 1934, is cited because it is a rather
thorough discussion of that phase of the law which relates to apartment houses and hotels in cities and as they
affect residential property. It was presented to the
Court by some of the ablest members of the California
bar. One portion of the opinion is applicable to one
viewpoint that may be taken of the case at bar. The
Court said:
''As hereinbefore stated, an individual complaining of an unlawful structure must show that
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he has suffered some exceptional damage other
than that suffered by the public generally. An
increase in fire hazard or in insurance rates has
been generally held not to constitute such damage." (Citing authorities) "Nor will the fact
alone that property will be depreciated in value by
the mere proximity of an unlawful structure have
that effect."
It should be remembered that there is not a particle
of evidence from which it might be inferred or found
that any of the plaintiffs' property has been damaged
in any respect by odors or fumes. None of the plant or
animal life that exists on any of the plaintiffs' property has been affected in any way.
As appellant reads the Dahl case, its effect is not
confined alone to an industrial section, but rather lays
down the rule as applicable in any situation where the
activities of the defendant complained of are a reasonable use, in view of the nature of the locality. There
is no evidence to show the unreasonableness of maintaining a rendering plant in a stock feeding area. Whether
we classify stock feeding as agricultural or industrial,
we can with the same propriety designate defendant's
activity by the same name. Its business is an incident
to the raising and particularly the feeding and fattening
of livestock. To talk about maintaining residences up
and down the stock-feeding area of Utah County contiguous to the main lines of the Oregon Short Line Railroad and the Rio Grande Railroad is to talk about temporary maintenance. These lands and these homes are
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.,

awaiting the coming of the industry which their owners,
as well as everybody else, hope to see come. The o'\vners, of
course, desire to get something in the way of income to
pay taxes and make "ThateYer use they can of these properties until the time arrives when the properties may be applied to an appropriate and beneficial use that will yield
returns justifying the amount of money invested in such
properties. If it were not for the future hopes of industry in this locality, the identical lands of the plaintiffs
would not have the value which is now claimed for them.
It is said that one must so use his own property as
not to injure another, but the law applies this maxim
with an eye to practical justice, in order to preserve order
and maintain a just equilibrium between the rights of
man and man. As one author has said:
''The problem is to discover the exact point
where such equilibrium can be maintained. This
must always be done on the particular facts of
each case since, generally speaking, there is no
inflexible criterion for determining just when an
act constitutes a nuisance.''
Chief Baron Pollock at one time said:
"I do not think that the nuisance for which
an action will lie is capable of any legal definition
which will be applicable to all cases and useful
in deciding them. The question so entirely depends
on the surrounding circumstances, the place
where; the time when; the alleged nuisance, what;
the mode of committing it, how; and the duration
of it, whether temporary or permanent.''
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Everyone knows that the taking up of a residence in
any community naturally entails some inconvenience,
and a man is not allowed to complain of little annoyances which are inseparable from the turmoil of towns
and the business which is normally pursued in their different sections.
Anyone is required to accept the consequences of
his environment, and he is also compelled to endure the
annoyances which are inseparable from the turmoil of
the locality in which he lives. This is especially true when
he helps to create the turmoil (odors), as have the plaintiffs in the community in which they live. Parties are not
allowed to stand upon extreme rights and maintain actions merely because of their peculiar tastes and sensibilities. Diminution of the value of property, even when
it is direct and substantial, and even when it is such
as can be shown by a plain witness to a plain juryman,
may be adequately redressed in an action for damages,
but does not give rise to any equitable action or any
equitable jurisdiction. In the case at bar there is no
direct injury to the property whatsoever. As was said
by Mr. Justice Cherry in the Dahl case, referring to
the odors:
"It is obvious that they cause no direct or
physical injury to property." 71 Ut. 14.
If a man lives upon land that is decidedly appropriate
for industrial and manufacturing purposes, and it is a
fact that his residence upon that land is maintained in
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anticipation of the property in the vicinity of the land
being ultimately applied and put to that use for which
it is most appropriate, then the coming of the anticipated
industries and their location cannot be complained of as
a nuisance, and it is necessary that he should suffer the
consequences of the operation of those industries which
may be carried· on in his in1mediate locality. Those industries are actually necessary for trade and commerce
and for the enjoyment of the very property upon which
he lives, and for the benefit of the inhabitants of the
community in which he lives and the public at large. He
has no ground of complaint because he cannot have the
quiet of a hermitage.
In fact, the value of property depends upon the use
to whlch it may be put. It is only as communities are
settled and become intensely populous that the value of
property may be said to increase. Property peculiarly
appropriate for industrial and manufacturing purposes,
even though used for residential purposes, cannot be
irrevocably and irretrievably held for such residential
purposes. There is a place for residences and there is
a place for industrial concerns, as well as stock yards,
stock feeding and fattening, and stock raising.

Actionable Nuisance
There is not and has not been any actionable nuisance established by the evidence for which equitable relief in the way of an injunction or legal relief in the
way of damages may be awarded. The lower Court canSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not confer upon itself equitable jurisdiction by a finding
of nuisance and then avoid the necessity of recognizing it on the ground of laches, when in fact the evidence
discloses no actionable nuisance at all. In making this
contention the appellant desires to establish the fact
that the lower Court should have permitted the cases of
Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 71 Ut. 1, and Norback v.
Board of Directors, 84· Ut. 506, and Wasatch Oil Refining
Co. v. Wade, 63 Pac. (2d) 1079, to control rather than
the case of Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 53 Ut. 10,
177 Pac. 418. If there is any conflict in these cases, the
three cases first mentioned are the latest declarations of
this Court, and would take precedence over any earlier
decision, so far as it is related to the facts of this case.
The question of the kind of neighborhood was not discussed in the Kinsman case.
NATURE OF COMMUNITY
Industries such as defendant must be located where
they benefit a locality, rather than where there is no
need for the industry. They are entirely dependent on
the community for their raw materials. Defendant's
plant does not constitute a nuisance, because it is located
in a proper location.
So far as the odors are concerned, the allegations of
the amended complaint are denied, and the history of
the community, and particularly that portion of it where
the rendering plant is located, is shown. This identical
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site upon 'vhich defendant's rendering plant is located
was industrialized at least twenty years before the coming
of the defendant, and used for twenty years as the brick
yard for the to,vns and comn1unities near by. This particular place is on the outskirts, the very fringe of Benjamin, and likewise on the fringe, and a little farther
removed, from the town of Spanish Forie Most, if not
all, of these plaintiffs, and their fathers before them,
assisted in the development of this particular location as
the center of such industrial activity as 'vas to be found
in that community. The history of this community is the
same as the history of all communities up and down the
valleys of this State traversed by railroads. That land
lying in close proximity to the railroads and on the
outskirts of our towns and cities has become the industrial property. Transportation is the most vital element
with which industry is concerned. The result has been
that industry follo,vs the railroad track into the towns.
The exact number of miles from the Benjamin railroad
station to the land of the plaintiffs is not shown by the
evidence. The sugar factory is two miles closer to the
town on the railroad right of way than defendant's plant.
The pea vinery is three-quarters of a mile closer to the
town. The evidence shows that this plant of the defendant is the farthest removed of any plant of any industry
in the community. Near the railroads and in this same
vicinity there is or has been a flour mill, alfalfa mill,
railroad stock loading yards and chutes, beet loading
yards, wool loading yards and cattle feed yards.
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The plaintiffs may say that they had nothing to do
with the building of the sugar factory, although they
grow sugar beets on their lands. They may say that they
had nothing to do with the building of the pea vinery,
although they grow peas on their properties and their
cattle consume the by-products. But more than all of this,
they and their fathers before them have been making a
living off this land, feeding the crops grown and harvested off these lands and the products of the sugar
factory, pea vinery, flour and alfalfa mills to live stock
which they brought upon these lands for winter feeding.
Are we going to say, as the lower Court in effect has
said in awarding damages to these plaintiffs, that it is
an industry to operate a rendering plant in which the
losses occasioned in the stock feeding business are profitably disposed of, but it is not an industry which produces these very losses~ On the other hand, it is defendant's contention that the feeding of live stock in feed
yards in close proximity to the railroad over which the
stock can be shipped in and out, is as much an industry
as the rendering plant operated by this defendant, and
the operation of which in this same community is condemned by the lower Court.
Let us look for a moment beyond the limits of this
small community with its relatively small industries, to
a metropolitan city like Chicago. The feed yards maintained in connection with the Union Stock Yards Company of Chicago represent a tremendous industry, and
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in the heart of this industry are to be found the largest
rendering plants in the world, known the world around,
such as Armour, S'vift, l\1orris, and others. A skyscraper
has been built in the n1iddle of these feed yards to house
the army of employees required to operate this industry
in all of its ran1ifications. Appellant ventures to say
that even the respondents will not contend that stock
feeding carried on on as a large a scale as it is in Chicago
is not an industry. If this be the fact, where are we
going to draw the line~ Are we going to say that it is
not as appropriate for this defendant to have a $30,000
rendering plant in the heart of the stock feeding district
in the south end of Utah County, in a community in
which one plaintiff alone feeds more than 2,000 head of
livestock, as it is to have rendering plants worth $30,000,000 or more in a similar district in Chicago~ It is defendant's most serious representation that its rendering
plant, located where it is, is the farthest removed of any
industries from the town of Benjamin, and is an industry
naturally developed on account of the industrial activities
of these feeders of cattle, making out of their yards
and their gardens stock feeding centers, and thereby
maintaining on their own premises an industry which
would be most offensive in and of itself in any residential
section. Thus the defendant brings itself strictly within
the rule announced by this Court in the case of Dahl v.

Utah Oil Refining Company, supra. This case is purely
and simply a case of the owners and operators of one industry complaining of the operators of another, when
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the odors produced by each emanate basically from the
same source, and are equally objectionable to those who
do not appreciate the smell of livestock and its necessary
incidents.
Of the four homes that are in close proximity to the
plant, that is to say, less than seven or eight hundred
feet away from it, one home is owned by the defendant,
and two homes were built there in the days of the brick
kilns, and the natural inference is that they were built
so close thereto to accomn1oda te the employees thereof.
They have since been used to house the employees of this
defendant's plant. The fourth home has been built since
the plant was built, and to the owner and occupant of
this home the defendant has furnished employment from
time to time. The occupant of this latter home, John
Anderson, admits in his testimony that he assisted the
defendant in rebuilding its rendering plant after the
fire in 1937, and was employed in both the old and new
plants.
So far as the rest of the plaintiffs are concerned,
they are so far removed from the plant that a mere inspection of their premises alone would show that any
odors permeating their homes come from their own back
door yards, rather than from a small plant a half mile
or more away.
This community is naturally adapted to industrial
pursuits, being more sparsely settled than any vicinity

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

213

in Utah County adjacent to the railroad. This is demonstrated in the panoramic view of the surrounding
territory taken from the roof of defendant's building
and shown in Exhibits 21 to 21-G, inclusive. Much of
this land around the plant is farm land 'vithout improvements upon it, the owners living in town and
farn1ing this ground either individually or through tenants. ~Iuch of the land, as 'vill be seen from Exhibit 16,
is in the possession of others than the plaintiffs.

The defendant has constantly improved the operation of its plant. Only shortly before the trial of the
case, expert combustion engineers changed the operation of the plant so that all gases emanating from the
cooking operation, which seemed to be the main source
of the odors complained of by the plaintiffs, were either
condensed and carried off with the 'vater, or passed
through a temperature in excess of 1300 degrees and
were entirely consumed before passing into the atmosphere through the smoke stack from defendant's boilers.
The contention of the plaintiffs is that the location
of their lands is a residential district, and the contention
of appellant is that the district in which they live is industrial, including the agricultural industrial pursuits of
the plaintiffs themselves. The evidence does not disclose
the kind of a community alleged to exist in the complaint
or found by the lower Court to exist in its findings.
Not a single word of evidence was offered by anyone for the purpose of showing this community to be a
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residential community. Plaintiffs' first and really principal witness, Mr. Greer, testified that he selected the
site of defendant's plant and purchased the property
for the defendant and helped build the plant (Abs. 49,
50); that he had worked six or seven years in a rendering
plant for this defendant before he came to Spanish Fork;
that he selected this old brick yard as a suitable site
for the defendant to begin doing business; that his einployment continued until after the defendant began rendering carcasses in its plant in question ( Abs. 54).
Some of the plaintiffs themselves, particularly E.
B. Selene, an employee of l\1r. Greer now engaged in a
competitive business, and John Anderson, testified that
they had been employees of the defendant previously,
and had worked in this plant, and John Anderson testified
that he had helped to construct the new plant after the
fire. It would be idle to contend that Mr. Anderson and
~Ir.

Selene did not know the purpose fQr which the new

plant was being built, and it should be equally idle for
them to contend that they did not acquiesce in the use
of defendant's premises by defendant for the purposes
which they testified have now become offensive to them.
For these services Selene and Anderson received valuable consideration. They were willing to recognize the
lawfulness of this industry and were satisfied to have
their homes near by so long as they were employees.
This all tends to establish this locality as a proper one
for defendant's plant.
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The Supreme Court of Louisiana has decided a very
important case, Meyer v. Kemper Ice Co., 158 So. 378
(1935).
Passing oYer a portion of the opinion, we come to
subdivision n1arked '' 3'' of the opinion, reading as follo'\Ts:
''Plaintiff alleged in her petition, and the
judge of the lower court said in his written opinion, thafthis ice plant was located in an exclusively residential section of the city."
(This portion of the opinion is highly important if
one is considering the contention of the plaintiffs in the
case at bar 'Yith reference to the locality in which their
ho1nes are located being a residential community, plaintiffs appearing to have the idea that the presence of two
railroads or a pea vinery or a sugar factory or a beet
loading rack has nothing to do with determining whether
a given corrununity is residential or of some other character. Let us see what the Louisiana court has to say
on that subject. After using the language above quoted,
the opinion continues :)
''Some of the witnesses called by plaintiff said
that, but we do not find it so. The undisputed facts
are that there are some seven or eight business
houses located along Railroad A venue, which
forms the western boundary of the block in which
plaintiff's residence and the ice plant are located.
A railroad runs within 100 feet of the ice plant,
and just across the railroad within a short dis-
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tance of plaintiff's residence there is a cotton
gin and a rice mill, a sash and door factory, and
other industries. The mayor testified that Railroad Avenue is given over principally to commercial enterprises. He further testified that he considered the site selected by defendant a proper
location for an ice plant. Several witnesses testified that, while there were no business houses
located in that block on Vine or Liberty streets,
yet there are in the block more business houses
than residences.''
From an examination of this evidence the Court held
that the allegation that the plant was located in an exclusively residential section of the city was not supported
by the evidence.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana expressed the same
idea that is to be found in the opinion of Justice Cherry
in the Dahl case.
The Meyer case is direct authority, of a persuasive
character, in support of the appellant's contention that
the refining plant is not located in a community residential in character.

What Is Industrial Property as Contradistinguished
from Residential Property?
A thing either personal or real that has no value for
any purpose cannot be said to be property, and in the
language of Chief Justice Bleckley in the case of Wells
v. City of Savannah, 87 Ga. 398, 13 S. E. 442:
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''The value of property consists in its use,
and he who owns the use forever, though it be on
condition subsequent, is the true owner of the
property for the time being. This holds equally
of a city lot or of all the land in the world.''
The use to 'vhich property may be put is what gives
it a value, and in the case of real property, perhaps this
rule operates "ith greater force than in the case of personal property. The appropriate uses are often numerous and are indeed variable with the march of time, the
increase or decrease of population and the exigencies of
life.
Some horses are built for speed; others for draft
purposes. In one age the horse was ahnost a necessity.
Since the coming of the· railroad train, the automobile
and the aeroplane, he is almost a luxury.
Some land is agricultural in character, whereas other
land is mineral in character. Some streets in towns and
cities are strictly residential; others are given up to
mercantile purposes, and even these mercantile purposes
are further classified. In one part of the mercantile district you will find the wholesale houses and in another
part the retail concerns.
In some instances the character of land is to be determined by comparing its value for one purpose with its
value for another purpose. In looking over this territory
one can see that generally speaking the railroads have
run parallel to each other and in close proximity to one
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another. This was done because there was really no
other place to put them. There was Utah' Lake on the
west and the mountains on the east. In a sense, their
location was surveyed for them by nature's obstacles. We
find both of the railroads, Denver and Rio Grande R. R.
and tJnion Pacific R. R. paralleling each other in this
locality.
It was all right to pern1it dead animals to decay and
dry up \vhere they fell in the early days of the pioneers,
when farn1s were large and distances between ranches
great, but as communities grew in number and farms
and ranches diminished in size, it became just as necessary for the establishment of plants such as defendant's
plant to take care of the dead animals as for the
growth of any other industry. To this extent defendant's industry has not only been necessary for the further
growth of the community, but extremely beneficial to the
comn1unity since its initiation. This makes the location
of defendant's plant not only appropriate but legal, that
is to say, invulnerable in every respect as against the
attack made upon it on the ground that it is a nuisance.

Plaintiffs Have Acquiesced in the Use of These
Premises for Industrial Purposes
In the case at bar, as pointed out, the plaintiffs have
been actively engaged in assisting or participating in and
receiving benefits from the operation of this plant. It
does not n1ake any difference that the brick yard sold out
and went away, and defendant came. It does not n1ake
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any difference that upon analysis it can be found that
the odors produced by the one plant are different from
the odors produced by the other plant. It may be well to
examine a fe,Y authorities.
In the case of Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U. S. 368,
36 L. Ed. 738, cited in the

K~insman

case, the Court said:

''But it is unnecessary to multiply cases.
They all proceed upon the theory that laches
is not like limitation, a mere matter of time; but
principally a question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced-an inequity founded
upon some change in the condition or relations of
the property or the parties.''
In quoting from a Pennsylvania case, Justice Gideon
in his opinion in the Kinsman case approved of the following language :

''A suitor who by laches has made it impossible for a court to enjoin his adversary without
inflicting great injury upon him will be left to
pursue his ordinary legal remedy.''

In the case of Chaffee v. Telephone & Telegraph Construction Co., 77 Mich. 625, 43 N. W. 1064, 6 L.R.A. 455
(1889), the majority of the Court used the following
language:
''Failure to protest against a nuisance for a
long space of time will not prevent an action to
abate it, upon the principle that each day of its
continuance is a new nuisance; and 1nany courts
hold that the right to 1naintain a nuisance can
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never be gained by prescription. But I can find
no authority anywhere, and I should doubt its
being good law if I did find it, that will permit
a man to build by the side of these telegraph and
telephone poles and wires, without any protest
or demur whatsoever against their standing there,
when they are on his own land, and go on for
years, without finding any fault whatever, and
allow a tenant to use one of the wires for business purposes in his building, and then, when a
fire arises, and the poles are found to hinder
the firemen in their work of extinguishing it,
charge up to the corporation maintaining these
poles the loss occasioned by such fire. To do this
would be to violate one of the plainest principles
of justice; and the law, in my opinion, will not
permit it." (Italics ours.)
In Karcher v. City of Louisville, 213 Ky. 281, 281
S. W. 1010 (1926) the plaintiff sought to recover damages
from the City of Louisville for the construction, maintenance and operation of a public incinerator in close
proximity to his residence near Camp Taylor. This
incinerator was used for the burning and destruction of
dead bodies and gave off offensive and obnoxious fumes
and odors, which permeated his home and premises and
rendered them unfit for residential purposes. It was
claimed that the plaintiff, for a valuable consideration,
sold, transferred and conveyed by deed of general warranty to appellee the incinerator plant, to be used by it
for the burning and destruction of dry and wet garbage,
including dead animals gathered from the streets and
public places. The Court held:
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"If plaintiff, co1nplaining of operation of
public incinerator on property sold by his wife
to city through his own efforts, might have foreseen injury of which he complained at time of
making sales, he is not entitled to relief therefrom.''
It approved the conclusion of law made by the trial
Court, reading in part as follows :
''The owner of property or one having an
interest therein, who conveys it to another with
knowledge of the purpose for which it is purchased or the use to which it is to be applied,
is not in a position to complain that the use of
the property, bought for a specific purpose, constitutes a nuisance.''
The Court cited L. d!; N. R. Co. v. Daugherty, 36
S. W. 5, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 273 (1896). In this Daugherty
case it appeared that the railroad company had erected
a dam along its road some 80 yards from the premises
of the plaintiff Daugherty, and constructed a large pond
from which it used water in the operation of its trains.
There were two actions brought for damages, one by
Daugherty for himself and one by him and his wife
Jane. It appeared that Daugherty was active and influential in the negotiations resulting in the purchase
by the railroad company of the ground whereon the
pond was erected. The Court, among other things, said :
''If the ground on which the pond was constructed had been purchased from appellees, and
used for the purpose for which it had been
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bought, the vendors knowing that purpose, and
from the condition of the old dam and previous
accumulations of decayed matter, had reason to
believe that such accumulations would continue
or be increased by reason of the new structure,
and they yet sold the ground for that purpose,
and consented to the construction, then no action
could be maintained at all.''
In the case of Mahoney Land Co. v. Cayuga Investment Co., 88 Wash. 529, 153 Pac. 308 (1915), the Court
said:
''The direct encouragement and acquiescence
shown here as to an alleged private nuisance is
fatal to equitable as well as legal relief." (Italics
ours.)
See Huntington Land Development Co. v. Phoenix
Powder Mfg. Co., 40 W.Va. 711, 21 S. E. 1037 (1895).
In Swain v. Semans, 9 Wall. 254, 19 L. Ed. 554, the
Court said:
"Where one tacitly encourages an act he
cannot exercise a legal right contrary to such
consent to the prejudice of another.''
Now, if such is the rule relative to an encouragement which is merely tacit, then with stronger reason
it applies to those in the situation of some of these
plaintiffs, who have profited by the industrialization of
this particular site, in that they have obtained employment thereon, and have assisted in the building thereof;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

223

have benefited by the sale of animals to it and the
purchase of stock feed from it. They should not now
be heard to complain that a useful industry is being
pursued on this site.
Street, in his work on foundations of legal liability,
says:
''And one who has agreed to take part in an
operation necessitating the production of fumes
injurious to health, has no cause of action in
respect of bodily suffering or inconvenience resulting therefrom, though another person residing
near to the seat of these operations might well
maintain an action if he sustained such injuries
from the same cause."
1 Street's Foundations of Legal Liability, p. 162.

Whatever may be said of some plaintiff who took
no part in the industrialization of a community, surely
no one can believe that another may bring about such
an event, and even profit by it, and then complain about
it either in an action at law or in a suit in equity. Under
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dition, it is submitted that plaintiffs cannot recover
either jointly or severally. If any plaintiff is free of this
defense, then there is certainly a misjoinder of parties.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that for each
of the foregoing reasons, summarized as follows, the
judgment of the lower court should be set aside and the
action of the plaintiffs dismissed:
1. There is no actionable nuisance either pleaded
or proved in law or equity.
2.

The defendant's plant is properly located in an

industrial district along a railroad section industrialized
by plaintiffs themselves and their predecessors in interest.

3. The defendant's plant is surrounded by improvements placed on plaintiffs' lands by plaintiffs for use in
industries operated by the plaintiffs, which improvements are included in the damages awarded, in spite of
the fact that the defendant's industry is allied to the
industries of the plaintiffs and each is necessary to the
other.
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4.

The court erred in retaining jurisdiction and in

failing to require the plaintiffs to establish first the existence of a nuisance at law.
5. Plaintiffs' action was brought in equity to invoke
injunctive relief. Proof of a nuisance was not clear,
convincing or satisfying as required by equity in actions
invoking extraordinary equitable relief such as injunction. No equitable cause of action was proved. In spite
of the fact that a multiplicity of suits alone forms no
basis for equitable relief ,and in spite of this failure of
proof, the court improperly retained jurisdiction of
eleven separate causes of action of eleven misjoined
plaintiffs owning in severalty distinct property interests
and rendered a common law judgment for damages in
their favor.
6. Damages were given to these eleven persons upon
the sole basis of an alleged diminution of their several
property values. This basis was wrong; a mere diminution in value of property without irreparable mischief
will not furnish any foundation for equitable relief. No
irreparable mischief is alleged or proved.
7.

The only damages pleaded and proved are tem-

porary, although permanent damages are sought in the
prayer and granted by the court.
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8. If the action were considered as a suit to recover permanent damages it is barred by the Statute
of Limitations.
9. Further error In assessing the damages was
committed in the following particulars:
(a) Though the only nuisance claimed was an unpleasant odor, the judgment included permanent damages to the following properties of the plaintiffs which
for various reasons could not have been damaged by
the alleged nuisance: water rights, barns, chicken coops,
granaries, pig pens, stock yards, feed yards, corrals, and
farm lands without homes or improvements on them.
(b) The judgment rendered included permanent
damages to the pl~intiffs John Anderson, Edward Ludlow and Margaret D. Hansen, although the evidence
showed that title to the lands claimed to be injured was
not in these plaintiffs.
(c) The judgment rendered includes permanent
damage to plaintiffs who, in varying degrees, acquiesced
in, encouraged, assisted in, and benefited by the maintenance of defendant's business from its inception to
the date of suit.
(d) The judgment rendered includes permanent
damages to the plaintiffs John Anderson, Rufus Ander-
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son, Paul E. Swartz, John Angus, and Ed Selene for
injury to improvements constructed by these plaintiffs
since the operation of defendant's plant.
(e)

The judgment rendered was based upon tes-

timony awarding damages for the total difference between the value of plaintiffs' property with and without
the defendant's plant, entirely eliminating from consideration the presence of industrial factors such as the
brick yards and railroads which would be present if
defendant's plant were not operating.
(f) The judgment rendered includes permanent
damages to lands industrialized by the plaintiffs themselves and their predecessors in interest, and to improvements placed on the said lands by the plaintiffs for use
in the maintenance of these industries.
(g)

Plaintiffs neither alleged nor proved damages

of a different character special and apart from that which
the public in general sustains.
10. Whatever the theory used as a basis for the
damages awarded, these damages are excessive.
11.

The lower court erred in permitting the mis-

joinder of eleven plaintiffs and permitting an improper
uniting of eleven causes of action.

This denied to de-
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fendant its constitutional right of trial by jury, there
being no basis for equitable relief.
12.

The lower court erred in permitting the plain-

tiffs to split their causes of action:
(a)

By the amended complaint into actions In

equity for injunctive relief; and
(b) By the supplemental complaint into actions at
law for common law permanent damages.
13.

The lower court erred in preventing defendant

from fully showing by its evidence, expert or otherwise:
(a)

The industrial nature of the community;

(b)

The values at which these lands were appraised

by the State Tax Commission;
(c) The incompetency of the expert witnesses on
values offered by plaintiffs ;
(d)

The entire basis upon which plaintiffs' experts

predicated their appraisals.
14.

The court's decision IS In conflict with the

following cases, which should control: Dahl v. Utah Oil
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Refining Co., 71 Utah 1; Norback v. Board of Directors,

84 Utah 506; Wasatch Oil Ref. Co. v. Wade, 92 Utah 50.
Respectfully submitted
MOYLE, RICHARDS & McKAY,
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
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